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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN OPTIMIZATION METHODS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Markos Epitropou
Rakesh Vohra
This dissertation proposes and investigates the use of mathematical programming techniques
to solve resource allocation problems that are typically handled using other techniques. This
approach both simplifies proofs of earlier results as well as extends them.
The first setting addresses a network of agents, initially endowed with resources, exchanging
goods and services via bilateral contracts. Under full substitutability of preferences, it is
known via fixed point arguments that a competitive equilibrium exists in trading networks.
I formulate the problem of finding an efficient set of trades as a generalized submodular
flow problem in a suitable network. Existence of a competitive equilibrium follows directly
from the optimality conditions of the flow problem. This formulation enables me to perform
comparative statics with respect to the number of buyers, sellers, and trades. For instance,
I establish that if a new buyer is added to the economy, at equilibrium the prices of all
existing trades increase. In addition, a polynomial time algorithm for finding competitive
equilibria in trading networks is given.
The second setting relates to dynamic resource allocation with the presence of uncertainty
for future rewards. Prophet inequalities involve a set of results relating the reward attained
in an on-line selection setting to the reward generated by a prophet possessing perfect
information. I develop new, approximately efficient rules leveraging the reduced-form rep-
resentation of on-line selection problems. I apply the method in an on-line mechanism
design problem with verification and the on-line fractional knapsack selection problem.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
The best use of scarce resources is a primary objective of economic activity and has many
different flavors depending on the circumstances the various decisions are taken. Instantia-
tions of the resource allocation problem include production planning, scheduling, portfolio
selection, ad allocation, and labor markets. Mathematical programming frameworks have
been widely used to address resource allocation problems by providing well-defined descrip-
tions of the relevant problem. An objective function models the notion of efficiency, and a
constraint set formalizes the scarcity of resources. An algorithm for solving a mathematical
program can serve as a decision-making strategy to allocate the relevant scarce resources.
However, the challenges inherent in resource allocation problems expand way beyond a sim-
ple notion of efficiency. For a variety of instances, there are concerns related to the design of
information structures, the implementation of decision-making procedures under strategic
behavior, fairness, and privacy.
This research will focus on two settings related to resource allocation and how they can
be addressed using a carefully chosen optimization framework. The first setting addresses
a network of agents, initially endowed with resources, exchanging goods and services, via
bilateral contracts. The second setting relates to dynamic resource allocation with the
presence of uncertainty for future rewards. This research examines the relevant optimization
frameworks in order to provide qualitative insights for each setting.
1.1. Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach
The terms of trade for the exchange of goods and services are often set via bilateral contracts.
For instance, in labor markets, firms contract with individual employees who offer their
labor and time. In supply chains, manufacturers bilaterally contract with their suppliers
to procure materials needed for the production of their goods. Service firms, such as those
providing tax and consulting services, (commercial as well as passenger) transportation, and
construction use bilateral contracts with their clients to specify the scope of their projects
as well as the payment for the service they provide.
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Trading networks, introduced in Hatfield et al. (2013), are a way to represent the non-price
aspects of bilateral trades such as quantity, quality, delivery dates, and returns policy. The
vertices of the underlying network correspond to agents, or traders, who buy and/or sell
goods or services. Each arc represents the non-price aspects of a bilateral trade between the
agents corresponding to the incident vertices. The orientation of the arc identifies which
agent is the “buyer” and which the “seller” in that particular trade. Agents have quasilinear
preferences over the set of incident arcs and their corresponding prices. Preferences need not
be additive over the trades and, in general, can exhibit a fairly rich combinatorial structure.
For instance, in a supply chain, a firm is unable to sell goods to its downstream buyer
without first procuring necessary materials from upstream suppliers – a feature that can
be encoded by appropriately specifying agents’ preferences. A central question is whether
there exist prices for the trades that “clear” the market, i.e., competitive equilibria.
The classic assignment model of Shapley and Shubik (1971) is a special case. Each agent
is either a buyer or a seller, but not both. Furthermore, no agent can participate in more
than one trade. In this setting the underlying network is bipartite. The existence of
market-clearing prices is a consequence of linear programming duality. By contrast, trading
networks are rich enough to model an agent who takes the “buy” side in some trades and the
“sell” side in others. This is an important feature, for instance, in supply chain networks,
where firms simultaneously participate as buyers of their production inputs and sellers of
their finished products. In supply chain networks, the underlying directed network is often
acyclic. Under this condition, Ostrovsky (2008) establishes1 the existence of competitive
equilibria.
Acyclicity of trading networks is violated if there is a market for resale of goods. For
example, in the used car sales market, some individuals participate as buyers and others
participate as sellers, and dealers trade with both buyers and sellers of used cars and with
each other (Hatfield et al., 2013); hence the underlying trading network involves directed
1In fact, it is shown that existence obtains under preferences more general than quasilinear.
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cycles. Similar directed cycles are present in financial markets, where financial institutions
may simultaneously buy securities from some institutions while selling them to others.
Finally, firms offering different services can also induce cycles, e.g., a firm offering consulting
services to an audit firm while also receiving audit services for its operations.
Hatfield et al. (2013, 2019a) have shown that under a full substitutability condition on
agents’ preferences, a competitive equilibrium exists in trading networks, whether acyclic
or not. The full substitutability condition generalizes the gross substitutability condition
used to establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium in two-sided markets (Kelso
and Crawford, 1982; Gul and Stacchetti, 1999; Sun and Yang, 2006). Thus, the trading
network model extends the competitive equilibrium existence results to multi-sided settings.
Competitive equilibria in trading networks are also stable outcomes in that they cannot be
blocked by any coalition of agents and trades. A blocking set is a set of (feasible) trades
and corresponding prices such that all agents who can participate in these trades prefer
them (while possibly declining some of their equilibrium contracts) (Hatfield et al., 2013).
Conversely, in any stable outcome, it is possible to price the trades not involved in this
outcome to support the stable outcome as a competitive equilibrium. In fact, the stability
condition is equivalent to the seemingly weaker chain stability condition (Hatfield et al.,
2019b). The latter condition restricts blocking sets to be paths/cycles of trades in the
underlying trading network.
A first contribution is to show that under the full substitutability assumption, all these
results can be obtained simply and directly from the optimality conditions of a generalized
submodular flow problem in a suitable network. An optimal flow corresponds to competitive
equilibrium trades, and its optimal dual solutions (potential values) are supporting prices.
Moreover, in generalized submodular flow problems, a feasible flow is optimal if and only if
there is no improvement cycle. This optimality condition yields the equivalence between a
competitive equilibrium outcome and (chain) stability. As a result, it is possible to obtain
polynomial algorithms for finding a competitive equilibrium, testing whether a given payoff
3
vector can be supported in a competitive equilibrium, as well as identifying a blocking chain
when an outcome is not stable. In addition, I exploit the connection to the submodular
flow problem to give new comparative statics on the behavior of equilibrium prices as the
set of buyers, sellers, and trades changes.
The starting point is to express the problem of identifying the set of trades that maximize
welfare as a network flow problem in an appropriately defined flow network. The flow
network is related to, but distinct from the underlying trading network. In the flow network,
each vertex corresponds to an agent-trade pair of the trading network. Since exactly two
agents are involved in each trade, the flow network has two vertices for each feasible trade
(one associated with the buyer and the other associated with the seller). These vertices
are connected by an arc in the flow network, though, the flow network itself need not be
connected.
Full substitutability of agents’ preferences corresponds to M \-concavity of agents’ value
functions (Hatfield et al., 2019a). This observation allows us to represent the problem of
finding the set of welfare-maximizing trades as a generalized submodular flow problem in
the flow network. In doing so, I do not impose flow conservation at each vertex. Instead,
I impose an M -convex penalty term on the net outflow at vertices associated with the
same agent in the flow network. Intuitively, the net outflow encodes the trades in which an
agent participates as a buyer/seller, and the penalty term captures the total value the agent
gains from these trades. Minimum cost flows in this network correspond to trades in the
original network that maximize total welfare. The optimal dual solutions to this problem are
competitive equilibrium prices that support the welfare-maximizing set of trades. Thus, the
approach generates the equilibrium trades and prices through the solution of an optimization
problem. This is in contrast to Hatfield et al. (2013), who construct an auxiliary two-
sided market and invoke the associated competitive equilibrium existence results of Kelso
and Crawford (1982). These existence results rely on both discrete prices and explicitly
constructing a price (salary) adjustment process that converges to prices that complement
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an efficient set of trades. My approach relaxes the discreteness requirement on prices and
skips the reduction to Kelso and Crawford (1982), and leverages duality results to establish
the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
I establish the equivalence between stability, chain stability, and competitive equilibrium
outcomes directly from the fact that a given flow is optimal if and only if it admits no
improvement cycle. The proof technique used also provides an algorithm that (i) checks
whether an outcome is (chain) stable, and (ii) identifies a blocking chain if it is not. In
particular, given a set of trades and associated prices, I first consider a (reduced) trading
network, which consists of the remaining trades (after an appropriate modification of the
payoff functions), and the corresponding flow network. The algorithm starts with the (triv-
ial) flow, which does not use any arc in the flow network that is associated with the trades
in the (reduced) trading network. Then, the algorithm searches for an improvement cycle.
If such a cycle is absent, I conclude that the initial set of trades/prices constitutes a (chain)
stable outcome. Otherwise, an improvement cycle with the least number of arcs reveals
a blocking chain. The computational complexity of this approach is equivalent to that of
constructing the flow network and identifying a negative cycle with the least number of arcs
in this network. The overall complexity is polynomial in the number of vertices/arcs in
the underlying trading network. Thus, the network flow approach presented here not only
gives simpler proofs of the properties of trading networks (e.g., existence of a competitive
equilibrium, and its equivalence to stability), but also provides a tractable algorithm for
determining competitive equilibria, testing whether a given payoff vector can be supported
in a competitive equilibrium, testing (chain) stability, and identifying blocking sets of trades
whenever they exist.
Hatfield et al. (2019b) observed an equivalence between stability and chain stability that
resembles an analogous equivalence in classic network flows. Those authors argued that
there are important differences between the two settings:
“[I]n the ‘network flows’ environment, there is a single type of good ‘flowing’
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through the network, and the objective function is the maximization or mini-
mization of the aggregate flow, whereas in our setting many different types of
goods may be present, and the preferences of agents in the market may be more
complex.”
My work shows this difference to be superficial. An outcome is not stable if the correspond-
ing flow is suboptimal. In the generalized submodular flow problems, suboptimality implies
the existence of an improvement cycle. This indicates that whenever the initial outcome is
not stable, it can be blocked by relying on a “simple” set of trades, which corresponds to a
chain in the underlying trading network.
This optimization approach allows us to determine how competitive equilibria change if a
new trade, buyer, or seller is added to the economy. It is shown that if a new trade is
added to the economy, the new equilibrium trades can be found by augmenting the existing
trades with a set of trades that form an undirected chain in the trading network, i.e., by
(i) including among equilibrium trades the trades of this chain that do not belong to the
initial equilibrium, and (ii) removing the remaining trades associated with the arcs in the
chain from the set of the equilibrium trades. Adding a new buyer (seller) to the economy
is equivalent to adding a collection of such trades, and hence new equilibrium trades can
be found by repeatedly augmenting the existing ones. In addition, it is shown that if a
new buyer (seller) is added to the economy, the prices of all existing trades, even those of
traders not adjacent to the new agent, increase (decrease). Hence, the equilibrium payoffs
of all existing buyers decrease (increase), and those of all sellers increase (decrease). Using
these results as building blocks, I provide comparative statics for richer settings where the
new trades are not all adjacent to a single trader (and can involve multiple buyers/sellers).
I also outline how to incorporate trade frictions into the model, and generalize the results
on competitive equilibria and comparative statics. Finally, I discuss applications of the
comparative statics to changes in trade frictions (e.g., excise taxes or transportation costs)
as well as to quotas in trading networks.
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I summarize the related literature below. Trading networks, the M-convex submodular flow
problem, and their relation are introduced in Chapter 2. Applications of this approach are
presented in Chapter 3.
Related literature: Gross substitutability of agents’ preferences is a sufficient condition
for the existence of a competitive equilibrium in settings with indivisible goods (Kelso and
Crawford, 1982; Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). It is equivalent to M \-concavity of agents’ value
functions (Fujishige and Yang, 2003; Murota and Tamura, 2003a; Leme, 2017; Shioura and
Tamura, 2015). It has been used in mathematical economics to generate direct proofs of
the existence of competitive equilibria in exchange economies (Danilov et al., 2001, 2003;
Murota and Tamura, 2003a,b). For a survey see Murota (2016).
Kelso and Crawford (1982) and Gul and Stacchetti (1999) were concerned with a two-sided
market of buyers and sellers. The trading network literature (Ostrovsky, 2008; Hatfield
et al., 2013, 2019a,b) extends these results to multi-sided settings, where agents can simul-
taneously participate as buyers and sellers in the market. This is done by extending the
gross substitutes condition on preferences2 to full substitutability. Full substitutability of
agents’ preferences corresponds to M \-concavity of agents’ value functions (Hatfield et al.,
2019a).
In Murota (2003) and Murota and Tamura (2003b), the problem of finding the efficient
allocation in a two-sided economy with multiple buyers and sellers was formulated as a
generalized submodular flow problem in a bipartite network. In our case, the presence of
agents who participate as buyers in some trades and sellers in others makes the reduction
in Murota (2003) and Murota and Tamura (2003b) inapplicable. I provide an alternative
network flow formulation for identifying the efficient set of trades. Additionally, this for-
mulation shows the equivalence of competitive equilibrium to (chain) stable outcomes and
characterizes them using a generalized submodular flow formulation. Thus, together with
2Some papers, e.g., Ostrovsky (2008) and Hatfield et al. (2019b), relax the assumption of quasilinear
preferences.
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the results of Murota (2003) and Murota and Tamura (2003b), this work indicates that a
generalized submodular flow formulation provides a unifying framework for the study of
various competitive equilibrium results in the literature.
Prior to this dissertation, Ikebe and Tamura (2015) and Ikebe et al. (2015) also used ideas
from discrete convexity to study trading networks. Ikebe and Tamura (2015) focused on
acyclic trading networks (called supply chain networks) under M \-concavity of agents’ value
functions. They allowed trades between agents to occur with some (integer) intensity,
capturing the fact that multiple units of the same trade can take place. They also provided
algorithms for finding chain stable outcomes. Importantly, the authors focused on a setting
where there are finitely many contracts (trade and price tuples). This implies that the
supporting prices are exogenously restricted to a finite set. Given the restriction to finitely
many contracts and acyclic networks, the algorithms provided in their paper for testing chain
stability do not apply to my setting. Finally, this dissertation provides comparative statics
and sheds light on the equivalence between stability, chain stability, and the competitive
equilibrium outcome.
Ikebe et al. (2015) focused on general trading networks, where, as in Ikebe and Tamura
(2015), agents may engage in multiple units of the same trade. In their setting trades
between different pairs of agents are considered distinct. In particular, trades that represent
two distinct sellers selling the same commodity to a common buyer are considered distinct.
Under these restrictions, the authors established the existence of a competitive equilibrium
where all identical trades have the same price. This result is related to but weaker than the
one presented in Section 2.3.2 below. When identical trades are defined I do not restrict
attention to pairs of agents. Hence, I allow for settings where the same commodity is sold
by different sellers to a common buyer. I establish the existence of competitive equilibria
where all identical trades adjacent to an agent have the same price.
Ikebe et al. (2015) employed a definition of stability that differs from the one used here
along two dimensions. First, when a trade is included in a blocking set, the prices of
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other identical trades (which belong to the original outcome) are allowed to change as well.
Second, agents are not allowed to drop old trades if identical trades are included in the
blocking set. Under this alternative definition of stability, Ikebe et al. (2015) showed that a
stable outcome need not correspond to a competitive equilibrium. By contrast, I establish
an equivalence between the two outcomes.
Like us, Ikebe et al. (2015) exploited properties of discrete convexity to derive their results.
However, they did not obtain the network flow formulation, which allows us to provide short
proofs of the equivalence of various solution concepts. The network flow formulation is
conceptually important because it explains why chain stability is a natural solution concept
for trading networks in the first place. As in the classic network flow problem, if a flow is
suboptimal (i.e., the corresponding set of trades is inefficient), it is always possible to find an
improvement cycle, which in the context of my network flow formulation closely relates to
a blocking chain. Furthermore, leveraging network flow ideas allows us to develop efficient
algorithms for identifying blocking chains and provide interesting comparative statics, both
of which are beyond the scope of Ikebe et al. (2015).
One can exploit gross substitutability to derive a tâtonnement that converges to a compet-
itive equilibrium. In two-sided markets, Ausubel (2006) provided such a tâtonnement pro-
cess, similar in spirit to the one in Gul and Stacchetti (2000). Sun and Yang (2009) analyzed
a tâtonnement process called double-track, which converges to a competitive equilibrium
for the case of substitutes and complements. The double-track procedure was generalized
to the case of multiple complementary goods in Sun and Yang (2014). Using the network
formulation of the efficient allocation problem, I outline a similar tâtonnement process for
trading network models.
Comparative statics have received significant attention in the matching and trading network
literature (Kelso and Crawford, 1982; Blum et al., 1997; Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005; Ostro-
vsky, 2008; Fleiner et al., 2018). The network flow literature contains a rich set of sensitivity
analysis results on how optimal flows and corresponding potential values change as arc ca-
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pacities, costs, and supply/demand at different vertices change (Granot and Veinott, 1985;
Ahuja et al., 1993). By extending these results to my network flow formulation, I obtain
new results on how the equilibrium trades, prices, and payoffs change as new trades/traders
are introduced into the economy.
1.2. Prophet Inequalities in Resource Allocation Under Uncertainty
Stopping problems are concerned with choosing a time to take a given action based on
sequentially observed random variables in order to maximize an expected payoff. The
action taken may be to reject a hypothesis, replace a machine, hire a secretary, or exercise
an American option. They are often solved using dynamic programming.
In a simple version of a stopping problem, introduced by Krengel and Sucheston (1977),
one is shown n non-negative numbers, sequentially, that are independent draws from known
distributions (not necessarily identical). I refer to it as the basic stopping problem hereafter.
The goal is to maximize the number on which one stops relative to the expected maximum
value in hindsight. Krengel and Sucheston (1977) obtained a tight approximation guarantee
of 12 . In other words, the optimal reward of the stopping problem is at least half of the
expected value of the largest of the n random numbers. This approximation guarantee is
usually referred to as a prophet inequality.
A simple example shows that the approximation factor of 12 is the best possible. There are
two prizes, where the first one gives a reward of 1, while the second one gives a reward of
1
ε with probability ε or 0 otherwise. Both strategies of stopping or not stopping in the first
period return the same expected reward equal to 1. However, a prophet could solve an off-
line version of the problem, and choose the second prize only when a reward of ε is realized,
i.e., with probability 1ε . Hence, the expected prophet’s reward is equal to 2 − ε. The on-
line decision-maker guarantees 12−ε of the prophet’s reward. Thus,
1
2 is the approximation
factor that most algorithms attempt to attain unless the structure of the problem is more
welcoming.
The problem has attracted an enthusiastic following which has extended the problem in
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a variety of ways. Hill and Kertz (1992) provide an early survey, and Hartline (2012)
and Lucier (2017) provide surveys discussing the implications of prophet inequalities for
mechanism design and pricing. Part of the literature considers on-line selection problems,
a series of problems where the selected elements must satisfy combinatorial constraints.
Alaei (2011) considers an extension where k numbers can be chosen and Kleinberg and
Weinberg (2019) deal with a general setting, where the set of numbers chosen must form
an independent set of a specified matroid.
Interestingly, research on prophet inequalities finds applications in mechanism design. Apart
from the efficiency guarantees, several proofs reveal simple rules for well-known mechanism
design problems. Samuel-Cahn (1984) provided a simple proof of the prophet inequality,
where the median of the largest order statistic of n numbers is chosen as a threshold to
decide which number to choose. Chawla et al. (2010) establish a connection with mechanism
design, by showing that this threshold can serve as a posted price in an auction setting.
Recently, Duetting et al. (2017) covered a unifying technique for general settings which is
approximately efficient and operates by producing balanced prices.
This dissertation follows a different path by modeling the prophet problem via linear pro-
gramming. The modeling process is closely related to works in mathematical finance where
the decisions made are conditioned on the paths of the relevant stochastic process generating
the rewards. The main contributions of this part of the dissertation is a new representa-
tion of the stopping problem, an alternative viewpoint of the prophet inequality, as well as
applications in on-line selection problems with complex constraints.
Initially, the basic stopping problem is considered and its application in auction theory.
First, a naive linear programming formulation is presented. Unfortunately, the linear pro-
gramming representation of the problem exploits a set of variables conditioned on the pos-
sible paths of the reward generation stochastic process, which exponentially grows on the
number of agents. As a remedy, the reduced-form representation of the basic stopping
problem is introduced. The reduced-form representation is a tractable description of the
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stopping problem, where a polynomial number of variables is used. The reduced-form repre-
sentation has been employed in auction theory before, mainly through the work of C Border
(1991), with the main contribution known as Border’s theorem. The variables in Border’s
theorem are called interim allocation, representing the expected allocation to an agent given
her type. The same idea applies to the optimal stopping setting, from an auction-based
viewpoint. Using this new representation, I devise a new algorithm which is approximately
efficient, along the lines of the classic prophet inequality. This constitutes a new proof of
the classic prophet inequality.
A first application involves a mechanism design problem with verification. The problem
can be thought in the context of labor markets. I consider a principal who must hire an
employee from a set of candidates arriving sequentially, each of whom prefers to have the
job than not. Each agent has access to private information about the principal’s payoff
if he gets hired. The decision to allocate the job to an employee must be made upon his
arrival and is irreversible. There are no monetary transfers but the principal can verify
agents’ reports at a cost and punish them (by not hiring them). The optimal allocation
and verification rules are given as a solution to a compact linear program. There exists a
strategy that can achieve on expectation at least half of the second-best of a prophet, i.e.,
when all agents arrive simultaneously but still the principal has to elicit truthful reports
via verification.
Last, I provide a generalized version of on-line selection problems and a linear programming
formulation addressing the problem. The formulation is also valid for simple on-line selection
problems since the linear programming formulation for their continuous counterparts has
integer optimal solutions. I will consider a setting based on the fractional knapsack selection
problem and provide an algorithm that scales the prophet’s reduced form by 12 and then
implements it. I prove that it is well-defined for the fractional knapsack selection setting,
i.e., the interim allocation that it constructs is implementable, and trivially achieves a 12 -
approximation of the prophet’s rewards (linear in interim allocation variables). It is worth
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noting that the above algorithm details a way to convert a solution of the classic allocation
problem to a solution when the actions must be taken sequentially. Finally, we see that
the linear programming formulation captures simple on-line selection problems too, i.e.,
problems defined in a combinatorial domain. For simple settings, the prophet inequalities
attained are the same, regardless of whether the domain is continuous or combinatorial.
In Chapter 4 I introduce the basic stopping problem. I then describe three different tech-
niques to derive the classic prophet inequality. The techniques are based on different al-
gorithms for the stopping problem. First, I describe pricing strategies, where a reward is
chosen when it is larger than an a priori defined threshold, which can be thought of as a
price paid in an auction setting where bidders arrive sequentially. The pricing schemes come
from different works found in the literature. Second, I describe a duality-based technique
to derive the prophet inequality. The argument examines the optimal stopping rule and
is based on the celebrated work of Davis and Karatzas (1994) in mathematical finance.
I include this proof to better illustrate duality in prophet inequalities. Last, I formulate
the optimal stopping problem as a linear program. First, I provide a proof of the prophet
inequality using an appropriate price, based on Guha and Munagala (2007). The prophet
inequality leverages a relaxed linear programming formulation of the stopping problem us-
ing the reduced form. Next, i describe the reduced-form representation of the optimal
stopping problem. Leveraging this representation, I present the algorithm based on scaling
the reduced form of the prophet’s strategy.
In Chapter 5 I describe applications of some of the above techniques. Specifically, I introduce
the on-line verification problem and describe a linear programming formulation of it. The
linear program implies an algorithm to solve it as well as a direct argument to lower bound its
efficiency. Finally, in Chapter 6, I introduce the fractional knapsack problem and provide
a novel application of it in computational sprinting. The above technique of scaling the
reduced form is used to derive a new prophet inequality for the fractional knapsack problem.
Finally, I end the chapter by showing that the formulation for the fractional version of the
13
problem, in simple settings, carries on to settings with integrality constraints.
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CHAPTER 2 : Trading Networks through Network Flows
The subsequent Section 2.1 introduces notation and the model. Section 2.2 describes the
submodular flow problem and its optimality conditions. Section 2.3 describes the transfor-
mation of the problem of finding an efficient set of trades into an instance of the submodular
flow problem.
2.1. Model
A trading network is represented by a directed multigraph G = (N,E), where N is the
set of vertices and E the set of arcs. Each vertex corresponds to an agent and each arc
corresponds to the non-price elements of a trade that can take place between the incident
pair of vertices. For each arc e ∈ E, let e+ and e− denote the tail and head of this arc,
respectively. Vertex e+ corresponds to the seller and vertex e− corresponds to the buyer of
the trade associated with e. Let δ+(i) and δ−(i) respectively be the outgoing and incoming
arcs incident to vertex i ∈ N , and set δ(i) = δ+(i) ∪ δ−(i). A price vector is dentoed by
p ∈ RE , where pe is the price associated with the trade that corresponds to arc e. Denote
by pX the price vector restricted to the arcs in X.
Denote agent i’s value function for any set of trades involving agent i by1 wi : 2
δ(i) →
R ∪ {−∞}. Agent i’s payoff function is ui : 2δ(i) × Rδ(i) → R ∪ {−∞}. For each S ⊂ δ(i)
and p ∈ RE , the agent’s payoff can be expressed as:







The demand correspondence for agent i ∈ N , given a price vector p ∈ Rδ(i), is
Di(p) = arg max
Y⊂δ(i)
ui(Y, p).
1Having −∞ in the range of the value function allows us to incorporate trading constraints as described
in Hatfield et al. (2013); e.g., if a trader cannot sell goods without procuring her inputs first, this can be
incorporated by specifying −∞ for bundles of trades.
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Definition 2.1.1. A set of trades X ⊂ E along with a price vector p ∈ RE is a competitive
equilibrium (X, p) if, for all i ∈ N ,
X ∩ δ(i) ∈ Di(p).
Definition 2.1.2. A set of trades X ⊂ E is efficient if





2.2. M -convex Submodular Flow Problem
Here I describe the M -convex submodular flow problem that generalizes the classic network
flow problem (see Chapter 9 in Murota (2003)). A directed graph F = (V,A) is given,
where V is the set of vertices and A is the set of arcs. For each arc a ∈ A, denote by a+
and a− the tail and head vertices respectively. For each v ∈ V denote by δ+(v) and δ−(v)
the set of outgoing and incoming arcs incident to vertex v, respectively.
As in the classic network flow problem, each arc a ∈ A has a cost ca ∈ R per unit of flow,
and lower and upper capacities ka ∈ Z ∪ {−∞}, ka ∈ Z ∪ {∞}. Denote by xa the amount
flowing through a ∈ A, and let x denote the vector of {xa}a∈A. Given flows on the arcs, let
yv be the net outflow (positive or negative) from vertex v, and denote the vector of {yv}v∈V
by y. In what follows I focus on integer flow problems, where x, y have integer entries.
The added feature of the M -convex submodular flow problem (MSFP) is a function f :
ZV → R ∪ {∞} in the objective function that penalizes the net outflow at each vertex.
The function f is assumed to be M -convex (defined below). MSFP2 can be formulated as
follows:
2This version of MSFP is called the M-convex submodular integer flow problem, due to the integrality
constraint on (x, y). As in the classic network flow problem, under mild conditions, the integrality condition
is without loss of optimality; i.e., even when the problem is formulated over the reals, an integral optimal













xa = yv ∀v ∈ V,
ka ≤ xa ≤ ka ∀a ∈ A.
To define M -convexity, let χj ∈ Zn denote the 0-1 vector with exactly one nonzero entry in
component j. A function f : Zn → R∪{∞} on the integer lattice is M -convex if it satisfies
the following exchange axiom:
(M-EXC[Z]): For all z, z′ ∈ Zn and for all u ∈ supp+(z − z′),
f(z) + f(z′) ≥ min
v∈supp−(z−z′)
f(z − χu + χv) + f(z′ + χu − χv),
where supp+(z − z′) (supp−(z − z′)) is the set of indices in {1, . . . , n} such that zi − z′i > 0
(zi − z′i < 0). A function f is called M -concave if −f is M -convex.
A set B ⊂ Zn is called M -convex if given z, z′ ∈ B, for all u ∈ supp+(z − z′), there exists
v ∈ supp−(z − z′) such that z−χu +χv ∈ B, and z′+χu−χv ∈ B. An M -convex function
f ’s effective domain (i.e., domf , {z ∈ Zn| − ∞ < f(z) < ∞}) as well as the function’s
minimizers are M -convex sets.
In the classic network flow problem, f ’s effective domain is a single point ({y0}), which
allows for a fixed amount of net inflow (outflow) at demand (supply) vertices satisfying
{i|y0i < 0} ({i|y0i > 0}), while imposing flow conservation at the rest of the vertices (i.e.,
the inflow to a vertex is equal to the outflow). In MSFP, the flow conservation constraints
are relaxed through the use of the penalty function f . In the next section, when I study
trading networks, I formulate the problem of finding the efficient set of trades as an MSFP.
In this formulation, a unit of flow from a vertex associated with agent i to a vertex associated
with agent j represents the trade between these agents (where i is a seller and j is a buyer),
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and the associated valuations of agents is encoded by the appropriately defined net outflow
penalties. Note that in the efficient set of trades, an agent may participate in more trades as
a buyer than as a seller (or vice versa). Also, the valuations of agents need not be additive
over the trades they participate in. As a result, it is impossible to formulate the problem
of finding the efficient set of trades in trading networks as a classic network flow problem.
However, as I illustrate in Section 2.3, the aforementioned problem can be formulated as an
MSFP with appropriately constructed penalties.
One can generalize the optimality conditions of the classic flow problem with a linear ob-
jective function to MSFP (see Murota (2003)). In particular, the optimality of a flow is
characterized by the nonexistence of a negative cycle in an auxiliary network as well as in
terms of a set of potential values associated with the vertices of the network.
Before I state the optimality conditions, some necessary definitions are introduced. First,
define an auxiliary network F aux, which is an extension of the idea of the residual network
used in the classic network flow problem to account for the non-linearities in f . Let x be
a feasible flow in F = (V,A) and y be the associated vector of net outflows at each vertex.
Consider three sets of arcs incident to the set of vertices V :
1. Aaux(x) = {(u, v)|(u, v) ∈ A, x(u,v) < k(u,v)},
2. Baux(x) = {(v, u)|(u, v) ∈ A, x(u,v) > k(u,v)}, and
3. Caux(y) = {(u, v)|u, v ∈ V, f(y − χu + χv) < +∞}.
Let F aux(x, y) = (V,Aaux(x) ∪ Baux(x) ∪ Caux(y)) be the directed multigraph where all
three sets of arcs are present. Note that, in general, F aux can be a directed multigraph.
However, in this work, I focus on settings where F is a directed graph that has at most
one arc between any pair of vertices, and the effective domain of f is such that the arcs
in Caux do not overlap with those in Aaux and Baux. As a result, F aux is always a simple
directed graph. The auxiliary network F aux has no arc capacities. The cost for each arc a
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in F aux(x, y) is given by
cauxa (x, y) =

c(a+,a−) if a ∈ Aaux(x)
−c(a−,a+) if a ∈ Baux(x)











































Figure 1: (a) Feasible Flow (b) Auxiliary Network
Figure 1 illustrates the construction of the auxiliary network. The flow network is dis-
played in (a). The penalty function is given by f1(y1, y2) + f2(y3, y4), where yi denotes
the net outflow at vertex vi. The effective domain of f1 is {(1, 0), (2,−1)} and that of
f2 is
3 {(−1, 0), (−2, 1)}. Function f1 penalizes the net outflow at vertices {v1, v2} while
f2 penalizes the net outflow at {v3, v4}. The functions f1 : {(1, 0), (2,−1)} → R, and
f2 : {(−1, 0), (−2, 1)} → R are specified such that f1(y1, y2) + f2(y3, y4) is M -convex over
its effective domain. The upper arc capacities in this example are 2 units for the first arc
and 1 unit for the second arc, and the lower arc capacities are zero for both arcs. Suppose
that one unit of flow is sent on the first arc, as denoted by the arrow below the arc. The
corresponding auxiliary network is displayed in (b). The arcs in Aaux(x) ∪Baux(x) appear
as solid arrows while the arcs in Caux(y) appear as dashed arrows.
In classic network flow problems, f(y) = ∞ unless y = y0 for some y0, which allows for
a fixed net inflow/outflow for a subset of vertices, while imposing flow conservation at the
3Any functions f1 and f2 that take finite values at {(1, 0), (2,−1)} and {(−1, 0), (−2, 1)}, respectively,
and take a value of ∞ elsewhere, satisfy M -EXC[Z] and are M -convex.
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rest of the vertices. Consequently, Caux(y) = ∅, and hence the auxiliary network reduces to
the residual network that is standard in the network flow literature. By contrast, in MSFP
the auxiliary network involves additional arcs whose costs are determined by the associated
outflow penalty. Consider the classic network flow problem given in Figure 1, where it is
assumed that y0 = (1, 0,−1, 0). Note that the only feasible solution is to send one unit of
flow on the upper arc and zero unit of flow on the lower arc. Then, the auxiliary network
consists of the pair of arcs between v1 and v3, as well as the single arc from v4 to v2. By
contrast, in more general MSFP formulations, depending on the penalty function f , one or
both of the arcs in the network may have nonzero flow in the optimal solution. In this case,
flow conservation may not be preserved, but the effect of the net outflows is still reflected
in the penalty function f . Moreover, as discussed above, the auxiliary network may involve
arcs from Caux(y).
The sum of the arc costs associated with a directed path/cycle of the auxiliary network
is interpreted as the “length” of the path/cycle. The distance from a vertex to another
vertex is defined as the smallest length achieved by a directed path connecting them. Any
path achieving this distance is referred to as the shortest path. A directed cycle of negative
length is called a negative cycle. The following theorem summarizes the optimality criteria
for MSFP.
Theorem 2.2.1. (Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 in Murota (1999)) Given a feasible solution (x, y)
to an MSFP, the following three conditions are equivalent for the MSFP:
1. (x, y) is an optimal solution to the MSFP.
2. There does not exist a negative cycle in F aux(x, y).
3. There exists a potential function π : V → R such that
(a) for each (u, v) ∈ A,
(i) c(u,v) + π(u)− π(v) > 0⇒ x(u,v) = k(u,v)
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π(v)y′v for all y
′ ∈ ZV .
Conditions 2 and 3 are called the negative cycle criterion and the potential function op-
timality criterion, respectively. The negative cycle criterion furnishes a means to improve
a given suboptimal solution. Specifically, suppose that (x, y) is a suboptimal (integral)
solution to an MSFP. Therefore, the auxiliary network has a negative cycle. Choose K to
be a negative cycle in F aux(x, y) with the least number of arcs. Consider augmenting the
current flow x along K and updating the associated net outflow y accordingly, i.e., :
• x(a+,a−) = x(a+,a−) + 1, if a ∈ K ∩Aaux(x),
• x(a−,a+) = x(a−,a+) − 1, if a ∈ K ∩Baux(x),




Intuitively, the flow on arcs along K that are common to the underlying network F and
have excess capacity (i.e., arcs in Aaux(x)) is increased. On the other hand, some arc a in
the network may carry flow exceeding the associated lower bound, and hence there may be
a corresponding arc in F aux(x, y) with a reversed orientation (which belongs to Baux(x)).
If this arc also belongs to K, then, the flow on a is reduced after augmentation. The net
outflow is also updated so that it is consistent with the resulting induced flow.
It can be shown that augmenting a flow along the negative cycle K with the least number
of arcs lowers the cost of the MSFP. Moreover, successive augmentation along such negative
cycles4 guarantees convergence to an optimal solution of the MSFP; see Murota (2003).
The potential values associated with the vertices of the flow network can be viewed as
dual variables for the MSFP, and those satisfying Condition 3 are referred to as the optimal
4Successively augmenting the flow along any negative cycle guarantees convergence to an optimal solution
in the classic minimum-cost network flow problems (without M -convex penalties) as well. However, unlike
in the classic setting, in MSFP one must augment the flow along the negative cycle with the least number
of arcs.
21
potential values. I conclude this section by providing an equivalent statement of the potential
function optimality criterion of Theorem 2.2.1, which is used in the subsequent analysis.
This characterization is in terms of the reduced costs of the arcs in the auxiliary network
F aux(x, y). For a given set of potential values π at the vertices of the network, the reduced
cost of each arc a in F aux(x, y) is given by cπa = c
aux
a (x, y) + π(a
+)− π(a−).
Theorem 2.2.2 (Reduced-Cost Optimality Condition). A feasible solution (x∗, y∗) satisfies
the optimality conditions of Theorem 2.2.1 with vertex potential function π, if and only if
the following reduced-cost optimality condition holds:
cπa ≥ 0 for each arc a in F aux(x∗, y∗).
Proof. It can be readily seen that the conditions in Theorem 2.2.1, part 3(a), are equivalent
to the reduced-cost optimality conditions for the subsets of arcs Aaux(x∗) and Baux(x∗) in
the auxiliary network F aux(x∗, y∗). Thus, to prove the claim it suffices to show that the
reduced-cost optimality conditions for the remaining subset of arcs Caux(y∗) in F aux(x∗, y∗)
hold if and only if the conditions of Theorem 2.2.1, part 3(b), hold.
This immediately follows from the fact that (i) f̄(y) = f(y) −
∑
v∈V
π(v)yv is an M -convex
function, and (ii) for an M -convex function f̄ , local optimality is equivalent to global op-
timality, i.e., f̄(y1) ≤ f̄(y2) for all y2 = y1 − χu + χv and vertices u, v ∈ V if and only if
f̄(y1) ≤ f̄(y) for all y (see, e.g., Murota (2003)). Note that given net outflow y∗, we have an
arc (u, v) ∈ Caux(y∗) if and only if f(y∗ − χu + χv) <∞. It follows that reduced costs are
nonnegative for arcs in Caux(y∗), if we have f̄(y∗) ≤ f̄(y∗−χu+χv) for all u, v ∈ V , and vice





∗) ≤ f̄(y) = f̄(y) −
∑
v∈V
π(v)yv for any y. Since the latter
condition is equivalent to Theorem 2.2.1 (3b), the claim follows.
Remark. MSFP can be defined without restricting (x, y) to be integral. For this version of
MSFP, the domain of the penalty term on net outflows is the reals and the penalty term is
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required to be an integral polyhedral M -convex function. An integral polyhedral M -convex
function f̄ is obtained by extending an M -convex function f to Rn via its convex closure









αiyi + α0 ≤ f(y) ∀y ∈ Zn
}
for all x ∈ Rn.
Theorem 9.15 in Murota (2003) guarantees the existence of an optimal integer flow to
MSFP when the capacities are integer-valued and the penalty function is integral polyhedral
M -convex – a result analogous to integrality of optimal solution in classic network flow
problems. Moreover, the optimality conditions provided in Theorem 2.2.1 continue to hold
in such settings; see, e.g., Murota (2003).
2.2.1. M \-Concave Functions
An M \-convex function f : Zn → R is a function satisfying the following exchange axiom
(M \-EXC[Z]): For all x, y ∈ Zn and for all u ∈ supp+(x− y),
f(x) + f(y) ≥ min[f(x− χu) + f(y + χu), min
v∈supp−(x−y)
f(x− χu + χv) + f(x+ χu − χv)].
An M \-convex function is supermodular. A function f is M \-concave if −f is M \-convex.
Any M \-convex function f : Zn → R ∪ ∞ can be represented as an M -convex function
f ′ : Zn+1 → R ∪∞, where
f ′(x0, x) =








In Section 2.1, each wi was defined as a function over subsets of δ(i). If sets are repre-
sented by their characteristic vectors, we can treat each wi as a function over {0,−1}δ−(i)×
{0, 1}δ+(i). I extend the domain of wi to Zδ(i) by following the convention that wi(y) = −∞
for y ∈ Zδ(i) such that y /∈ {0,−1}δ−(i) × {0, 1}δ+(i). An analogous convention applies to
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each payoff function ui. Next, assume that for each i ∈ N , wi is M \-concave. This is
equivalent to the property that each agent’s preferences are fully substitutable (see Hatfield
et al. (2013, 2019a) and Theorem 7 in Murota and Tamura (2003a)).
Definition 2.2.1. Agent i’s preferences are fully substitutable if:
1. For all p, p̃ ∈ Rδ(i) such that pe = p̃e for all e ∈ δ+(i) and p̃e ≥ pe for all e ∈ δ−(i),
for every Y i ∈ Di(p) there exists Ỹ i ∈ Di(p̃) such that (Y i ∩ {e|pe = p̃e}) ∩ δ−(i) ⊂
Ỹ i ∩ δ−(i) and Ỹ i ∩ δ+(i) ⊂ Y i ∩ δ+(i).
2. For all p, p̃ ∈ Rδ(i) such that pe = p̃e for all e ∈ δ−(i) and p̃e ≤ pe for all e ∈ δ+(i),
for every Y i ∈ Di(p) there exists Ỹ i ∈ Di(p̃) such that (Y i ∩ {e|pe = p̃e}) ∩ δ+(i) ⊂
Ỹ i ∩ δ+(i) and Ỹ i ∩ δ−(i) ⊂ Y i ∩ δ−(i).
2.3. Transformation to MSFP
In this section, the optimality conditions of MSFP are used to show that a competitive
equilibrium exists when agents have M \-concave value functions, and shed light on its
structure. To do so, I first transform the problem of finding an efficient set of trades into
an instance of the MSFP.
I introduce a flow network F = (V,A), associated with the trading network G = (N,E).
Recall that there is an M \-concave function wi : Zδ(i) → R associated with each vertex
i ∈ N . I slightly modify this representation in Section 2.2.2, and represent the set of trades
agent i participates in by a vector yi ∈ Z×Zδ(i). Index the entries of yi with 0 (to capture
its first entry) and e ∈ δ(i). For each trade e ∈ δ(i) that occurs, set yie = 1 if e ∈ δ+(i)
and yie = −1 if e ∈ δ−(i) (i.e., the entries of yi corresponding to e ∈ δ(i) constitute the





the entries of the yi vector sum up to zero. With this representation each wi can be replaced
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by an M -concave function w′i : Z× Zδ(i) → R, such that
w′i(z0, z) =













M -concavity of w′i for all i ∈ N implies that f is M -convex5 as the arguments of the M -
convex functions in the summand are disjoint.
In the flow network, each i ∈ N is represented by a set V i of vertices associated with the





where V i = {vie|e ∈ {0} ∪ δ(i)}. I refer to vertices of the form vi0 as special vertices. I add
a directed arc between every pair of special vertices. In what follows, the orientation of
this arc does not matter, and hence I pick it arbitrarily. The set of all arcs between special





Intuitively, one unit of flow on this arc represents agents e+ and e− executing the trade




e )|e ∈ E}. Informally, each w′i is a function of the
characteristic vector of arcs incident to V i that carry positive flow, as there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the vertices V i and the incident arcs.
Formally, the set of arcs in F is given by A = A0 ∪A1. Furthermore, I assume that for any
arc a ∈ A, the associated flow costs are zero, i.e., ca = 0, and the lower and upper capacities
are set6 as follows:
ka = −∞, ka = +∞. (2.4)
5In general, the sum of M -convex functions is not M -convex. However, this property trivially holds when
M -convex functions with disjoint arguments are considered.
6Because of this assumption on capacities, given any feasible flow on F = (V,A), in the associated
auxiliary network there are two directed arcs with opposite orientations between any pair of special vertices.
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An example of this construction is displayed in Figure 2. Figure 2(a) is the trading network,
where each vertex appears as a large black circle. Figure 2(b) shows the associated flow
network. The special vertices appear as dotted circles. The vertices associated with a
given agent appear together in the relevant rectangle. I refer to the induced subnetwork
consisting of the vertices in a given rectangle as the corresponding agent’s internal network.














Figure 2: (a) Trading NetworkG = (N,E) (b) Corresponding Flow Network F = (V,A)










xa = yv ∀v ∈ V
ka ≤ xa ≤ ka ∀a ∈ A.
Recall that, by construction, f(y) is M -convex. Suppose that a set S ⊂ E of trades in
the trading network G = (N,E) is executed. A corresponding flow in F = (V,A) can be
obtained by sending one unit of flow on each arc in A1 associated with these trades, and
choosing the flow through arcs between special vertices to keep the total net outflow at
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the vertices in V i equal to zero (which is possible since by (2.4) I can set negative flow
values). Observe that the absolute value of the associated flow cost is equal to the welfare
corresponding to S. Conversely, by the construction of f , it can be seen that any flow with
bounded cost is such that the net outflow at the vertices in V i is equal to zero for all i (see
(2.3)), and each arc in A1 carries at most one unit of flow. Moreover, the absolute value of
the cost of any such flow is equivalent to the total welfare associated with the trades that
correspond to the arcs in A1 with nonzero flow. Hence, integer flows with bounded cost
in F correspond to feasible sets of trades in G. Thus, the optimal solution of the MSFP
corresponds to an efficient set of trades for the trading network G = (N,E).
The construction of the auxiliary network associated with a given feasible solution (x, y)
of this problem is displayed in Figure 3. The network in Figure 3(a) is the flow network







indicated by the arrows, which corresponds to executing trade e1 in Figure 2. The network





















Figure 3: (a) Feasible Solution (b) Auxiliary Network (solid arcs: Aaux(x)∪Baux(x), dashed
arcs: Caux(y))
Consider an optimal solution (x, y) to the MSFP in F . There exists a vertex potential
function π that satisfies the optimality conditions in Theorem 2.2.1, part 3. Moreover, by
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Theorem 2.2.2, under this potential function the associated reduced costs of the arcs in the
auxiliary network are nonnegative. Recalling that the arc costs of the auxiliary network are
as in (2.1), and the arc cost of a ∈ A satisfies ca = 0, the reduced-cost optimality condition
can be stated as follows:
π(v)− π(u) ≤ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ Aaux(x) ∪Baux(x), (2.5)
π(v)− π(u) ≤ f(y − χu + χv)− f(y) ∀(u, v) ∈ Caux(y). (2.6)
Recall by (2.4) that (u, v) ∈ Aaux(x) if and only if (v, u) ∈ Baux(x). Together with the above
optimality conditions this implies that π(u) = π(v) for all (u, v) ∈ A. For (u, v) ∈ A1 ⊂ A,
this potential value is the candidate price for the trade associated with (u, v). Similarly,
since there is an arc in A0 ⊂ A between any pair of special vertices, it follows that each
special vertex has a potential value equal to some π0. Furthermore, given a potential
function π : V → R satisfying conditions (2.5) and (2.6), setting π′(u) = π(u) + c for all
u ∈ V gives another potential function satisfying these conditions. By setting c = −π0 the
potential function is normalized to take a value of zero at the special vertices throughout
my analysis.
Potential values are defined at vertices. Recall that in the construction of flow networks
each vertex corresponds to a particular agent-trade pair and the optimal potential values
of two adjacent vertices (associated with the same trade) are equal. Theorem 2.2.1 (3b)
implies that if these potential values are interpreted as prices, and the set of trades yi
chosen for some agent i is unilaterally modified (through the choice of a different outflow
at the vertices in V i), then the payoff of agent i cannot be improved. Thus, it follows that
an optimal solution (x, y) of the MSFP and the prices that correspond to potential values
satisfying Theorem 2.2.1 (3b) constitute a competitive equilibrium.
Conversely, given a competitive equilibrium, the prices for trades define potential values
at all vertices of the flow network, where the potential value of a vertex is the price of
28
the corresponding trade and the special vertices get a potential value of zero. The equilib-
rium conditions imply that the equilibrium prices and trades satisfy Theorem 2.2.1 (3a–3b).
Hence, the flow associated with the equilibrium trades solves the MSFP. Thus, the equiva-
lence of optimal solutions of the MSFP to efficient sets of trades, as well as the equivalence
of optimal potential values to competitive prices, follow.
2.3.1. Immediate Consequences
Theorem 2.3.1. (Theorem 1 in Hatfield et al. (2013)) There exists a competitive equilib-
rium.
Proof. Given a trading network G = (N,E), I map it to the associated flow problem in
the flow network (V,A). The MSFP in (V,A) has an optimal solution (x∗, y∗), since it is
a discrete problem and “no flow” is a feasible solution. Theorem 2.2.1 implies that there
exists an optimal potential function π∗ satisfying Condition 3. The trades that correspond
to (x∗, y∗), along with the prices associated with the potential function π∗, constitute a
competitive equilibrium, and the claim follows.
The set of trades associated with a competitive equilibrium is efficient.
Theorem 2.3.2. (First Welfare Theorem, Theorem 2 in Hatfield et al. (2013)) Suppose
that (X, p) is a competitive equilibrium. Then, X is an efficient set of trades.
Proof. Let (x, y) be a feasible flow associated with the set of trades X. The competitive
prices define a potential function for the flow (x, y). By Theorem 2.2.1, (x, y) is optimal;
therefore, the set of trades X is efficient.
Next, it is shown that competitive prices support all efficient sets of trades; i.e., competitive
prices along with any efficient set of trades constitute a competitive equilibrium.
Theorem 2.3.3. (Second Welfare Theorem (strong version), Theorem 3 in Hatfield et al.
(2013)) For any competitive equilibrium (X, p) and efficient set of trades X ′, (X ′, p) is also
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a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. The sets of trades X,X ′ correspond to optimal flows (x, y) and (x′, y′), respectively.
The prices define a potential function associated with the optimal flow (x, y). The second
part of Theorem 3.1 in Murota (1999) states that the potential function satisfies the con-
ditions of Theorem 2.2.1 (3) for the flow (x′, y′). I conclude that (X ′, p) is a competitive
equilibrium.
The set of competitive prices has a lattice structure.
Theorem 2.3.4. (Theorem 4 in Hatfield et al. (2013)) The set of competitive price vectors
is a lattice.
Proof. The claim7 is immediate from the fact that the feasible region of the system of
difference constraints (2.5) and (2.6) is a lattice.
Remark. Hatfield et al. (2013) established the existence of a competitive equilibrium in
trading networks, by reducing the trading network to a two-sided market. Then, they in-
voked the existence results of Kelso and Crawford (1982) for two-sided markets. Finally,
the authors used this equilibrium to construct a corresponding equilibrium for the underly-
ing trading network model, which implies the existence of competitive equilibria in trading
networks. The proof of Kelso and Crawford (1982) relies on discrete prices and a price
update process, and requires establishing that this process terminates in a finite number of
steps. The limiting point is always a competitive equilibrium. My approach eliminates the
need for discrete prices and the need to devise a specific price update process that converges
7Theorem 9.15 in Murota (2003) implies a stronger version of this result, which can be explained through
L-convexity. A set B ⊂ Zn is L-convex if (i) for p, q ∈ B we have p ∨ q, p ∧ q ∈ B, and (ii) for p ∈ B we
have p± 1 ∈ B. Here, p ∨ q (p ∧ q) is a vector, which is obtained by taking the component-wise maximum
(minimum) of the p and q vectors, and 1 is the vector of ones. B′ is L\-convex if B′ = {p|(0, p) ∈ B} for
some L-convex set B. Convex hulls of L-convex (L\-convex) sets are referred to as L-convex (L\-convex)
polyhedra. Theorem 9.15 in Murota (2003) implies that the set of optimal potential functions can be
represented as an L-convex polyhedron. Therefore, the set of competitive prices, which is a restriction of the
potential values to the coordinate plane, is an L\-convex polyhedron. L\-convex polyhedra exhibit lattice
structure.
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to a competitive equilibrium. Nor does it rely on any fixed-point arguments. Instead, the
competitive equilibrium allocation and prices are obtained directly in terms of primal/dual
optimal solutions of an optimization problem (i.e., the optimal flows and potential functions
in MSFP).
2.3.2. Multiple Identical Trades
In the trading network model one can interpret a trade as the sale of a unit of a good from
a seller to a buyer. For the case where there are multiple identical units of a good offered by
the seller, Hatfield et al. (2013) gave a sufficient condition for the existence of a competitive
equilibrium, where all “identical” trades receive the same price. The connection to MSFP is
used to extend this sufficient condition. I define what it means for two trades to be perfect
substitutes for each other.
Definition 2.3.1. Agent i’s trades e, e′ ∈ δ+(i) (similarly e, e′ ∈ δ−(i)) are perfect substi-
tutes if wi(X ∪ {e}) = wi(X ∪ {e′}) for all X ⊂ δ(i) \ {e, e′}.
This definition immediately implies that the value function of agent i depends only on
the number of trades chosen in an equivalence class of perfectly substitutable trades Y
associated with her, i.e., wi(X ∪ S) = wi(X ∪ S′) for all S, S′ ⊂ Y such that |S| = |S′| and
for all X ⊂ δ(i) \ Y .
In Hatfield et al. (2013) it was established that there exists a competitive equilibrium where
trades that are perfect substitutes receive the same price, provided that these trades are also
mutually incompatible, i.e., accepting more than two such trades leads to a payoff of −∞.
The next result shows that such an equilibrium still exists, when the mutual incompatibility
assumption is relaxed. Importantly, this relaxation allows the seller to produce and sell
multiple identical goods. A similar result, where each seller offers multiple identical goods
to each buyer, but offers distinct goods to distinct buyers, is given in Ikebe et al. (2015).
Theorem 7 generalizes this result by also allowing the sellers to offer identical goods to
different buyers. The proof of this result is a simple consequence of the MSFP formulation.
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Theorem 2.3.5. There exists a competitive equilibrium where any two trades that are
perfect substitutes for some agent receive the same price.
Proof. As before, I introduce a flow network F = (V,A), associated with the trading network
G. Recall that an M -concave function w′i is assigned to each agent with each argument
capturing the net outflow at a vertex u ∈ V i. Suppose that agent i has Li disjoint sets
of trades, and the trades in each set are perfect substitutes for each other. Specifically,
for every k ∈ {1, . . . , Li}, Y ik ⊂ δ(i) denotes a set of trades incident to agent i, such that
any two trades in Y ik are perfect substitutes for agent i. Denote by VY ik
⊂ V i the vertices
associated with trades Y ik in F . Merge all vertices in VY ik
into a vertex vY ik
. Make each arc
incident to a vertex in VY ik
incident to vY ik
. I obtain a new set of vertices associated with








Define a new function ŵi : ZV
i
m → R such that
ŵi(y
i
V i\Ri , yY i1





V i\Ri , z)
∣∣∣∣ ∑
e∈Y ik
ze = yY ik
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , Li}
}
.
The function ŵi is generated by (repeated) aggregation of the original M -concave function
w′i. Aggregation preserves M -concavity (see Theorem 6.13 in Murota (2003)).
Consider the MSFP formulation associated with the network obtained after merging all
vertices in each VY ik
into a single vertex vY ik
and imposing the penalty function f̂() =
−
∑
i ŵi(). The optimal flow in this formulation corresponds to the set of trades in the
trading network, where the net outflow from a vertex vY ik
represents the total number of
trades executed in the set of trades Y ik . Moreover, since all trades in Y
i
k are perfectly
substitutable, by the construction of ŵi, the absolute value of the cost of the optimal flow
is equivalent to the maximum total welfare.
The theorem follows from the equivalence between potential values and competitive prices.
As argued before, Theorem 2.2.1 (3b) gives a potential function π which associates values
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with the vertices of the flow network that can be interpreted as prices. Moreover, under
these prices agents maximize their payoff by choosing the trades associated with the optimal
flow; i.e., the aforementioned trades and prices constitute a competitive equilibrium. By
construction, all arcs corresponding to trades in Y ik are adjacent to a single vertex vY ik
.
Thus, there exists a unique potential value/price π(vY ik
) for trades Y ik . Hence, it follows
that a competitive equilibrium where all trades in Y ik receive identical prices exists.
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CHAPTER 3 : Applications of the Network Flow Approach in Trading Networks
Section 3.1 discusses the equivalence of various stability notions, Section 3.2 discusses al-
gorithms for obtaining competitive equilibria and testing (chain) stability, and Section 3.3
presents several comparative statics results. I conclude in Section 3.4.
3.1. Stable Outcomes
In this section I first review various notions of stability for trading networks proposed in
Hatfield et al. (2013). Informally, a stable outcome has the property that no subset of agents
has an incentive to deviate from it. Given a set of trades X, the prices of the corresponding
trades are denoted by pX , and the set of trades agent i demands once she is restricted to the
trades in X is denoted by Di(p
X) ⊂ X ∩ δ(i). I refer to the tuple (X, pX) as an outcome.
Call an outcome (X, pX) individually rational if








pXe ∀i ∈ N.
Definition 3.1.1. An outcome (X, pX) is stable if it is individually rational and is un-
blocked:
There is no feasible, nonempty blocking set Z ⊂ E, along with prices pZ , such that
1. Z ∩X = ∅, and
2. for all agents i involved in Z, for all Y i ∈ Di(pZ∪X), we have Z ∩ δ(i) ⊂ Y i.
The closely related notion of strongly stable outcome is defined next.
Definition 3.1.2. An outcome (X, pX) is strongly stable if it is individually rational and
is strongly unblocked:
There is no feasible, nonempty blocking set Z ⊂ E, along with prices pZ , such that
1. Z ∩X = ∅, and
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Clearly, a strongly stable outcome is stable.
The next notion of stability is analogous to pairwise stability in bipartite matching. I refer
to a set of consecutive arcs in a graph G, i.e., a set of m arcs S = {e1, . . . , em}, such that
e−i = e
+
i+1 for all i = 1, . . . ,m− 1, as a chain.
Definition 3.1.3. An outcome (X, pX) is chain stable if it is individually rational and is
unblocked by a chain:
There is no feasible, nonempty blocking chain Z ⊂ E, along with prices pZ , such that
1. Z ∩X = ∅, and
2. for all agents i involved in Z, for all Y i ∈ Di(pZ∪X), we have Z ∩ δ(i) ⊂ Y i.
The related notion of strong chain stability is defined below.
Definition 3.1.4. An outcome (X, pX) is strongly chain stable if it is individually rational
and is strongly unblocked by a chain:
There is no feasible, nonempty blocking chain Z ⊂ E, along with prices pZ , such that
1. Z ∩X = ∅, and

















Clearly, a strongly chain stable outcome is chain stable. Definitions 3.1.1–3.1.4 also imply
that a (strongly) stable outcome is (strongly) chain stable, since if there exists no (strongly)
blocking set, there exists no such set with a chain structure.
Before I show the equivalence of these stability concepts, I focus on the case where not
executing any trades is inefficient. In this case it is shown that it is always possible to find
a chain that improves welfare. Intuitively, this preliminary result implies that it may be
possible to restrict attention to chains when searching for a blocking set. I subsequently
formalize this intuition in Corollary 3.1.2 for outcomes where no trade is executed.
Lemma 3.1.1. Consider a trading network G = (N,E). If not executing any trades is
inefficient, there exists a chain of trades that improve welfare.
Proof. Consider the MSFP formulation of the welfare-maximization problem in G, and let
(x, y) denote a feasible solution of the MSFP associated with flow network F = (V,A)
that corresponds to executing no trades, i.e., that associates zero flow with all arcs in A1,
and hence guarantees y = 0. Since executing no trades in G is inefficient, according to
Theorem 2.2.1 there exists a negative cycle in the auxiliary network F aux(x, y). Pick a
negative cycle K with the least number of arcs. Observe that this cycle visits each vertex
of F aux(x, y) at most once, as otherwise there would exist a negative cycle with fewer arcs.




cauxa (x, y) =
∑
(u,v)∈K∩Caux(y)
[f(y − χu + χv)− f(y)].
2. The cycle contains at most one special vertex or two incident special vertices.
3. If (u, v) ∈ K ∩Baux(x), then (v, u) ∈ A0.
4. For all arcs in h ∈ K ∩A1, there exist hs, hb ∈ K ∩Caux(y) such that hs− h− hb is a
sequence of arcs along K.
The first condition follows since K is a negative cycle, and arc costs are nonzero only for
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arcs in Caux(y). Suppose that the second condition is violated. Then there are two special
vertices that are not connected by an arc along K. Add the arcs with zero cost between
them to K. Then, we get two cycles with fewer arcs, such that at least one has negative
length. This contradicts the assumption that K is the negative cycle with the least number
of arcs.
To prove the third condition, observe that Caux(y) = {(u, v)|u, v ∈ V, f(y−χu +χv) <∞}
consists only of arcs (u, v), where (i) u, v ∈ V i for some agent i, and (ii) u ∈ {vie|e ∈
{0}∪ δ−(i)} and v ∈ {vie|e ∈ {0}∪ δ+(i)}. To see (i), note that y = 0, and, by construction,
f(z) <∞ only when the total net outflow at the vertices in V i is zero for all i. Thus, if this
claim does not hold, then f(y − χu + χv) =∞, indicating that (u, v) /∈ Caux(y). Similarly,




i, and the definition of w
′
i implies
that f(y − χu + χv) =∞ unless this property holds.
Suppose by way of contradiction that (u, v) ∈ K ∩ Baux(x) and (v, u) ∈ A1. Observe that
(v, u) ∈ A1 implies that v ∈ {vie|e ∈ δ+(i)} for some agent i. Hence, the next arc (v, v′)
along K, cannot belong to Caux(y) (as this would violate (ii)). Since the arcs in A1 are
disjoint, this arc is given by (v, v′) = (v, u). By omitting both (u, v) and (v, u) from K, a
negative cycle with the same length but fewer arcs can be obtained, thereby leading to a
contradiction. Thus, the third condition follows.
For the fourth condition, fix h = (u, v) ∈ K ∩ A1. Since the arcs in A1 correspond to
disconnected components of F = (V,A), it follows that the next (similarly previous) arc
along K is either (v, u) ∈ Baux(x) or an element of Caux(y). The third condition together
with the fact that (u, v) ∈ A1 rules out the former case. The latter case implies the fourth
condition.










since K is a negative cycle with the fewest arcs. The term on the right-hand side is the cost
of the flow obtained after modifying the original flow by sending one unit of flow on arcs
A1 ∩K and adjusting the flow on A0 according to K ∩ (Aaux(x)∪Baux(x)) so that the net
outflow at V i is zero for all i. Thus, I conclude that executing the set of trades associated
with arcs A1 ∩K improves welfare. I complete the proof by showing that this set of trades
constitutes a chain in the trading network.
Assume that K does not involve any special vertices. Consider an arc h ∈ K∩Caux(y), and
recall that both end points of this arc belong to V i for some agent i. Both the predecessor
and successor of this arc along K belong to A1, since the arcs in C
aux(y) incident to a non-
special vertex either all have this vertex as their head or they all have it as their tail. This,
along with the fourth condition, implies that arcs along K alternate between Aaux(x) and
Caux(y). The successor of h connects a non-special vertex in V i to a non-special vertex in
V j for some j 6= i, thereby capturing trades between i and j. Since arcs along K alternate
between Aaux(x) and Caux(y), it follows that the next arc’s (say h′’s) end points belong to
V j . By the same argument it can be seen that the arc after h′ suggests a trade relation
between j and some other agent k. Thus, proceeding iteratively, I conclude that the set of
trades associated with arcs A ∩K constitutes a chain1 in G.
The same argument still holds when there is a single special vertex v ∈ V i for some i that
belongs to K. Arcs alternate between Aaux(x) and Caux(y), aside from the arcs adjacent
to v. Since v is connected to other special vertices and vertices in V i, and K visits a single
special vertex, it follows that there exist u, u′ ∈ V i such that (u, v)− (v, u′) belongs to K.
Since u, u′ are non-special vertices in V i, the earlier argument implies that the successor
(predecessor) of (v, u′) ((u, v)) belongs to A1. Thus, proceeding as before, I conclude that
the set of trades associated with arcs A ∩K constitutes a chain starting and ending at i.
Assume instead that K involves an arc between special vertices. Since K involves at most
1In this case, it can be seen that the aforementioned trades also constitute a cycle in G. This is because
special vertices are not visited.
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two special vertices, there can be only one such arc. Starting with such an arc, and pro-
ceeding as before, it follows that the remaining arcs along K suggest a chain of trades that
correspond to the arcs A ∩K.
Hence, I conclude that the trades identified by the smallest negative cycle induce a chain
of welfare-improving trades, as claimed.
The optimality conditions for MSFP and the structure of the flow network play a key role in
the proof of Lemma 3.1.1. This result also has a straightforward corollary that characterizes
blocking chains in terms of a minimal set T of trades that improve welfare, i.e., T such that
no subset of T improves welfare when compared to executing no trades.
Corollary 3.1.2. Consider a trading network G = (N,E). Assume that not executing any
trades is inefficient. Then,
(i) any minimal set of trades that improve welfare constitutes a chain, and
(ii) there exist prices that together with these trades constitute a blocking chain.
Proof. (i) Assume ∅ is not efficient in G, and let T ⊂ E be a minimal set of trades that
strictly improve welfare. Consider a trading network Ĝ = (N,T ), obtained by restricting the
original set of trades to T . Observe that ∅ is also not welfare-maximizing in Ĝ. Lemma 3.1.1
implies that there exists a welfare-improving set of trades that constitutes a chain in Ĝ.
Since T is the minimal (and only) set of trades that improves welfare, it follows that T is
a chain.
(ii) Since T is a minimal welfare-improving set of trades, it follows that in Ĝ = (N,T ) the
unique efficient set of trades is T .
Let ∆ > 0 be such that
∑
iwi(T ∩ δ(i))−2∆|T | >
∑
iwi(X ∩ δ(i))−2∆|X| for any X ( T .
It suffices to choose a ∆ > 0, such that 2∆|T | <
∑
iwi(T ∩ δ(i)) −
∑
iwi(∅) (recall that∑
iwi(X ∩ δ(i)) ≤
∑
iwi(∅) for any X ( T , since T is a minimal welfare-improving set
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of trades). Consider another economy with the same network structure Ĝ = (N,T ), but
with valuations2 w̄i(Z) = wi(Z)−∆|Z|, where Z ⊂ δ(i). Observe that for any set of trades
X ( T we have
∑
i
w̄i(T ∩ δ(i)) =
∑
i
(wi(T ∩ δ(i))−∆|T ∩ δ(i)|) =
∑
i









Thus, it follows that T is still the unique efficient set of trades in this economy. Denote a
competitive equilibrium in this economy by (T, pT ).
I claim that (T, pT ) is a competitive equilibrium in the economy with value functions
{wi}i∈N , where Di(pT ) = {T ∩ δ(i)}. This is because, if a set of trades T ∩ δ(i) is de-
manded in the economy with value functions {w̄i}i∈N , for any S ( T ∩ δ(i) we have
ui(T ∩ δ(i), pT )−∆|T ∩ δ(i)| = ūi(T ∩ δ(i), pT ) ≥ ūi(S, pT ) = ui(S, pT )−∆|S|, (3.2)
where ūi is the payoff function associated with w̄i. This implies that the payoff of agent i
for the trades in T ∩δ(i) is strictly greater than her payoff for any set of trades S ( T ∩δ(i).
Thus, I conclude that in the economy with value functions {wi}i∈N we have Di(pT ) =
{T ∩ δ(i)}. Hence, it follows that (T, pT ) is a blocking chain for the outcome (∅, p∅).
The definitions in this section imply that verifying stability of an outcome (X, pX) requires
focusing on trades that belong to E \X and establishing that there is no blocking set (or
chain) in E \ X. Thus, to study the stability of an outcome (X, pX) with X 6= ∅, it is
necessary to study the preferences of agents for trades in E \ X. To this end, the idea of
a contraction of an economy (see Hatfield et al. (2013)) is used. For an outcome (X, pX),
2The use of “modified valuations” was employed in Hatfield et al. (2013) to establish that a stable outcome
can be supported with appropriate prices to obtain a competitive equilibrium. I follow a similar construction
to show that if the efficient allocation is unique, then there exist competitive equilibrium prices under which
each agent strictly demands her equilibrium set of trades. Note, that this result is independent of the trading
network structure, and is a byproduct of strict complementarity in optimization.
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I define a new trading network GX = (N,E \X), where agent i ∈ N has a value function
ŵi : 2
δ(i)∩(E\X) → R given as follows:
ŵi(S) = max
Y⊂X∩δ(i)







It follows from Murota (2003) (Theorem 6.13 (3), Theorem 6.15) that ŵi is M
\-concave for
each i ∈ N . Refer to GX as the contraction of economy G, with respect to (X, pX).
3.1.1. Equivalence of Solution Concepts
Given a competitive equilibrium (X, p) I refer to the tuple (X, pX), obtained after restricting
the prices to the trades in X, as a competitive equilibrium outcome. It is next shown that all
notions of stable outcomes coincide with competitive equilibrium outcomes. My approach
involves the following two steps (established in Theorems 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, respectively):
1. A competitive equilibrium outcome is a (strongly) stable outcome.
2. A chain stable outcome is a competitive equilibrium outcome.
The first result follows from the definition of stability, while the second follows from
Lemma 3.1.1 and Corollary 3.1.2, which exploit the network flow formulation.
Theorem 3.1.3. (Theorem 5 in Hatfield et al. (2013)) If (X, p) is a competitive equilibrium
in trading network G and pX is the restriction of p to the arcs in X, then, (X, pX) is a
(strongly) stable outcome in G.
Proof. Since (X, p) is a competitive equilibrium, it follows that (X, pX) is individually
rational. To complete the proof, it suffices to show that there is no set of trades that
(strongly) blocks (X, pX). Let GX be the contraction with respect to (X, pX). Since
(X, p) is a competitive equilibrium in G, (∅, p(E\X)) is a competitive equilibrium in GX .
Theorem 2.3.2 implies that ∅ is an efficient set of trades in GX . Suppose, for a contradiction,
there exist trades and prices (Z, pZ) that (strongly) block (X, pX) in G. This would imply

















Figure 4: Outcomes Hierarchy
As any (strongly) stable outcome is (strongly) chain stable, Theorem 3.1.3 implies the
hierarchy displayed in Figure 4.
Next, I establish the equivalence of all the stability notions, by showing that in any chain
stable outcome (X, pX), it is possible to find prices for trades E \ X to support X as a
competitive equilibrium. Thus, the “weakest” and “strongest” equilibrium/stability notions
in Figure 4 are equivalent.
Theorem 3.1.4. Suppose that (X, pX) is a chain stable outcome in trading network G.
Then, there exists a price vector p ∈ RE , with pe = pXe for all e ∈ X, such that (X, p) is a
competitive equilibrium in G.
Proof. Consider the contraction GX of the trading network G with respect to (X, pX). I
claim that for some price vector p̂E\X , (∅, p̂E\X) is a competitive equilibrium in GX . Assume
not, then, it follows from Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.3 that ∅ is not welfare maximizing in GX .
Then, Corollary 3.1.2 implies that this outcome is not chain stable, and there exists a
set of trades T ⊂ E \ X, and prices pT that constitute a blocking chain in GX . This
implies that (T, pT ) also blocks (X, pX) in the original economy G. Thus, a contradiction
is obtained, and it follows that (∅, p̂E\X) is a competitive equilibrium in GX . Since (X, pX)
is chain stable and hence individually rational, this implies that in the economy G, under
prices (pX , p̂E\X), each agent i demands X ∩ δ(i). Hence, this outcome corresponds to a
competitive equilibrium, and the claim follows.
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3.2. Algorithms for Trading Networks
The MSFP formulation leads to computationally efficient algorithms for obtaining compet-
itive equilibria and stable outcomes. In this section, I first outline algorithms that can be
used to obtain competitive equilibria and various associated quantities. I then provide an
algorithm that can be used to check whether a given outcome is (chain) stable.
3.2.1. Competitive Equilibrium Computation
An algorithm for solving MSFP in time that is polynomial in input size is described in
Iwata et al. (2005). The transformation of the problem of finding an efficient set of trades
into an instance of MSFP also has polynomial complexity. Thus, it follows that an efficient
set of trades for trading networks can be obtained in polynomial time, by formulating and
solving3 the associated MSFP.
The algorithm outlined requires oracle knowledge of agents’ valuations. Alternatively, it is
possible to design a tâtonnement process that converges to competitive equilibria. Specif-
ically, it is possible to set prices, collect the set of demanded trades by each trader, and
adjust prices until convergence to a competitive equilibrium. Such iterative price update
schemes are privacy-preserving, in the sense that they do not necessitate knowledge of the
entire value function of the agents, and are employed in iterative auction design; see, e.g.,
Ausubel (2006).
Consider for instance Algorithm 1, which is initialized with arbitrary (integral) prices for
trades. At each stage, it collects agents’ demand reports, i.e., the sets of trades that are
demanded at the current price vector p. Then, Algorithm 1 checks whether it is possible to
choose a set of trades X that is consistent with agents’ demand reports; i.e., X assigns to
3The algorithm in Iwata et al. (2005) runs in strongly polynomial time; i.e. the number of arithmetic
operations performed does not depend on the magnitudes of agents’ valuations. Thus, it is possible to
compute the efficient set of trades in a number of operations and space bounded by a polynomial in input
size. Similarly, it can be shown that by computing the shortest distances from special vertices to the
remaining vertices of the auxiliary network, potential values that satisfy the difference constraints (2.5) and
(2.6) can be readily obtained. This can be accomplished in strongly polynomial time, using shortest-path
algorithms, e.g., the Bellman-Ford algorithm. Using these observations it is possible to strengthen all of
the results on the polynomial complexity in this and the next subsection. Specifically, it can be shown that
a competitive equilibrium can be obtained, and stability can be checked in strongly polynomial time for
trading networks.
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each agent demanded trades (X ∩ δ(i) ∈ Di(p) for each i).
ALGORITHM 1: Tâtonnement Process
1 Initialize price vector p = p0, where p0 ∈ ZE ;
2 Collect agents’ demand reports Di(p) ;
3 if no set of trades is consistent with demand reports then













5 p := p+ ε∗χS
∗
;




Note that if such a set of trades X exists, then it is also efficient, and p is a vector of
competitive prices. Otherwise, Algorithm 1 increments/decrements the price of a set of
trades. Suppose that the algorithm chooses (ε∗, S∗) and updates the prices by ε∗χS
∗
, where
ε∗ ∈ {−1, 1} and χS ∈ {0, 1}E is a characteristic vector for set S; i.e., its entry corresponding










captures the corresponding change in the maximum payoff of agent i from the previously
demanded sets in Di(p). Thus, Algorithm 1 updates the prices in a way that decreases the
aggregate payoff of agents from demanded bundles as much as possible.
Convergence of Algorithm 1 to a competitive equilibrium can be established by showing








Thus, this function can be used as a Lyapunov function for establishing convergence. Note
that for the efficient set of trades X, by choosing S∗i = X ∩ δ(i), it can be seen that g(p) ≥∑
i ui(S
∗




i ). Thus, g is lower-bounded by the optimal welfare. Moreover,
this lower bound is achieved whenever ui(S
∗
i , p) = max
S⊂δ(i)
ui(S, p) for all i, or, equivalently,
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whenever p is a competitive equilibrium vector. Thus, when the algorithm converges, it
converges to a competitive equilibrium.
The fact that the unit price updates given in the algorithm decrease g(p) follows from
the duality theory of M -convex optimization. The function max
S⊂δ(i)







pe is the convex conjugate of −wi. Convex conjugates of M \-convex
functions, as well as their sums such as g, are L\-convex functions. A function h : Zn → R is
L-convex if (i) for p, q ∈ Zn we have h(p)+h(q) ≥ h(p∨q)+h(p∧q), and (ii) h(p+1) = r+h(p)
for some r ∈ R. A function h is L\-convex if h̃(p0, p) = h(p−p01) for some L-convex function
h̃. L\-convex functions have desirable properties. For instance, if p is not a minimizer of an
L\-convex function, then by jointly incrementing/decrementing a subset of the coordinates
of p, the value of the function can be decreased (see Section 7 in Murota, 2003). Note that
Algorithm 1 relies on such price updates. The details of convergence of this algorithm are
standard, and hence omitted. Note that similar algorithms have also been used to determine
competitive equilibria in two-sided markets (Sun and Yang, 2009; Murota, 2003).
I close this section by providing an approach for testing whether a given payoff vector can
be supported in equilibrium. Formally, given σ ∈ RN , I investigate whether there exists a
competitive equilibrium (X, p) such that σi = ui(X ∩ δ(i), p) for all i ∈ N .
Let X denote an efficient set of trades. Theorem 2.3.3 implies that (X, p) is a competitive
equilibrium for any equilibrium price vector p. Since in a competitive equilibrium agents
demand trades that maximize their payoff, it also follows that all competitive equilibria
with price vector p share the same payoff vector; i.e., agent i ∈ N receives the same payoff
in all such equilibria. Thus, to characterize the set of payoff vectors that can be induced in
equilibrium, it suffices to fix an efficient set of trades X and consider different equilibrium
price vectors.
Recall that an efficient set of trades can be obtained by using the MSFP formulation. Let
(x, y) denote an optimal solution of this problem, and let X denote the corresponding
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efficient set of trades. Consider the auxiliary network F aux(x, y) associated with (x, y), and
recall that the reduced cost optimality conditions can be expressed as in (2.5) and (2.6). As
discussed in Section 2.3, when the potential values of the special vertices in the flow network
({vi0}i∈N ) are set to zero, the potential values satisfying (2.5) and (2.6) characterize the set
of all competitive equilibrium price vectors. In particular, given a solution π to this system
by setting the price of any trade e ∈ E to pe = π(ve
+
e ) (= π(v
e−
e )) yields a competitive
equilibrium price vector and vice versa.
Using these observations it follows that the payoff vector σ can be supported in equilibrium
if and only if the following system has a solution π:






π(vie) = σi ∀i ∈ N
π(v)− π(u) ≤ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ Aaux(x) ∪Baux(x)
π(v)− π(u) ≤ f(y − χu + χv)− f(y) ∀(u, v) ∈ Caux(y)
π(vi0) = 0 ∀i ∈ N,
(P)
where f is defined as in Section 2.3 (see the discussion following (2.3)).
Thus, I conclude that by first obtaining an optimal solution (x, y) to the MSFP formulation
(and the associated efficient set of trades X), and then checking whether (P) admits a
feasible solution (π), it can be determined whether σ constitutes a competitive equilibrium
payoff vector or not. The latter step can be accomplished by solving a linear program.
Moreover, both this linear program and the MSFP formulation can be solved in time that
is polynomial in the number of trades in the economy. Therefore, I have established the
following corollary:
Corollary 3.2.1. It is possible to check in time that is polynomial in |E| whether a given
vector σ ∈ RN constitutes an equilibrium payoff vector.
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3.2.2. Determining a Blocking Chain
Recall that an outcome is chain stable if it is individually rational and does not admit a
blocking chain. I describe below a polynomial-time algorithm, Algorithm 2, for identifying
a blocking chain for a given outcome or for certifying that none exists. This algorithm can
also be used to test chain stability in polynomial time.
Fix an outcome (X, pX). To verify individual rationality of this outcome it suffices to
ensure that ui(X ∩ δ(i), pX) is greater than ui((X ∩ δ(i)) \ {e}, pX) for all e ∈ X ∩ δ(i),
and ui((X ∩ δ(i) \ {e1, e2}), pX) for all e1 ∈ X ∩ δ+(i), e2 ∈ X ∩ δ−(i) and i ∈ N . This
follows from Theorem 6.26 in Murota (2003), together with the fact that the value functions
and hence ui(X ∩ δ(i), pX) are M \-concave. Thus, individual rationality can be checked by
comparing X ∩ δ(i) with polynomially many sets of trades incident to agent i, for all i.
Assume that outcome (X, pX) is individually rational. Then, Algorithm 2 can be used to
identify a blocking chain or certify that none exists. In the description of the algorithm the
shorthand (x, y) = RḠ(X) is used to denote the flow/net outflow that is consistent with a
given set of trades X, in the flow network associated with a trading network Ḡ.
Algorithm 2 proceeds in two phases. Phase one focuses on the contraction GX (with respect
to (X, pX)), corresponding value functions {ŵi}i∈N (see (3.3)), and set of trades ∅. It uses
the auxiliary network associated with GX , and finds a minimal welfare-improving chain T
if one exists. If none exists, then there is no blocking chain. Otherwise, the second phase
returns the prices pT , which together with T constitute a blocking chain for the empty
outcome in GX , and, equivalently, outcome (X, pX) in G.
The algorithm relies on three functions: aux.construct(), greedyX(), BellmanFord(). It
starts phase one by considering the trading network Ḡ = GX , and flow (x, y) = RḠ(∅) in
the corresponding flow network. Function aux.construct(Ḡ, (x, y)) constructs the associated
auxiliary network. The auxiliary network has at most O(|N |+|E|) vertices (since it contains
two vertices for each trade and a special vertex for each agent) and O(|N |2 + |E|2) arcs
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ALGORITHM 2: Determining a Blocking Chain
Input: Trading network G = (N,E), valuations {wi}i∈N , and outcome (X, pX ).
Output: Blocking chain T with prices pT .
1
2 Ḡ = GX ; (x, y) = RḠ(∅); F
aux(x, y) = aux.construct(Ḡ, (x, y));
3 foreach (u, v) ∈ Aaux(x) ∪ Baux(x) do caux(u,v)(x, y) = 0;
4 foreach i ∈ N do
5 foreach u ∈ V i do
6 foreach v ∈ V i do
7 caux(u,v)(x, y) = greedyX(wi, y




11 foreach u ∈ V do
12 foreach v ∈ V do
13 W [u, v, 1] = caux(u,v)(x, y);
14 end
15 end
16 for m = 2→ |V | do
17 foreach u ∈ V do
18 foreach v ∈ V do
19 W [u, v,m] = W [u, v,m− 1];
20 foreach t ∈ V do





26 Find smallest m such that W [u, u,m] < 0 for some u and negative cycle K from matrix of predecessors;
27 if not found then
28 return No Blocking Chain;
29 else
30 set T = {e ∈ E|the corresponding arc in the auxiliary network belongs to K ∩ Aaux(x)};
31 end
32
33 Ĝ = (N, T ); (x, y) = R
Ĝ
(T ); Faux(x, y) = aux.construct(Ĝ, (x, y)) ;
34 foreach (u, v) ∈ Aaux(x) ∪ Baux(x) do caux(u,v)(x, y) = 0;
35 foreach i ∈ N do
36 foreach u ∈ V i do
37 foreach v ∈ V i do
38 caux(u,v)(x, y) = greedyX(wi, y




42 Set ∆ = 1
4|T | ;
43 foreach a ∈ Caux(y) do
44 if a is adjacent to a special vertex then




47 cauxa (x, y) = c
aux
a (x, y)− 2∆;
48 end
49 end
50 Pick a special vertex s in Faux(x, y);
51 d = BellmanFord(Faux(x, y), s);
52 foreach e ∈ T do




55 return (T, pT );
(where the cardinality of Aaux(x)∪Baux(x) is O(|N |2 + |E|), and the cardinality of Caux(y)
is O(|E|2), since it is bounded by
∑
i∈N (|δ(i)| + 1)2). Note that traders who do not have
any incident arcs cannot affect the stable outcome/blocking chains. Thus, in this analysis
without loss of generality, such agents are omitted from the trading network, and I consider
settings where G = (N,E) is (weakly) connected4 and satisfies |E| ≥ |N | − 1. Hence, the
4If G is not connected then the algorithm can examine each connected component separately.
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number of arcs in the auxiliary network is O(|N |2 + |E|2) = O(|E|2).
Algorithm 2 assigns costs to all arcs in Caux(y), using greedyX(). As the auxiliary network
is associated with the contraction GX , these costs are a function of {ŵi}i∈N . Algorithm 2
does not need to explicitly determine {ŵi}i∈N . It suffices to evaluate these functions for
each arc in the auxiliary network in Caux(y) to determine the arc costs. Specifically, recall
that each arc (u, v) ∈ Caux(y) is such that u, v ∈ V i for some i ∈ N , and thus caux(u,v)(x, y) =
f(y − χu + χv) − f(y) = ŵ′i(yi) − ŵ′i(yi − χu + χv), where ŵi
′ is the M -concave function
associated with ŵi (recall the definition in (2.2)). The definition of {ŵi}i∈N in (3.3) and
M \-concavity of wi imply that for a given y, it is possible to compute ŵ
′
i(y) with a greedy
algorithm (greedyX()) in polynomial
5 time (Shioura, 2004). The complexity of computing
this quantity, and hence caux(u,v)(x, y) for each (u, v) ∈ C
aux(y), is O(|X|2), which is bounded
by O(|E|2). Thus, the overall complexity of computing all arc costs and constructing the
auxiliary network is O(|E|4) (recall that the cardinality of Caux(y) is bounded by O(|E|2)).
Recall that a negative cycle with the least number of arcs in the auxiliary network reveals
a (minimal) chain of trades that improve welfare, which constitutes a blocking chain T (see
Lemma 3.1.1 and Corollary 3.1.2). To find such a negative cycle, it suffices to compute the
array W , whose (u, v,m) entry, W [u, v,m], is the smallest length achieved by a directed
path from vertex u to vertex v using at most m arcs. If W [u, u,m] is nonnegative for each u
and m ≤ |V |, then the first phase of Algorithm 2 terminates by concluding that no negative
cycle exists, and hence not executing any trades in GX is efficient (Theorem 2.2.1). Thus,
there is no blocking chain. Otherwise, the negative cycle with the least number of arcs is
given by the element W [u, u,m] which is negative for the smallest possible m. The arcs
along the negative cycle can be found by keeping track of the arcs added to the shortest
paths at the computation of W (i.e., the arcs (t, v) whose length determines W [u, v,m] in
line 20). In this case, the first phase of the algorithm terminates with a blocking chain T .
Computing W and finding a blocking chain T (or establishing that it does not exist) takes
5In our case this greedy algorithm is strongly polynomial, since domf ⊂ {−1, 0, 1}V .
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O(|V |4) = O((|N |+ |E|)4) = O(|E|4) steps.
In phase two I construct the prices pT accompanying the blocking chain T . The algorithm
focuses on trading network Ĝ = (N,T ), value functions {ŵi}i∈N , and set of trades T , and
constructs the prices following the approach in the proof of Corollary 3.1.2. Specifically, it
first perturbs the value functions {ŵi}i∈N by ∆ > 0 (which is chosen to satisfy the conditions
imposed in the proof of Corollary 3.1.2) to obtain valuations w̄i(Z) = ŵi(Z)−∆|Z|. Then,
it computes a competitive equilibrium in the economy with respect to {w̄i}i∈N . As in
Corollary 3.1.2, a competitive equilibrium in this economy yields prices pT such that under
these prices, each agent i strictly demands T ∩ δ(i) in GX , thereby implying that (T, pT ) is
a blocking chain for outcome (X, pX) in G.
To compute the competitive equilibrium prices, the algorithm focuses on the flow network of
Ĝ, and the flow consistent with executing trades T . Then, it constructs the corresponding
auxiliary network and its arc costs (according to {w̄i}i∈N ), which takes O(|E|4). To see
this, note that arc costs according to {w̄i}i∈N and those according to {ŵi}i∈N are closely
related.
In particular, since we start with a flow consistent with executing all trades T in Ĝ, each
arc in Caux(y) corresponds to dropping one existing trade (if incident to a special vertex)
or two existing trades (such that an agent is a buyer in one and a seller in the other). In
the former case (assuming trade e is dropped), the arc cost is given by:
w̄i(T )− w̄i(T \ {e}) = ŵi(T )−∆|T | − ŵi(T \ {e}) + ∆(|T | − 1) = ŵi(T )− ŵi(T \ {e})−∆.
Thus, the arc cost according to {w̄i}i∈N is obtained by subtracting ∆ from the arc cost
according to {ŵi}i∈N . In the latter case, since the arc is not incident to a special vertex,
the algorithm follows a similar approach and computes the arc costs by subtracting 2∆ from
the arc costs associated with {ŵi}i∈N . Instead of constructing the functions {ŵi, w̄i}i∈N
explicitly, the algorithm relies on greedyX() to evaluate the arc costs according to {ŵi}i∈N .
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This step has complexity O(|E|4). Then, it perturbs these by ∆ and 2∆ as appropriate, to
construct the arc costs according to {w̄i}i∈N . Since the cardinality of Caux(y) is O(|E|2),
the overall complexity of constructing the auxiliary network and accompanying arc costs
according to {w̄i}i∈N is O(|E|4).
Given the auxiliary network and arc costs, if potential values satisfying conditions (2.5)
and (2.6) are known, they will be equilibrium prices pT . Such potential values can be
obtained by solving a linear program. Alternatively, consider the shortest distances from a
special vertex to all vertices of the auxiliary network. Observe that these distances readily
satisfy conditions (2.5) and (2.6), and hence give pT . For an auxiliary network F aux(x, y)
and (special) vertex s, the function BellmanFord(F aux(x, y), s) of the algorithm computes
the shortest path distances on F aux(x, y) from vertex s using the Bellman-Ford algorithm.
Constructing the prices following this approach has complexity O(|V ||A|) = O(|E|3).
In sum, the overall complexity of the algorithm is O(|E|4 + |E|4 + |E|3) = O(|E|4). Hence,
using Algorithm 2 it is possible to identify a blocking chain or to certify that none exists in
polynomial time. Since individual rationality can also be checked in polynomial time, my
results imply that for trading networks chain stability can be tested in polynomial time.
3.3. Comparative Statics
The study of how the solutions of an economic model change as its parameters are changed
is important because most of the testable predictions of a model are comparative statics
predictions. Here, I first characterize how competitive equilibria change if (i) a new trade or
(ii) a new buyer is added to the underlying economy. I build on these results to characterize
how the addition of a collection of trades (possibly between more than two traders) may
change the equilibrium. Finally, I discuss possible applications of my comparative statics.
My characterization exploits how optimal flow/potential values change as the parameters
of the corresponding MSFP are modified.
Sensitivity results are available for the classic minimum-cost network flow problems (see,
e.g, Ahuja et al. (1993)). I provide a similar result for MSFP using the reduced costs
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associated with a given optimal flow and potential function.
Lemma 3.3.1. Consider a network F = (V,A) and let â be an arc with zero capacity, i.e.,
kâ = kâ = 0. Let (x, y) and π respectively denote an optimal solution of the MSFP and
vertex potential values that satisfy the optimality conditions in Theorem 2.2.1. Construct
the auxiliary network F aux(x, y), and let d : V → R be a function such that d(v) is the
length of the shortest path from â− to v ∈ V in F aux(x, y), where the length of each arc is
given by the reduced cost under π.
Consider the instance of MSFP when kâ is increased to one. For this problem an optimal
solution (x̂, ŷ) and an associated potential function π̂ that satisfies the optimality conditions
of Theorem 2.2.1 can be obtained as follows:
• Set π̂(v) = π(v) + d(v) for all v ∈ V .
• If cπâ + d(â+) ≥ 0, set (x̂, ŷ) = (x, y). Otherwise, let P be a shortest path (with
respect to the reduced costs) from â− to â+ in F aux(x, y) with the least number of
arcs. Obtain x̂ by augmenting the flow x in F along P , and sending one unit of flow
on arc â. Define ŷ as the associated net outflow.
Proof. Theorem 2.2.2 implies that in F , the vertex potential function π together with the
optimal solution (x, y) of the MSFP satisfy the reduced-cost optimality conditions. Let F̂
denote the network obtained after increasing the capacity of arc â in F by one unit. Observe
that the optimal flow (x, y) of F continues to be feasible for F̂ (since the capacities of arcs
do not decrease). Let F̂ aux(x, y) denote the auxiliary network associated with F̂ , and (x, y).
Note that F̂ aux(x, y) is obtained from F aux(x, y) by including arc â. Thus, it follows that
(x, y, π) satisfies the reduced-cost optimality conditions for all arcs in F̂ aux(x, y) except â.
Case 1 (cπâ + d(â
+) ≥ 0): Construct a new potential function as defined in the statement
of the lemma: π̂(v) = π(v) + d(v) for all v ∈ V . Observe that for any arc a in F aux(x, y),
we have d(a−) ≤ d(a+) + cπa , i.e., the shortest path from â− to a− is at most the length
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of the shortest path to a+ plus the length of arc a. This implies that for all arcs a 6= â in




remain nonnegative. As for arc a, the new reduced cost is nonnegative according to the
hypothesis of this case (since cπ̂â = c
π
â + d(â
+)). Thus, (x, y) and π̂ satisfy the reduced-cost
optimality conditions in F̂ . Therefore, by Theorem 2.2.2, (x, y) is an optimal solution of
the MSFP, and together with potential function π̂ it also satisfies the optimality conditions
of Theorem 2.2.1.
Case 2 (cπâ + d(â
+) < 0): Update the potential function as in Case 1. Define a new
solution (x̂, ŷ) to the MSFP as described in the statement of the lemma. Denote by Âaux(x),
B̂aux(x), and Ĉaux(y), the subsets of the arcs in the auxiliary network F̂ aux(x, y) (as defined
in Section 2.2). As in the first case, under the new potential function π̂ any arc a 6= â in
F̂ aux(x, y) has a nonnegative reduced cost. Consider the new auxiliary network F̂ aux(x̂, ŷ)
obtained after the flow is updated, and define the associated reduced costs with respect to
the potential function π̂.
First focus on the arcs in Âaux(x̂) ∪ B̂aux(x̂). Following a similar approach to Case 1,
it can be shown that the reduced costs of arcs that were also present previously, i.e., in
Âaux(x) ∪ B̂aux(x), remain nonnegative. It follows from the construction of the auxiliary
network that the new arcs in F̂ aux(x̂, ŷ) (that do not belong to F̂ aux(x, y)) are those obtained
after reversing the arcs in P ∪ {â}. Observe that arc â is only present with an opposite
orientation, since in x̂ one unit of flow is sent on arc â. It can be readily seen that the
reduced-cost optimality condition on this arc, hereafter −â, is now satisfied since it is given
by cπ̂−â = −(cπâ + d(â+)) > 0, where the inequality follows from the assumption in this case.
For each arc a in P ∩ (Âaux(x)∪ B̂aux(x)), let −a denote the arc obtained after reversing a,
and recall that −a ∈ Âaux(x̂)∪ B̂aux(x̂). Since arc a is on the shortest path between â− and
â+, we have d(a−) = d(a+) + cπa . Consequently, c
π̂
−a = −cπ̂a = −(cπa + d(a+) − d(a−)) = 0.
Thus, it follows that all arcs in Âaux(x̂) ∪ B̂aux(x̂) have nonnegative reduced cost.
To conclude the proof I establish that the reduced costs of arcs in Ĉaux(ŷ) are positive using
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the following lemma:
Lemma 3.3.2 (Lemma 3.2 in Moriguchi and Murota (2003)). Suppose that y ∈ arg min
z
f(z)−
p · z and that (u1, v1), (u2, v2), . . . , (ur, vr) ∈ Caux(y) have distinct end vertices. If (ui, vi) ∈
Caux(y)∩ {a|cpa = 0} for i = 1, . . . , r and (ui, vj) /∈ Caux(y)∩ {a|cpa = 0} for any i < j, then
ŷ = y +
r∑
i=1
(χvi − χui) ∈ arg min
z
f(z)− p · z.
Given flows x and x̂ in F̂ , focus on the associated outflow y and ŷ, and the corresponding
sets of arcs Ĉaux(y) and Ĉaux(ŷ). The hypotheses of this lemma can be verified by setting
pv = π̂(v) for all v ∈ V .
First, observe that under π̂ the reduced cost of any arc in F aux(x, y) is nonnegative. Hence,
under π̂ any arc a 6= â in F̂ aux(x, y) has a nonnegative reduced cost, and I conclude that
the reduced costs of all arcs in Ĉaux(y) are nonnegative. Note that the reduced cost of an
arc (u, v) ∈ Ĉaux(y) can be expressed as follows: cπ̂(u,v) = f̄(y + χ
v − χu)− f̄(y) ≥ 0, where
f̄(y) = f(y) −
∑
v∈V
π̂(v)yv. Since local optimality implies global optimality for M -convex
functions (see Murota (2003)), and Ĉaux(y) consists of all (u, v) for which f(y + χv − χu)




Second, all arcs in P ∩ Ĉaux(y) have distinct end vertices. To show this, I examine how P
was formed in the auxiliary network F aux(x, y) with potential function π. The shortest path
P cannot go through a vertex twice, since all reduced costs are nonnegative. In addition,
there are no consecutive arcs (s, u)−(u, t) in P ∩Caux(y), since by M -convexity the reduced
cost of the shortcut (s, t) is less than the sum of the reduced costs in (s, u) and (u, t), which
would have revealed that there exists a shortest path from â− to â+ with fewer arcs than
P . Formally, let caux(u′,v′)(x, y) be the cost of arc (u
′, v′) in F aux(x, y). Using the definition
in (2.1) and directly applying M -EXC[Z] on f , it can be seen that the triangle inequality
holds for the arc costs of the auxiliary network, i.e.,
caux(s,t)(x, y) ≤ c
aux









(s,u)(x, y) + π(s)− π(u) + c
aux
(u,t) + π(u)− π(t)
= caux(s,u) + c
aux
(u,t) + π(s)− π(t)
≥ caux(s,t) + π(s)− π(t)
= cπ(s,t).
As explained above, we have cπ̂a = 0 for all a ∈ P∩Ĉaux(y). Now, suppose that P∩Ĉaux(y) =
{(u1, v1), . . . , (ur, vr)}, where the indexing is chosen with respect to the order of arcs in P .
It readily follows that there is no shortcut arc (ui, vj) ∈ Ĉaux(y) such that i < j and
cπ̂(ui,vj) = 0, since this would imply that c
π
(ui,vj)
= d(vj)− d(ui), which raises a contradiction
by revealing that in F aux(x, y) with potential function π there exists a shortest path from
â− to â+ with fewer arcs than P .
Thus, Lemma 3.2 in Moriguchi and Murota (2003) guarantees that ŷ ∈ arg minz∈Z|V | f(z)−∑
v∈V
π̂(v)zv. Global optimality implies local optimality, and I conclude that c
π̂
a ≥ 0 for all
a ∈ Ĉaux(ŷ). Since I have also established that the reduced costs of arcs in Âaux(x̂) and
B̂aux(x̂) are nonnegative, by Theorem 2.2.2 the optimality of (x̂, ŷ) follows. Theorem 2.2.2
also implies that this optimal solution paired with the potential function π̂ satisfy the
optimality conditions of Theorem 2.2.1, as claimed.
This lemma implies that if a unit capacity arc is added to an instance of MSFP, the optimal
flow, as well as the supporting potential function, change in a predictable way. Specifically,
either the initial flow remains optimal, or a new optimal flow is obtained by augmenting
the flow on the new arc as well as the path connecting the end points of the aforementioned
arc, in the auxiliary network. Recall that in the MSFP formulation of Section 2.3, arcs
correspond to possible trades between the agents, and optimal flow provides equilibrium
trades. Thus, the change in equilibrium trades as a result of introducing new trades into
an economy can be characterized by using Lemma 3.3.1.
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3.3.1. Addition of a New Trade
I start by characterizing the change in competitive equilibrium trades with the introduc-
tion of a single new trade. I establish that after the introduction of the new trade, the
initial competitive equilibrium trades may still constitute an equilibrium. If not, the new
competitive equilibrium trades can be obtained by identifying a chain of trades in a slightly
modified trading network, and (i) including among equilibrium trades the trades of this
chain that do not belong to the initial equilibrium and (ii) removing the remaining trades
associated with the arcs in the chain from the set of equilibrium trades.
Theorem 3.3.3. Let X be a set of equilibrium trades in G, and G′ be a new trading
network obtained after adding a new trade e to G. Denote by Gres the trading network
obtained from G′ after reversing the orientations of the arcs in X. Either X continues to
be a set of equilibrium trades in G′ or there exists a chain C 3 e of trades in Gres such that
the new set of equilibrium trades is given by X ′ = Cf ∪X \ Cr, where Cr denotes the arcs
in G that are present in C with opposite orientations, and Cf denotes the remaining arcs
in C.
Proof. Since the value functions are M \-convex, the trading network can be transformed to
a flow network. I modify the internal network of each agent by introducing an additional
vertex for each agent/trade vertex in the flow network, where the agent is the buyer in
this trade. Call the new vertices terminal vertices. Each arc in the original flow network
corresponding to a trade is replaced by two arcs: one arc from the corresponding vertex
of the seller to the terminal vertex, and the other arc from the terminal vertex to the
corresponding vertex of the buyer. The former arc is uncapacitated, whereas the latter one
has a capacity of either 0 or 1 that encodes its absence or presence in the network. Nonzero
net outflow at terminal vertices has an infinite penalty (i.e., flow conservation is imposed at
these vertices), whereas the net outflow at the remaining vertices has penalties associated
with agents’ valuations, as before.
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An illustration can be found in Figure 5. The internal network of an agent, say i, appears
in (a). The dashed vertices correspond to trades where agent i is a buyer, the solid vertex
corresponds to a trade where i is a seller, and the dotted vertex is a special vertex. The
network in (b) depicts the transformed network.
Traders incident to e are not allowed to execute trade e in the original network. Thus, in
the corresponding flow network the terminal vertex and the seller’s vertex associated with
trade e are connected, but the buyer of the trade has a zero-capacity arc connecting the
terminal vertex associated with trade e to the rest of her internal network. Hence, initially,
no flow is sent on the arcs associated with trade e in the flow network, and the efficient set
of trades in G does not involve e. Let a0 denote the arc in the flow network between the
seller’s vertex associated with trade e and the associated terminal vertex. Similarly, denote












Figure 5: (a) An Agent’s Internal Network. (b) The Agent’s Modified Network.
Fix a competitive equilibrium (X, p) in G. Denote the corresponding flow/net outflow in
the flow network by (x, y), which is obtained by sending one unit of flow on arcs that
correspond to trades in X. This is similar to the previous construction, except that we have
two arcs associated with each trade (due to the modification of the internal networks) and
both carry the same flow. For any trade f in G, set the potential values of the associated





+ equal to −M , and the potential
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value of a− equal to M , for some M  0. Let π denote this potential function. As before,
it readily follows from the equilibrium conditions that (x, y) and π satisfy the reduced-cost
optimality conditions.
Next, assume that a new trade e is added to the economy. In the corresponding flow
network, increase the capacity of arc a from zero to one. Lemma 3.3.1 establishes that a
new optimal flow can be obtained from the original flow. There are two cases to consider. In
the first case, the original flow continues to be optimal. In the second case, an optimal flow
is obtained by sending a unit of flow on arc a, and augmenting the original flow by sending
one unit of flow from a− to a+ via the shortest path with the least number of arcs between
these vertices in the auxiliary network, as described in the lemma. Observe that this cycle
traverses at most two special vertices, since these vertices are connected by uncapacitated
zero-cost arcs. In other words, the new optimal flow is obtained by augmenting the original
flow along an improvement cycle that has at most one arc between the special vertices.
In both cases, the potential function updated as in Lemma 3.3.1 satisfies the reduced-cost
optimality conditions together with the updated flow. Thus, as before, the corresponding
trades/prices constitute a competitive equilibrium.
In the first case, the claim readily follows from these observations by setting C = ∅. To
prove the claim in the second case, first assume that no special vertices are visited. Then,
updating the flow along a cycle in the flow network corresponds to updating trades along
a cycle C in Gres, by executing some previously unexecuted trades, captured by Cf 3 e, in
the original network, and by dropping some executed trades (in cases where flow is sent in
the opposite direction through the auxiliary network) captured by Cr. If a single special
vertex is visited, the update structure is the same. If multiple special vertices are visited,
the update structure is similar, but the improvement cycle can be viewed as originating and
terminating at the special vertices. Hence, updating the flow along this cycle corresponds
to updating trades along a chain C in Gres that does not constitute a cycle. Moreover, in
both cases, the improvement cycle sends flow on arc a, thereby executing trade e. Hence,
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as claimed, the new set of equilibrium trades can be given by X ′ = Cf ∪X \ Cr, for some
chain C such that e ∈ C.
Suppose that a new trading opportunity emerges. A priori it is unclear how the equilibrium
trades would change and whether this change would exhibit any meaningful structural
properties. Surprisingly, my result implies that the change in equilibrium trades can be
captured in terms of chains of trades in the underlying network. This result exploits the
MSFP formulation of the problem of finding the efficient allocation and the sensitivity
analysis result for MSFP (Lemma 3.3.1). It highlights the power of using the network flow
formulation and its properties for obtaining novel comparative statics. In the next section,
this result is used as a building block to obtain more detailed comparative statics.
3.3.2. Addition of a New Buyer
Next, a new buyer is added to the economy with a set of possible trades ∆ and a value
function v : 2∆ → R. By sequentially introducing these trades the change in the set of
equilibrium trades can be characterized as in Theorem 3.3.3. In this section, I characterize
the change in equilibrium prices caused by adding a new buyer. The main result of this
section is that when a new buyer is introduced into the economy, the prices of all prior
trades (weakly) increase. I subsequently characterize the payoff implications of this change
on the equilibria.
When a new buyer enters the economy there are two effects. First, the traders she is
connected to enjoy higher demand, and start offering higher prices for all the trades in
which they participate as sellers. On the other hand, the addition of a new buyer increases
the competition between the traders serving her. This may lead to a decrease in some prices.
Theorem 3.3.4 below shows that the first effect dominates. What about the prices of trades
in which these traders participate as buyers? Surprisingly, the price increase is not limited
to the traders adjacent to the new buyer, but extends to the rest of the network. This is due
to the full substitutability of preferences, which guarantees that when the set of contracts in
which an agent participates as a seller expands, the agent starts demanding more contracts
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in which she participates as a buyer. This generates an increase in the equilibrium prices
of the corresponding trades.
Theorem 3.3.4. Assume that (X, p) is a competitive equilibrium in trading network G.
Assume that a new agent b joins the trading network, as a buyer of a set of trades ∆ whose
sellers belong to G. Denote the resulting trading network by G′.
There exists a competitive equilibrium (X ′, p′) in G′, such that p′e ≥ pe for all trades e not
incident to b.
Proof. Let v denote the value function of buyer b, X ′ denote a set of welfare-maximizing
trades in G′ once b is introduced to the economy, and S∗ = X ′ ∩∆ denote the set of trades
executed by agent b at X ′.
To derive competitive equilibrium prices p′ supporting X ′ in the economy with agent b, I first
characterize how the valuation and payoff of agent b change due to unit trade deviations6
from S∗, i.e., due to (i) adding a new trade to S∗, (ii) removing an existing trade from S∗,
and (iii) executing both steps simultaneously.
The proof has three steps.
1. I construct an alternative economy, Ĝ, where b is replaced with another buyer b̂,
with the same set of possible trades, and value function v̂ : 2∆ → R such that
v̂(S∗) = v(S∗). Buyer b̂’s value function is consistent with b in terms of unit trade
deviations from S∗. That is, changes in v̂ and v due to unit trade deviations coincide.
2. It is shown that X ′ constitutes an efficient set of trades in economy Ĝ. Moreover, any
equilibrium price vector p̂ supporting X ′ in the new economy, is also an equilibrium
price vector for G′.
3. It is shown that there exists an equilibrium price vector p̂ in Ĝ, where prices of all
6For M \-concave value functions, local optimality implies global optimality: if such unit trade deviations
do not decrease agent b’s payoff, then the bundle S∗ is payoff-maximizing for b.
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trades not incident to agent b̂ are weakly higher when compared to an equilibrium
price vector p in G.
Note that the last two steps jointly imply that p̂ is an equilibrium price vector for economy
G′, with weakly higher prices for all pre-existing trades.
Step 1: I define the value function v̂ of buyer b̂ in terms of the cost of a minimum-cost
flow in a network H = (VH , AH), hereafter referred to as the valuation network. Each
e ∈ ∆ gives rise to three vertices vine , v1e , v0e . The entire set of vertices in VH is given by
VH = {vout}∪Vin∪V1∪V0, where Vin = {vine |e ∈ ∆}, V1 = {v1e |e ∈ ∆}, and V0 = {v0e |e ∈ ∆}.
The vertices in {vout} ∪ Vin correspond to the vertices of the internal network of buyer b̂
(see Section 2.3), and are referred to as the terminal vertices of the valuation network. On
the other hand, V1, V0 are additional vertices whose incident arcs have costs that encode
agent b̂’s value function.
The set of arcs, AH , is such that for each trade e ∈ ∆, we have:
(a) a directed arc (vine , v
1
e) with capacity 1 and zero cost,
(b) a directed arc (v1e , v
0
e), with capacity 1 and cost −v(S∗) + v(S∗ \ {e}) if e ∈ S∗, and
cost −v(S∗ ∪ {e}) + v(S∗) otherwise, and
(c) a directed arc (v0e , v
out) with capacity k(v0e ,vout) = 1 and zero cost.
In addition, for each set of trades e, e′ ∈ ∆ such that e /∈ S∗, e′ ∈ S∗, we have:
(d) a directed arc (v1e , v
1
e′) with capacity 1 and cost −v(S∗ ∪ {e} \ {e′}) + v(S∗).
The valuation v̂(S) of agent b̂ for a set S ⊂ ∆ of trades is given by the negative of the
minimum cost flow in H where each vine for e ∈ S has a supply of one unit, and the vertex
vout demands |S| units (and flow conservation is satisfied). Figure 6 depicts an example of
the construction.
In this construction, arc costs of the valuation network, and hence the value function v̂ are
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defined in terms of the value function v of agent b. The construction guarantees that b̂ is
consistent with b in terms of unit trade deviations from S∗. To see this, first note that
any feasible flow on H associated with S ⊂ S∗ (i.e., that imposes one unit of supply at
each vine for e ∈ S) uses all arcs (v1e , v0e) for e ∈ S to capacity. This is because for e ∈ S∗,
vertices v1e each have a single outgoing arc with capacity one. Similarly, any feasible flow
in H associated with S ⊃ S∗ uses all arcs (v1e , v0e) for e ∈ S to capacity, since all vertices v1e
for e ∈ S \ S∗ have outgoing arcs only to v0e or a vertex v1e′ for e′ ∈ S∗ (and the outgoing
arcs of the latter are used to capacity). These observations, together with the description




(−v(S∗) + v(S∗ \ {e})) +
∑
e∈S\S∗
(v(S∗)− v(S∗ ∪ {e}))
 .
Hence, for e /∈ S∗ and e′ ∈ S∗ we have v̂(S∗) − v̂(S∗ ∪ {e}) = v(S∗) − v(S∗ ∪ {e}) and
v̂(S∗)− v̂(S∗ \ {e′}) = v(S∗)− v(S∗ \ {e′}); i.e., changes in v̂ coincide with changes in v in
terms of adding/removing a single trade.
Similarly, consider S = S∗ ∪ {e} \ {e′} for e /∈ S∗ and e′ ∈ S∗. As before, any feasible flow
associated with S in H uses all arcs (v1e′′ , v
0
e′′) for e
′′ ∈ S∗ \ {e′}. Moreover, a feasible flow




e) − (v1e , v0e) − (v0e , vout) or along the
path (vine , v
1
e)− (v1e , v1e′)− (v1e′ , vout) (since v1e have outgoing arcs either to v0e or v1e′). These
paths respectively have costs v(S∗)− v(S∗ ∪ {e}) and v(S∗ \ {e′})− v(S∗ ∪ {e} \ {e′}). Due
to the M \-concavity of v, it follows that the latter is smaller, and hence the minimum cost
flow under S continues to send flow on arc (v1e , v
1





I conclude that v̂(S) = v̂(S∗)− (−v(S∗ ∪ {e} \ {e′}) + v(S∗)) = v̂(S∗) + v(S)− v(S∗), and
that v̂ is consistent with v in terms of unit trade deviations.
In order to find the efficient set of trades in the new economy Ĝ, consider the corresponding
flow network, denoted hereafter by F̂ . To obtain F̂ , construct the flow network as in
previous sections, by connecting vertices that belong to the internal network of a trade’s
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buyer/seller via uncapacitated arcs. Similarly connect the special vertices so that between
any pair of special vertices there is exactly one uncapacitated directed arc. By convention I
assume that all arcs connecting agent b̂’s special vertex to other special vertices are outgoing.
This construction involves vertices {vout} ∪ Vin for agent b̂ in the flow network. For this
agent, also add the remaining vertices and arcs in the valuation network (which contains the
vertices of the internal network as a subnetwork). As before, for each agent other than b̂, I
associate a penalty function with the net outflow from the vertices of the internal network.
By contrast, for vertices of the valuation network of agent b̂, I impose flow conservation.
Note that the valuation of agent b̂ for a set of incident trades is still captured through the
arc costs in her internal network. Thus, the efficient set of trades can be found by solving














−v(S∗) + v(S∗ \ {e′}), [0, 1]










































Figure 6: (a) Buyer b with Two Trades e /∈ S∗, e′ ∈ S∗ (b) Buyer b̂’s Valuation Network.
The vertices vine , v
in
e′ are connected to the sellers’ vertices associated with trades e and e
′ in
the underlying trade network.
Step 2: Consider a competitive equilibrium (X ′, p′) in G′, and the corresponding optimal
flow and potential function (x′, π′) in the associated flow network, hereafter F ′. As before,
π′ is normalized such that it is zero on special vertices. Observe that F ′ has the same set of
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vertices and arcs as F̂ , other than the arcs and vertices of the valuation network of agent b̂.
Consider a flow-potential function pair (x̂, π̂) in F̂ such that it coincides with (x′, π′) on all
arcs and vertices common to F ′. By construction, the reduced-cost optimality conditions
are satisfied by arcs in F̂ , other than the arcs in the valuation network of b̂. I now argue
that the flows and potential values on arcs and vertices of b̂’s valuation network can be
set such that flow conservation and the reduced-cost optimality conditions are satisfied by
them as well. The construction will explicitly show that x̂ is optimal and corresponds to
the same set of trades X ′ in Ĝ.
Set the flow x̂ within b̂’s valuation network as follows:
• For each trade e′ ∈ S∗, one unit of flow is sent along the path (vine′ , v1e′) − (v1e′ , v0e′) −
(v0e′ , v
out).
• For each trade e /∈ S∗, set flow on path (vine , v1e)− (v1e , v0e)− (v0e , vout) to zero.
• Set the flow on arcs (v1e , v1e′) to zero.
Recall that each vertex vine′ has one unit of incoming flow if e
′ ∈ S∗ and zero unit of incoming
flow if e′ /∈ S∗, since for arcs common to F ′, the flow in F̂ is set consistently with F ′. It is
easily verified that this construction satisfies flow conservation at the vertices of b̂’s valuation
network.
Set the potential values within b̂’s valuation network as follows:
• For each trade e ∈ ∆, set π̂(vine ) = p′e, π̂(v1e) = p′e, and π̂(v0e) = 0.
• Set π̂(vout) = 0.
Now it can be verified that the constructed flow and potential values satisfy the reduced-
cost optimality conditions on the arcs in the valuation network of b̂. Consider the auxiliary





since the end points of these arcs have the same potential value by construction, and the
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underlying arc cost is zero. Similarly, it can be seen that cπ̂(v0e ,vout)
= 0. Thus, regardless









out), and (vout, v0e) in the auxiliary
network, the reduced-cost optimality conditions are satisfied. It remains to consider the
reduced costs of arcs whose end points belong to V0 ∪ V1:
• e′ ∈ S∗: The constructed solution sends one unit of flow from v1e′ to v0e′ , and hence
the auxiliary network has an arc from v0e′ to v
1






= v(S∗) − v(S∗ \ {e′}) − p′e′ ≥ 0, since competitive equilibrium conditions
imply that v(S∗)− p′e′ ≥ v(S∗ \ {e′}); i.e., in equilibrium (x′, p′) of G′ agent b has no
incentive to drop trade e′ ∈ S∗.
• e /∈ S∗: The constructed solution does not utilize the arc from v1e to v0e , and hence
the auxiliary network has an arc from v1e to v
0
e . The associated reduced cost satisfies
cπ̂(v1e ,v0e)
= v(S∗)−v(S∗∪{e})+p′e ≥ 0, since competitive equilibrium conditions imply
that v(S∗) ≥ v(S∗∪{e})−p′e; i.e., in equilibrium (x′, p′) of G′, agent b has no incentive
to execute an additional trade e /∈ S∗.
• e′ ∈ S∗, e /∈ S∗: Since the constructed solution does not utilize the arc from v1e to v1e′ ,
the auxiliary network has an arc from v1e to v
1





= −v(S∗ ∪ {e} \ {e′}) + v(S∗) + p′e − p′e′ ≥ 0, since competitive equilibrium
conditions imply that v(S∗)− p′e′ ≥ v(S∗ ∪{e} \ {e′})− p′e; i.e., in equilibrium (X ′, p′)
of G′, agent b has no incentive to execute an additional trade e /∈ S∗, while dropping
one of the equilibrium trades e′ ∈ S∗.
Thus, it follows that the constructed flow-potential function pair (x̂, p̂) (together with the
associated net outflow vector) satisfies the reduced-cost optimality conditions on all arcs,
and yields an optimal solution to the MSFP in F̂ . Since by convention this flow corresponds
to executing trades X ′, I conclude that X ′ is an efficient set of trades in Ĝ as well. This
completes the first claim in Step 2.
Consider any other equilibrium price vector p̂ in the economy Ĝ (with agent b̂), and observe
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that (X ′, p̂) is a competitive equilibrium (since any equilibrium price vector supports any
efficient set of trades). I show that any such p̂ is also a competitive equilibrium price vector
supporting X ′ in the economy G′.
Since (X ′, p̂) is a competitive equilibrium in Ĝ, in flow network F̂ , the flow x̂ corresponding
to X ′ (which is constructed following the same approach as before) satisfies the optimality
conditions with the optimal potential function π̂ associated with p̂ as well. Note that
this potential function (after normalizing the potential values of the special vertices to
π̂(vout) = 0) should be such that π̂(vout) = 0, π̂(vine ) = p̂e for any trade e ∈ ∆. Hence, the
reduced-cost optimality conditions imply the following:
• For each trade e′ ∈ S∗, the path vout−v0e′−v1e′−vine′ belongs to the auxiliary network.














−(−v(S∗) + v(S∗ \ {e′}))− p̂e′ . Hence, v(S∗)− p̂e′ ≥ v(S∗ \ {e′}).
• For each trade e /∈ S∗, the path vine − v1e − v0e − vout belongs to the auxiliary network.







v(S∗)− v(S∗ ∪ {e}) + p̂e. Hence, v(S∗) ≥ v(S∗ ∪ {e})− p̂e.
• For e′ ∈ S∗, e /∈ S∗, the path vine − v1e − v1e′ − vine′ belongs to the auxiliary network.














v(S∗)− v(S∗ ∪ {e} \ {e′}) + p̂e − p̂e′ . Hence, v(S∗) ≥ v(S∗ ∪ {e} \ {e′})− p̂e + p̂e′ .
These conditions imply that under the price vector p̂, agent b (with value function v) cannot
deviate from S∗ via a single improvement (i.e., dropping a trade, executing a new trade,
or both) and improve her payoff. Since v is M \-concave, it follows that S∗ is demanded by
agent b under price vector p̂. It readily follows that under this price vector agents other than
b also demand their equilibrium trades in X ′, since their payoffs are identical in economies
Ĝ and G′. Thus, it follows that if (X ′, p̂) is a competitive equilibrium in economy Ĝ, then
it is a competitive equilibrium in economy G′ as well.
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Step 3: I show that there exists an equilibrium price vector p̂ in the new economy Ĝ,
where the prices of all trades not incident to agent b̂ are weakly higher when compared to
an equilibrium price vector p in G. I do so by assuming that initially all arcs (v0e , v
out) in
the flow network F̂ have zero capacity, i.e., k(v0e ,vout) = 0, and by sequentially increasing
them to one.
Recall that (X, p) is a competitive equilibrium in the economy G. Consider the associated
optimal flow x in F , which is the flow network associated with G. As before, a potential
function π that supports x can be derived by setting the potential value of all special vertices
to zero, and the potential value of vertices associated with any trade e to pe.
Next consider F̂ , but set capacity k(v0e ,vout) = 0 for all e ∈ ∆. Observe that all vertices/arcs
in F also belong to F̂ . Hence, x (after setting flow to zero on all arcs not belonging to F )
is still feasible in F̂ . Set the potential value of vertices of F̂ common to F according to π.
Next, extend π to define potential values at the remaining vertices of F̂ .
Let m = mine′∈S∗,e/∈S∗ v(S
∗) − v(S∗ ∪ {e} \ {e′}). For e′ ∈ S∗, set π(vine′ ) = π(v1e′) = −M
for sufficiently large M  0, and for e /∈ S∗, set π(vine ) = π(v1e) = −M − m. Similarly,
for any trade e ∈ ∆, set the potential value of the vertex associated with the seller of this
trade, hereafter se, equal to π(se) = π(v
in
e ). Finally set π(v
0
e) = −2M for any e ∈ ∆, and
π(vout) = 0. I next establish that flow x together with the constructed potential function
satisfies the reduced-cost optimality conditions on F̂ (with k(v0e ,vout) = 0 for all e ∈ ∆), and
hence constitutes an optimal flow-potential function pair.
Since (X, p) is a competitive equilibrium in economy G, it can be seen that potential function
π satisfies the reduced-cost optimality conditions for the arcs in the network that are not
incident to the vertices of agent b̂ (or vertices {se′ |e′ ∈ ∆}). For sufficiently large M , the
fact that π(v0e) = −2M guarantees that any incoming arc to {v0e |e ∈ ∆} in the auxiliary
network also satisfies the reduced-cost optimality conditions (which are equivalent to the
arcs in the flow network since all arcs associated with agent b̂ initially have zero flow).
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Since π(se) = π(v
in
e ), it also follows that the reduced costs of arcs between these vertices
are equal to zero, and hence the optimality conditions are trivially satisfied. The fact that
π(se) ≤ −M  0 implies that the incoming arcs to se satisfy the reduced-cost optimality





= 0. Hence, the reduced cost optimality conditions hold for these arcs as well.
Thus, to establish optimality of x, it suffices to verify that any arc (v1e , v
1
e′) satisfies the





v(S∗) − v(S∗ ∪ {e} \ {e′}) + π(v1e) − π(v1e′) = v(S∗) − v(S∗ ∪ {e} \ {e′}) − m ≥ 0, where
the inequality follows from the definition of m. Therefore, it follows that the constructed
flow-potential pair satisfies the reduced cost optimality conditions when k(v0e ,vout) = 0 for
all e ∈ ∆, and hence is optimal.
I next sequentially increase the capacity of each arc (v0e , v
out) to k(v0e ,vout) = 1, and charac-
terize the change in the optimal flow-potential function pair using Lemma 3.3.1. At each
step the optimal flow-potential function pair prior to the update is denoted by (xold, πold)
and after the update is denoted by (xnew, πnew). After finishing the updates for all e ∈ ∆
an optimal flow-potential function pair (x̂, π̂) is obtained.
Consider a single step of the above process, and focus on the change in potential values
as given by Lemma 3.3.1. The lemma states that the potential value of any vertex v is
updated at each step as follows:
πnew(v) = πold(v) + d(v),
where d are the shortest path distances from vout with respect to the reduced cost of arcs in
the auxiliary network corresponding to (xold, πold). Note that d(v) ≥ 0 since (xold, πold) is
optimal prior to capacity increase, and hence satisfies the reduced cost optimality conditions
(see Theorem 2.2.2). Also observe that the special vertices still have a potential value of
zero, since all special vertices are connected by uncapacitated zero reduced-cost arcs to vout.
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Similarly, two vertices of the flow network that correspond to the same trade in the trading
network are connected by a zero length arc, since in the flow network the corresponding arc
is uncapacitated. Thus, equality between the potential values of the end points of an arc
representing a trade that is not incident to b̂ is preserved, and can still be interpreted as the
price of the trade. I conclude that the potential values of all vertices in the network (weakly)
increase, and those of the special vertices remain at zero. In particular, the potential value
of a vertex in the flow network associated with a trade e that is not incident to b̂ increases,
thereby implying that the price for trade e increases.
By updating the capacities sequentially, an optimal flow in the flow network F̂ is con-
structed, where all vertices associated with trades not incident to b̂ have (weakly) higher
potential values than before. I conclude that there exists an equilibrium in Ĝ, where any
trade e not incident to b̂ has higher prices when compared to p, i.e., p̂e ≥ pe.
By Step 2, we know that p̂ is also a competitive equilibrium price vector in G′. Hence, it
follows that (X ′, p̂) constitutes a competitive equilibrium in G′. Since p̂e ≥ pe for any trade
e that is not incident to b̂, the claim follows.
The above theorem makes use of the sensitivity analysis result on MSFP given in Lemma 3.3.1
to characterize how prices change when a new buyer joins the economy. I next examine the
impact of such price changes on agents’ payoffs.
Corollary 3.3.5. Let (X, p) be a competitive equilibrium in G. Assume that under X,
agent a1 only participates in trades where she is a seller, and agent a2 only participates in
trades where she is a buyer. Let σa1 , σa2 be the payoffs of these agents at (X, p).
Suppose that a new buyer is introduced. Then, there exists a competitive equilibrium
(X ′, p′) of the induced trading network G′, where the corresponding payoffs σ′a1 , σ
′
a2 satisfy:
• σa1 ≤ σ′a1 , and
• σa2 ≥ σ′a2 , unless a2 starts participating in new trades as a seller under X
′.
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Proof. Theorem 3.3.4 implies that there exists a competitive equilibrium (X ′, p′) such that
all prices (weakly) increase.
Note that if agent a1 still participates in her optimal trades in X (which are not necessarily
optimal under the new prices), her payoff increases (since she participates in those trades as
a seller, and the prices have increased). Since under her new equilibrium trades, her payoff
is weakly higher, it follows that her equilibrium payoff also increases.
Suppose that under X ′ agent a2 only participates in trades S2, where she is a buyer. Observe
that her payoff for S2 is higher prior to introducing the new buyer, since the prices of these
trades were weakly lower. Since her equilibrium payoff (prior to the update) was weakly
higher than her payoff for the bundle of trades S2, it follows that the payoff of a2 decreases,
if she continues to participate in trades only as a buyer.
Similar results follow when a new seller is introduced into the economy. Mimicking the
proof of Theorem 3.3.4, it can be shown that there exists a new competitive equilibrium
where all prices decrease and the buyers in the initial economy enjoy higher payoffs.
Qualitatively, these results suggest that when more “downstream” agents (buyers) are added
to the economy, the payoffs of “upstream” agents (sellers) improve and vice versa. It is
natural to expect the same when the set of agents is fixed but more trades connecting
upstream and downstream agents are added to the economy. The next example shows this
to be false, even when the new trades correspond to paths that bypass a “middleman”
who adds no value. This example highlights the nontrivial behavior of equilibria in trading
networks, and the special effect of adding a buyer/seller to the economy. It also implies
that while the addition of a new seller improves the payoffs of the buyers in the economy,
the change in the payoff need not be monotone in the arcs added to the economy.
Example. In the trading network displayed in Figure 7, agent i has a single good to offer,
and incurs a cost of 0 for providing it. Agent l has a value of 10 for consuming the good.
Agent j is an intermediary, who has a value of 0 for the good but can facilitate the transfer
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of the good between i and l at zero cost. Agent k has a value of 1 for consuming the
good, and she can also transfer the good between i and l at zero cost. Initially the solid
arcs belong to the trading network, and I examine the change in the equilibrium outcome





Figure 7: Payoff of buyer l may decrease as more paths to seller i emerge.
network involves trading the good along the (i, j)− (j, l) path at a price of zero. This yields
a payoff of 10 units for agent l and zero for the remaining agents. On the other hand, after
trade (i, k) is introduced, agent k is willing to pay at least 1 unit to agent i to acquire
the good. Consequently, agent i can guarantee at least 1 unit of payoff. Since the total
payoff in the efficient set of trades is still 10 units, it follows that the payoff of agent l
reduces in any equilibrium in the new network. Thus the addition of a trade might raise
the prices downstream and reduce the payoff of the final buyer. It is straightforward to
construct other examples where the addition of the new trade increases the payoff of the
buyer and/or decreases the payoff of the seller.
3.3.3. Addition of Trades between Multiple Buyers and Sellers
The results thus far are restricted to settings where all new trades in the economy are
incident to a single agent. Next, they are used as building blocks to characterize how
equilibria change with new trades involving multiple buyers/sellers.
The key idea is that a set of agents in a trading network can be replaced with a single
representative agent without impacting the equilibrium prices of the trades in the economy
for trades non-incident to the aforementioned set of agents. This result is formalized in
Lemma 3.3.7. Using it together with the findings of the previous subsections, I characterize
the equilibrium impact of adding a set of trades that connect two groups of agents in the
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underlying trading network (Theorem 3.3.8).
I start by formalizing the notion of a representative agent. Suppose that a trading network
G = (N,E) is given, and consider a set of agents N̂ ⊂ N . Given an arc e ∈ E as before,
let e+ and e− denote the tail and head of this arc, respectively. Denote by EN̂ = {e ∈
E|e+, e− ∈ N̂} the arcs that are among the members of N̂ . Let δ(N̂) = ∪i∈N̂δ(i) \ EN̂
denote the set of arcs that have an end point in N̂ and another in N \ N̂ . Similarly, let
δ+(N̂) (δ−(N̂)) denote the set of arcs in δ(N̂) that are outgoing from (incoming to) N̂ .
I construct another trading network G′ = (N ′, E′) by replacing N̂ with the representative
agent n̂ such that N ′ = (N \ N̂) ∪ {n̂}. For any i ∈ N ′, denote the incident arcs in G′
by δ′(i) and the outgoing and incoming arcs by δ′+(i) and δ
′
−(i), respectively. Note that
E′ = ∪i∈N ′δ′(i). The arcs in G′ that are not incident to n̂ are precisely the arcs in G that
are not incident to N̂ . On the other hand, each arc that is incident to n̂ in G′ corresponds
to an arc in δ(N̂) in G. Formally, there is a bijective map β : δ′(n̂)→ δ(N̂) such that
1. β(δ′+(n̂)) = δ+(N̂), β(δ
′
−(n̂)) = δ−(N̂),
2. for ê ∈ δ′+(n̂) and e = β(ê) (similarly f̂ ∈ δ′−(n̂) and f = β(f̂)) we have ê− = e−
(similarly f̂+ = f+).
Note that under this construction the arcs incident to each vertex can be given as follows:
δ′(i) = (δ(i) \ δ(N̂)) ∪ β−1(δ(N̂) ∩ δ(i)) for i ∈ N ′ \ {n̂}, and δ′(n̂) = β−1(δ(N̂)).
Define the value function ŵi of agent i ∈ N ′ \ {n̂} in G′ such that for any S ⊂ δ′(i), we
have:
ŵi(S) = wi(S \ δ′(n̂) ∪ β(S ∩ δ′(n̂))).
That is, the valuation of i for a set of incident trades S in G′ is equivalent to the valuation





wi((X ∪ β(S)) ∩ δ(i)), (3.5)
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for any S ⊂ δ′(n̂). Intuitively, each trade between N̂ and N \ N̂ corresponds to a trade
between the representative agent n̂ and N \ N̂ , and the maximum aggregate value of agents
in N̂ when a subset of these trades is executed (and the trades among members of N̂ are
chosen in the best possible way), is equal to the payoff of the representative agent n̂ for the
same set of trades.
Since for i ∈ N ′ \ {n̂}, the valuation for a set of trades is defined as the valuation the
agent has for the corresponding trades in the original economy, it readily follows that ŵi
is M \-concave. Despite being less obvious, the same conclusion also holds for agent n̂, as
the next lemma7 establishes. For this lemma, as well as for subsequent results, I follow the
same convention as before and express ŵi (wi) as a function on Zδ
′(i) (Zδ(i)).
Lemma 3.3.6. ŵn̂ : Zδ
′(n̂) → R is M \-concave.
Proof. Let h : ×i∈N̂Z






where y = {yi}i∈N̂ and y
i ∈ Zδ(i). Since h is a sum of M \-concave functions with disjoint
arguments, it follows that it is M \-concave. I define another function g : Zδ′(n̂) ×ZEN̂ → R
such that:
g(yδ′(n̂), zEN̂ ) = maxyE
N̂




e = ze for e ∈ EN̂}. (3.6)
Here, I split the argument y of h into yδ′(n̂) and yEN̂ such that yδ′(n̂) ∈ Z
δ′(n̂) = Zδ(N̂)
consists of the entries of y that correspond to the arcs between the vertices in N̂ and the




e }e∈EN̂ ∈ Z
EN̂ × ZEN̂ consists of the remaining
entries of y, and zEN̂ represents a vector in Z
EN̂ . Observe that if {yi}i∈N̂ is consistent
7The operation used to define the payoff of the representative agent in (3.5) is mathematically similar to
(but different from) the operation used in the definition of contraction of an economy introduced in (3.3).
In the proof, it is established that the former operation also preserves M \-concavity.
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with a set of trades X ⊂ EN̂ (i.e., for each i ∈ N̂ , y
i encodes the trades in X in which i





e = 0 for all e ∈ EN̂ . Note that ŵn̂ is defined in terms of a set of trades
X ⊂ EN̂ that solves the optimization problem given in (3.5). Leveraging this observation,
I conclude that agent n̂’s value function satisfies
ŵn̂(yδ′(n̂)) = g(yδ′(n̂), 0EN̂ ), (3.7)
for yδ′(n̂) ∈ Zδ
′(n̂), where 0EN̂ is a vector whose entries are all equal to zero.
The maximization in (3.6) used to define g is referred to as the aggregation operation.
In (3.7), ŵn̂ is expressed in terms of g by setting some of the entries equal to zero – an
operation referred to as restriction. Both aggregation and restriction preserve M \-concavity
(Theorem 6.15 in Murota (2003)). These observations imply that ŵn̂ is M
\-concave, and
the claim follows.
Let (X, p) denote a competitive equilibrium in G = (N,E). I refer to the tuple (X ′, p′) as
the projection of this equilibrium onto G′ if X ′ = X \ (EN̂ ∪ δ(N̂)) ∪ β
−1(X ∩ δ(N̂)) ⊂ E′
and p′ ∈ R|E′| is such that p′e = pe for e ∈ E′ \δ′(n̂) and p′f = pβ(f) for f ∈ δ′(n̂). Intuitively,
(X ′, p′) is a projection of (X, p), if (i) X ′ consists of the trades in G′ that correspond to the
trades X \EN̂ in G and (ii) prices p
′ for trades in G′ match the prices of the corresponding
trades in G. The next lemma establishes that (X, p) and (X ′, p′) are closely related.
Lemma 3.3.7. Consider trading network G = (N,E), and the network G′ = (N ′, E′)
obtained after replacing N̂ ⊂ N by the representative agent n̂.
(i) If (X, p) is a competitive equilibrium in G, then its projection (X ′, p′) is a competitive
equilibrium in G′.
(ii) Conversely, if (X ′, p′) is a competitive equilibrium in G′, then there exists a competi-
tive equilibrium (X, p) in G, whose projection yields (X ′, p′).
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Proof.
Proof of (i). I first prove that the projection (X ′, p′) is an equilibrium in G′. To establish
this, it suffices to show that for any i ∈ N ′ the payoff-maximizing trades are given by
X ′ ∩ δ′(i) under price vector p′. Recall that by the definition of the projection, for any
i ∈ N \ N̂ ⊂ N ′, the adjacent trades in X ′ correspond to those in X. Furthermore, the
valuation of agent i ∈ N \ N̂ for any subset of adjacent trades in G is the same as her
valuation for the corresponding trades in G′, and the prices of these trades are identical
under p and p′. Finally, since (X, p) is a competitive equilibrium, in G under price vector
p the set of payoff-maximizing trades for agent i ∈ N \ N̂ is given by X ∩ δ(i). These
observations imply that in G′, for i ∈ N \ N̂ the set of payoff-maximizing trades under price
vector p′ is given by X ′ ∩ δ′(i).
It remains to prove that in network G′ under price vector p′ the payoff-maximizing trades
for n̂ are given by X ′ ∩ δ′(n̂) I claim that the following inequalities hold:
ŵn̂(X






































































Here, the first inequality follows since X ∩ EN̂ is a feasible solution to the maximization
problem (3.5), and by the definition of projection we have β(X ′∩δ′(n̂)) = X ∩δ(N̂), as well
as p′e = pe for e ∈ E′ \ δ′(n̂) and p′f = pβ(f) for f ∈ δ′(n̂). The second line follows by noting
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that for any e ∈ X ∩ EN̂ there exists one agent in N̂ for whom the corresponding price pe
appears with a positive sign in the summations in the first line and another agent in N̂ for
whom the same term appears with a negative sign. Thus, they cancel out. The third line
follows since (X, p) is a competitive equilibrium, and hence X ∩ δ(i) is a payoff-maximizing
set of trades for agent i in G under price vector p. The fourth line follows by switching the
order of max operators and the summations. The fifth line follows once again by canceling
out common price terms. By the definition of the projection and (3.5), it can be seen that
the expression in this line is equivalent to the payoff-maximization problem of agent n̂ in G′
under price vector p′. Therefore, the last line follows. On the other hand, these expressions
imply that for agent n̂ the payoff-maximizing trades are indeed given by X ′ ∩ δ′(n̂). Hence,
I conclude that (X ′, p′) is a competitive equilibrium, as claimed.
Proof of (ii). I next prove the second part of the claim. Suppose that (X ′, p′) is a
competitive equilibrium in G′. I construct an equilibrium (X, p) in G such that (X ′, p′) is
a projection of this equilibrium. To that end, set pe = p
′
e for e ∈ E \ (δ(N̂) ∪ EN̂ ) and
pf = p
′
β−1(f) for f ∈ δ(N̂). Similarly, set X \ EN̂ = (X
′ \ δ′(n̂)) ∪ β(X ′ ∩ δ′(n̂)). I will
construct the prices {pe}e∈EN̂ and the equilibrium trades in EN̂ (i.e., X ∩ EN̂ ) in the rest
of the proof.
To construct the remaining equilibrium quantities, I first consider another trading network
G̃ = (N̂ , EN̂ ), which is obtained by restricting attention to the subnetwork of G involving
agents in N̂ . In G̃, let the value function w̃i : 2
EN̂∩δ(i) → R of i ∈ N̂ be such that
w̃i(S) = max
T∈δ(N̂)
























































Here, the first equality is by the definition of {w̃i}i∈N̂ . Note that the max operation can be
pushed out of the summation, since the arguments related to each agent are disjoint; i.e.,
the collection {δ(N̂)∩ δ(i)}i∈N̂ consists of disjoint sets. Hence, the second equality follows.
The third one follows from (3.5) and the definition of prices {pe}e∈δ(N̂). The last equality
follows since (X ′, p′) constitutes an equilibrium in G′. Observe that an efficient set of trades
X̃? in G̃ solves the optimization problems in the first line. Let (X̃?, p̃) be an equilibrium in
G̃. Note that the last equality also implies that T = β(X ′ ∩ δ′(n̂)) solves the optimization
problems on the right-hand side of the first line where T appears. Equivalently, it implies
that for any i ∈ N̂ and S = X̃? ∩ δ(i) an optimal solution of the optimization problem in
(3.8) is given by T = β(X ′ ∩ δ′(n̂)).
Let X ∩ EN̂ = X̃
?. Together with the construction of X \ EN̂ , this implies that X =
X̃? ∪ (X ′ \ δ′(n̂))∪β(X ′ ∩ δ′(n̂)). Setting pe = p̃e for e ∈ EN̂ I also finalize the construction
of the price vector p. I claim that (X, p) is an equilibrium in G. To establish this, I will
show that in G, the trades X ∩ δ(i) are payoff-maximizing for all i ∈ N under price vector
p.
To see this first consider i ∈ N \ N̂ . Note that, by construction, trades X ∩ δ(i) in G
correspond to trades X ′∩δ′(i) in G′. Furthermore, as before, the valuation of agent i ∈ N\N̂
for any subset of adjacent trades in G is the same as her valuation for the corresponding
77
trades in G′, and the prices of these trades are identical under p and p′. Since (X ′, p′) is an
equilibrium in G′, it follows that X ′∩ δ′(i) is payoff-maximizing in G′ under price vector p′.
On the other hand, since these trades correspond to X ∩ δ(i) in G, and the prices of trades
adjacent to i are identical in both networks, it follows that X ∩ δ(i) maximizes the payoff
of i ∈ N \ N̂ under price vector p.
Consider next i ∈ N̂ . Since (X̃?, p̃) is an equilibrium in G̃, it follows that trades X̃? ∩ δ(i)
are payoff-maximizing for i in G̃ under price vector p̃, i.e.,
w̃i(X̃















Recall that for S = X̃? ∩ δ(i), an optimal solution of the optimization problem in (3.8)
is given by T = β(X ′ ∩ δ′(n̂)). Using this observation and the definition of {pe}e∈EN̂ , the
left-hand side of (3.9) is given by:













where Y = (β(X ′∩ δ′(n̂))∪ X̃?). Here, the equality follows since the definition of X implies
that for i ∈ N we have Y ∩ δ(i) = X ∩ δ(i). Similarly, using (3.8), the right-hand side of












It follows from (3.9)–(3.11) that X ∩ δ(i) is payoff maximizing for agent i in network G
under price vector p. Finally, it readily follows from the construction of (X, p) that its
projection yields (X ′, p′). Hence, the claim follows.
I proceed with establishing the first comparative static of this section. In particular, suppose
that the initial trading network has two components Gs and Gb that possibly consist of
multiple traders and trades among them (see Figure 8). Suppose that new trades from Gs
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to Gb that are incident to multiple traders from Gs and Gb are added to the economy. What






Figure 8: Comparative statics involving multiple buyers/sellers. Initial economy has com-
ponents Gs/Gb that are connected by the new trades (dashed arcs).
Theorem 3.3.8. Suppose that trading network G consists of two components Gs =
(N s, Es) and Gb = (N b, Eb), and let (X, p) denote an equilibrium in this network. Suppose
that a set ∆ of trades whose sellers belong to N s and buyers belong to N b are added to the
economy. Then,
• there exists an equilibrium (X ′, p′) in the new economy such that p′e ≥ pe for e ∈ Es.
• there exists an equilibrium (X ′′, p′′) in the new economy such that p′′e ≤ pe for e ∈ Eb.
Proof. Theorem 3.3.8 is proven by leveraging Lemma 3.3.7 together with the earlier com-
parative statics results. In particular, replace agents in Gb (similarly Gs) with a single
representative buyer (seller). Then, analyzing the impact of the addition of new arcs re-
duces to analyzing the addition of a (representative) buyer (similarly seller) to the economy.
The impact of the addition of a new buyer to the economy was characterized in Section 3.3.2.
The theorem follows by leveraging this characterization.
Denote the trading network obtained after adding trades ∆ to G by G′. Denote by Ĝ the
trading network obtained from G after replacing Gb with a representative agent b. Observe
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that adding trades ∆ to G is equivalent to adding the same trades between b and the vertices
that belong to Gs in Ĝ. Denote the trading network induced by adding the aforementioned
trades to Ĝ by Ĝ′. In networks Ĝ and Ĝ′ the value function of the representative agent b is
defined as in (3.5), in terms of the value functions of the agents in Gb (which capture the
valuations of these agents for trades in ∆). Note that Ĝ′ can equivalently be obtained from
G′ by replacing Gb with the representative agent b.
Let (X, p) denote an equilibrium in G. By Lemma 3.3.7 there exists an equilibrium (X̂, p̂) in
Ĝ that is a projection of (X, p). Theorem 3.3.4 implies that Ĝ′ has an equilibrium (X̂ ′, p̂′),
where the prices of trades in Es weakly increase relative to the corresponding prices in p̂.
By Lemma 3.3.7 there is an equilibrium (X ′, p′) in G′, where the prices of trades outside
Gb are the same as those in p̂′. These observations imply that p′e = p̂
′
e ≥ p̂e = pe for all
e ∈ Es. Thus, the first part of the theorem follows.
The proof of the second part is similar and is omitted. The key difference is that the proof
now involves replacing Gs with a representative agent s (as opposed to replacing Gb with
b), and using an analogous result to Theorem 3.3.4 that shows that the addition of a new
seller (as opposed to a buyer) decreases (as opposed to increases) the prices in the rest of
the economy.
Note that Corollary 3.3.5 generalizes to the setting of Figure 8. Suppose that there exists
an equilibrium of the original economy where some agent in Gb participates only as a buyer
(e.g., agent r in Figure 8). Theorem 3.3.8 implies that there exists an equilibrium in the
new economy where the payoff of this agent weakly increases. Similar characterizations hold
for agents who participate only as sellers in Gb, as well as for such agents in Gs. Perhaps
more interestingly, it is possible to reason about the impact of new trading opportunities on
the payoffs of a set of agents. For instance, if there is a set of agents N̂ b in Gb = (N b, Eb)
who in the initial equilibrium participate as buyers in trades between N̂ b and N b \ N̂ b,
the aggregate equilibrium payoff of these agents increases from the addition of the new
trades. For instance, the total payoff of agents k, r, t increases as a result of the addition
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of the dashed arcs in Figure 8. Since these observations on payoff changes follow from
Theorem 3.3.8 in a straightforward way by mimicking the approach of Corollary 3.3.5 I do
not state them formally.
The characterization in this subsection so far focuses on settings where the initial network
has two disconnected components. I next generalize this characterization, by allowing for
arcs between Gb and Gs.
Theorem 3.3.9. Let Gs = (N s, Es) and Gb = (N b, Eb) denote two induced subnetworks
of the trading network G = (N,E). Suppose that E = Eb ∪Es ∪ L ∪R, where trades in L
(R) have sellers in N s (N b) and buyers in N b (N s).
Let (X, p) denote an equilibrium in G where all trades in R are executed and no trade in L
is executed. Assume that a set ∆ of trades whose sellers belong to N s and buyers belong
to N b are added to the economy. Then, the results of Theorem 3.3.8 continue to hold.
Proof. To establish the result, I consider a sequence of transformations to the underlying
network, as illustrated in Figure 9, and study how the competitive equilibria change as a
result of these transformations. All these networks share the same set of vertices, N . Ḡ is
obtained from G by replacing each arc (trade) in R with an arc between the same vertices
but with opposite orientation. The set of arcs that replace those in R is denoted by R̄. Ĝ is
obtained from Ḡ by removing the arcs in L∪ R̄. G̃ is obtained from Ĝ by adding L∪ R̄∪∆.
Finally, G′ is obtained from G̃ by replacing the arcs in R̄ with those in R. Note that G′ can
also be directly obtained from G by adding arcs ∆ to G. However, considering the sequence
of transformations in Figure 9 allows us to reason about how competitive equilibria change
in a more straightforward way. In particular, I will show that after each transformation
it is possible to obtain a competitive equilibrium where the prices of trades in Es weakly
increase. Note that this readily implies that the first result of Theorem 3.3.8 continues to
hold in the setting described in Theorem 3.3.9, as claimed.





Figure 9: A sequence of transformations. The networks on the left (G,G′) involve R,
whereas the ones in the middle (Ḡ, G̃) involve R̄. The lower networks (G̃,G′) involve ∆ and
the ones above (G, Ḡ) do not. Ĝ does not involve any of the arcs in ∆, L,R, or R̄.









Figure 10: ∆ denotes the set of new arcs (trades) in the trading network. In the initial
equilibrium in G, the trades associated with the arcs in R are executed. R̄ is obtained from
R by reversing the orientation of each arc in R.
δ̄(i) ⊂ Ē denote the set of (directed) arcs incident to i in this network. Define a bijective
map γ : E → Ē such that:
1. γ(e)+ = e+ and γ(e)− = e− for all e ∈ E \R,
2. γ(e)+ = e− and γ(e)− = e+ for all e ∈ R.
Similarly, define a bijective map ζ : 2E → 2Ē , such that for any Y ⊂ E we have
1. e ∈ Y ⇔ γ(e) ∈ ζ(Y ) for all e ∈ E \R,
2. e ∈ Y ⇔ γ(e) /∈ ζ(Y ) for all e ∈ R.
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Next, the equilibrium (X, p) in G is used to construct the valuations of the agents in Ḡ. In
particular, let
w̄i(Ȳ ) = wi(ζ







for all Ȳ ∈ δ̄(i) and i ∈ N . Consider the representation of w̄i as a function on Zδ̄(i) = Zδ(i).
It readily follows from the definition of w̄i and ζ that:







for any z ∈ Zδ̄(i). Here, zE\R denotes the entries of z that correspond to the arcs in
E \ R = Ē \ R̄. I use the shorthand notation R̄+ (similarly R̄−) to denote R̄ ∩ δ̄+(i)
(R̄ ∩ δ̄−(i)), and define zR̄+ and zR̄− similarly to zE\R. 1S is used to denote the vector
of ones in ZS for S ∈ {R̄+, R̄−}. Also, when I write wi(zE\R, zR̄+ − 1R̄+ , zR̄− + 1R̄−), I
follow the convention that zR̄+ −1R̄+ (zR̄− + 1R̄−) is associated with the part of the domain
of wi that corresponds to δ−(i) (δ+(i)). Note that this convention is consistent with the







pe is a constant and wi is M
\-concave, it readily follows from
Theorem 6.15 in Murota (2003) that w̄i is M
\-concave.
Next, I construct a competitive equilibrium (X̄, p̄) in Ḡ. Set X̄ = ζ(X), and let the prices
remain the same for all arcs, i.e., p̄γ(e) = pe for all e ∈ E. To establish that (X̄, p̄) is a
competitive equilibrium, I next argue that for any agent i, in Ḡ under price vector p̄ the
set of payoff-maximizing trades is given by δ̄(i) ∩ X̄.
First, consider an agent i ∈ N such that δ(i)∩R = ∅; i.e., i is not adjacent to the trades R
in G. It readily follows that the adjacent trades and their prices are identical for agent i in
network G (under price vector p) and in network Ḡ (under price vector p̄). Since (X, p) is
a competitive equilibrium, we know that X ∩ δ(i) is a set of payoff-maximizing trades for
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agent i in G. These observations immediately imply that in Ḡ, under price vector p̄, the
payoff-maximizing trades for i are given by δ̄(i) ∩ X̄.
Next consider i ∈ N such that δ(i) ∩ R 6= ∅. In Ḡ, under price vector p̄, for any Ȳ ⊂ δ̄(i)
the payoff of agent i can be written as follows:











































where ūi denotes the payoff function of agent i in Ḡ. Here, the first equality follows from
the definition of the payoff function. The second one follows from the definition of w̄i. The
third equality is obtained by rewriting the summations that involve the prices after splitting
Ȳ into Ȳ ∩ R̄ and Ȳ \ R̄.
Recall that p̄γ(e) = pe for all e ∈ E. In addition, the definition of ζ implies that ζ−1(Ȳ \R̄) =
ζ−1(Ȳ ) \R and
Ȳ ∩ R̄ = {γ(e)|e ∈ R \ ζ−1(Ȳ )}.
Using these observations together with (3.12), I obtain:
ūi(Ȳ , p̄) = wi(ζ





























−1(Ȳ ) ∩ δ(i), p).
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Here, the second equality follows by collecting common terms together, and the last equality
follows from the definition of the payoff function. Note that by setting Ȳ = X̄ ∩ δ̄(i), we
have
ūi(X̄∩δ̄(i), p̄) = ui(ζ−1(X̄∩δ̄(i))∩δ(i), p) = ui(X∩δ(i), p) ≥ ui(ζ−1(Y ′)∩δ(i), p) = ūi(Y ′, p̄),
(3.13)
for any Y ′ ⊂ δ̄(i). Here the second equality follows from the definition of X̄, and the
inequality follows since (X, p) is an equilibrium in G. On the other hand, since (3.13) holds
for any Y ′ ⊂ δ̄(i), I conclude that X̄ ∩ δ̄(i) is a payoff-maximizing set of trades in Ḡ under
price vector p̄. Thus, it follows that (X̄, p̄) is an equilibrium in Ḡ.
Observe that, by construction, X̄ ∩ (L ∪ R̄) = ∅, and hence the trades in L ∪ R̄ are not
demanded in the competitive equilibrium (X̄, p̄) in Ḡ. Thus, removing these trades without
changing the prices of the remaining trades yields another equilibrium. Note that Ĝ is
obtained by excluding trades L ∪ R̄ from Ḡ. Denote the set of arcs in Ĝ by Ê, and note
that Ê ∪ L ∪ R̄ = Ē. Let X̂ = X̄, and denote by p̂ the price vector obtained by restricting
p̄ to Ê, i.e., p̂e = p̄e for e ∈ Ê. The above observation implies that (X̂, p̂) is an equilibrium
in Ĝ.
Next, add L ∪ R̄ ∪∆ to Ĝ to obtain G̃. It follows from Theorem 3.3.8 that there exists a
new equilibrium (X̃, p̃) in G̃ for which p̃(e) ≥ p̂(e) for all trades in Es.
Finally, by replacing the trades in R̄ with those in R, and replicating the approach I used
when I transformed G to Ḡ, it follows that there exists an equilibrium (X ′, p′) in G′ such
that the prices of trades in Es ∪Eb are the same as the corresponding prices in equilibrium
(X̃, p̃) in Ĝ.
In sum, the equilibria that were constructed for the sequence of trading networks presented
in Figure 9 are such that
pe = p̄e = p̂e ≤ p̃e = p′e
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for any e ∈ Es. Thus, I conclude that addition of the trades in ∆ to G yields an equilibrium
where the prices of trades in Es weakly increase. Hence, it follows that the first result of
Theorem 3.3.8 continues to hold in the setting described in the theorem statement.
Under an almost identical approach (but this time using the second finding of Theorem 3.3.8
in the transformation from Ĝ to G̃), it follows that the second result of Theorem 3.3.8 also
carries over to the setting described in the theorem statement. Hence, the claim follows.
It can be readily seen that Theorem 3.3.8 is a special case of Theorem 3.3.9 with L = R = ∅.
Qualitatively, this result suggests that the presence of unused trades (L) that have the
same orientation as the trades added to the economy and the executed trades (R) in the
opposite orientation do not impact the comparative statics in Theorem 3.3.8. In fact,
this claim is formalized in the proof of Theorem 3.3.9. More precisely, I first show that the
equilibrium in the initial trading network is identical to the equilibrium in a trading network
where trades in R are replaced with trades with the opposite orientation (after a valuation
transformation). In the equilibrium in the new network, the aforementioned trades are not
executed. Leveraging this observation, I reduce the analysis of the impact of the trades in
∆ on the competitive equilibrium of the initial network, to the setting of Theorem 3.3.8.
My findings suggest that leveraging the MSFP formulation is valuable for deriving nontrivial
comparative statics and certain monotonicity properties of equilibrium prices. In addition
to the change in the equilibrium prices, it is possible to characterize the change in the
equilibrium payoff of an agent (or a group of agents). The latter is omitted here for brevity.
3.3.4. Discussion: Other Comparative Statics and Applications
I have illustrated how a competitive equilibrium changes with the addition of new trades/agents
to the trading network. I close this section by outlining another set of comparative statics
that the MSFP formulation can generate, as well as possible applications of my results.
In the classic network flow problem, it is possible to characterize the impact of the changes
in (i) the arc capacities and (ii) the arc costs, on the optimal flow and vertex potential values
86
(see, e.g., Ahuja et al. (1993)). Above I furnish results analogous to (i) in the context of
MSFP (e.g., Lemma 3.3.1). The same techniques allow one to provide results analogous to
(ii) as well. Following the proof of Lemma 3.3.1, one can show that in MSFP as the arc
cost ca for arc a ∈ E decreases, either the optimal flow does not change (e.g., if the flow
on a is equal to the capacity of the arc), or the flow on this arc increases by one unit, and
the new optimal flow can be found by complementing the initial one with the shortest path
with the least number of arcs from a− to a+ in the underlying auxiliary network. In the
latter case, the new optimal vertex potential values can also be obtained by computing the
length of the shortest path from a− to the remaining arcs, similar to Lemma 3.3.1.
When I constructed the flow network associated with the underlying trading network, I
set all arc costs of the flow network equal to zero (see Section 2.3). However, allowing
positive arc costs enables one to model a variety of trade frictions, e.g., transportation costs
or excise8 taxes. In the presence of such trade frictions, a competitive equilibrium can be
obtained by solving a version of the MSFP formulation with nonzero arc costs. Moreover,
all of the results on the existence of a competitive equilibrium and its equivalence to (chain)
stability immediately generalize to this setting. This equivalence fails in the non-quasilinear
setting; see Fleiner et al. (2018).
Perhaps more interestingly, by combining the MSFP characterization of competitive equilib-
ria and the sensitivity analyses outlined in the previous paragraph, it is possible to reason
about the change in the equilibrium prices/payoffs as the aforementioned trade frictions
increase/decrease. For instance, the impact of targeting some sectors of an economy with
carbon taxes, on the market prices of the output of different sectors can be studied by
combining the MSFP formulation and these sensitivity results (similar to the analysis of
marginal tax changes in King et al. (2019)).
The comparative statics provided in this section also have immediate application to trade
8These taxes are independent of the transaction prices, and are imposed on oil, tobacco, alcohol, and
certain chemicals like carbon; see, e.g., Wasserman et al. (1991) and Barthold (1994).
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quotas. For instance, suppose that there is no trade between two countries (i.e., quotas
are set equal to zero for all goods). Suppose that quotas are raised to facilitate trade
of certain goods; what is the impact on the prices of different goods/services in the two
countries/economies? The setting studied in the previous section – after interpreting Gs
and Gb as the trading networks internal to different countries – precisely answers this
question. For instance, Theorem 3.3.8 implies that when economy Gb raises quotas (for
incoming goods), the buyers in this economy enjoy lower prices. Moreover, if these quotas
are fully used and economy Gs in turn raises quotas, Theorem 3.3.9 implies that this results
in an increase in the payoff of the buyers in economy Gs. I view the analysis of the impact
of more realistic changes in quotas on the competitive equilibrium, using the machinery
developed in this section, as an interesting future direction.
3.4. Concluding Remarks and Future Applications
In this work, I show that the problem of finding efficient sets of trades in trading networks
can be formulated as an MSFP in a suitable network. The network flow formulation and the
associated optimality conditions readily imply the known results on competitive equilibria
in trading networks, such as their existence and equivalence to (chain) stability. This for-
mulation also leads to algorithms for finding competitive equilibria and identifying blocking
chains, when they exist. Moreover, by leveraging sensitivity analysis ideas from network
flows I provide new comparative statics for trading networks.
In this work, the focus has been on quasilinear utilities/payoffs. For more general settings
without transferable utilities, full substitutability of preferences is not sufficient for the
existence of (chain) stable outcomes and its equivalence to the competitive equilibrium
outcome (Hatfield et al., 2019b). For such settings, alternative solution concepts have been
proposed in the literature; see, e.g., Fleiner et al. (2018). Exploring possible applications of
network flow formulations in such more general settings is an interesting future direction.
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CHAPTER 4 : Analytical Tools for Prophet Inequalities
Prophet Inequalities are a way to quantify the value of perfect information in optimal stop-
ping problems that are distribution-free. The first prophet inequality was derived in the
classic paper of Krengel and Sucheston (1977) in the context that I will call the basic stop-
ping problem. Consider a sequence of n random variables that are interpreted as rewards.
The random variables are sampled sequentially, and at each step, a decision-maker has to
decide whether to stop and receive the reward or continue. The question of maximizing the
expected reward constitutes the on-line problem. On the other hand, a prophet possesses
complete clairvoyance of the rewards, i.e., has perfect information. The off-line problem is
straightforward: select the largest realized reward. A prophet inequality bounds the ratio
of the expected value of the on-line problem to the off-line problem from below. The higher
this ratio, the less important perfect information is. Over time a huge literature has devel-
oped devoted to sharpening the original prophet inequality or deriving similar inequalities
for other stopping problems. An interesting survey of results and techniques can be found
in Hill and Kertz (1992) and later developments are presented by Lucier (2017).
In this chapter, a variety of different techniques that have been used to derive prophet
inequalities are summarized. This will serve as a contrast to two new linear programming
approaches that I have developed. The first is a primal approach, based on scaling the
reduced form of the prophet’s strategy. The second is a dual approach inspired by Davis
and Karatzas (1994).
4.1. Basic Stopping: A Linear Programming Approach
In the basic stoppping problem, a sequence of n random variables, indexed by I = {1, . . . , n}
and interpreted as rewards, are sampled sequentially, i.e., they are not known in advance.
Reward ri is revealed on step i. The realized rewards are independent. For most of this
dissertation, I will assume that the rewards can take values from a finite set Ri, where the
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probability that reward ri is realized is denoted by fi(ri).
1 r refers to a full profile of
rewards r = (r1, . . . , rn). Denote by r≤i the profile of rewards up to and including step i.
r<i denotes the profile of rewards up to but not including step i.
A decision consists of a stopping rule based on the realized rewards up to the current
step. A stopping rule specifies the probability zi(ri) that the decision-maker stops at step
i conditional on the event that she has not stopped in previous steps. Specifically, zi(ti) =
Pr[select ri|1, . . . , i − 1 not stopped]. This fully captures the set of stopping rules, since
independence implies that there is no need to condition the decision to stop on i upon r<i.
A linear programming representation can be given by considering path-dependent decisions.
Let qi(r≤i) be the probability of stopping on i ∈ I given the profile of rewards r≤i was
realized. These are called ex-post variables. The set of feasible stopping rules can be
represented by a set of nonnegative values q such that the sum of the variables relevant to
a full profile of rewards adds up to one. In more detail, the optimal stopping rule can be
found as a solution to a linear program (LP), defined below.







qi(r≤i) ≤ 1 ∀r
q ≥ 0.
(LP)
The optimal stopping rule can be implemented by dynamic programming. It selects a
reward ri if it greater than the expected reward in future rounds.
Definition 4.1.1. Let vi be the expected reward of the optimal stopping rule starting from
i. A dynamic program will proceed backwards, computing the values v1, . . . , vn recursively
as follows,
vi = Eri max{ri, vi+1}, (4.1)
1However, it is sometimes convenient to work with continuous distributions in that certain quantities can
be given succinct expressions.
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with initial condition vn+1 = 0. With these values in hand, the optimal stopping rule can
be easily implemented. The optimal stopping rule selects a reward ri in step i if and only
if ri ≥ vi+1.
In this chapter, I will also consider the prophet’s strategy. The prophet, possessed of
complete clairvoyance on the rewards, selects the maximum reward for each full profile of







In a similar fashion to (LP), the prophet’s strategy can be represented by a set of variables
{wi(r)}i∈I,r∈R, such that for all profiles
∑
i
wi(r) ≤ 1. Let w∗ be the prophet’s strategy,
such that for each profile of rewards r all variables are set to zero but the one with the
largest reward.
In the following sections, I study the optimal stopping rule, along with alternative strategies.
A number of strategies that return a reward comparable to the prophet’s expected reward
will be presented.
4.2. Balanced Thresholds
I first consider rules based on setting a fixed threshold. The decision-maker selects a realized
reward of ri whenever it exceeds the fixed threshold. Several thresholds can be used to derive
the prophet inequality. For simplicity, in this section, I assume that the rewards are sampled
from a continuous distribution. The results hold for all types of distributions, subject to a
few technicalities.
For the basic stopping problem, the total reward can be split between the value of the
threshold and the decision-maker’s surplus. Let τ(r) be the stopping time when profile r
is realized. Let p = Pr[max
i
ri ≥ T ]. Then, the total reward of the above selection rule is
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bounded from below as follows,
V = pT + Er[(rτ(r) − T )+] = pT + Er[
∑
i
(ri − T )+I(τ(r) = i)]
= pT + Er[
∑
i
(ri − T )+I(τ(r) > i− 1)] = pT + Er[
∑
i
(ri − T )+]P[τ(r) > i− 1]]
≥ pT + (1− p)
∑
i
Eri [(ri − T )+].
(4.3)
I summarize different thresholds that have appeared in the literature, and attempt to match




Eri [(ri − TH)]+








ri ≤ TmLOS ] ∼ 12
Table 1: Balanced Thresholds
The basic stopping problem has an interpretation in terms of dynamic posted prices. Agents
arrive sequentially. Agent i has a reservation value ri, drawn from a distribution indepen-
dently of the other agents. The threshold can be interpreted as a take-it-or-leave-it price.
If the current agent’s ri is below the threshold, no sale takes place, and the seller moves to
the next agent. If it is above, a sale is made, and the process stops. The expected payoff of
optimal stopping or a threshold-based strategy is the expected payoff of the seller posting
the prices plus the buyers’ surplus. The expected payoff of the prophet corresponds to the
expected payoff of a seller who knows the reservation values of each buyer in advance and
can, therefore, charge them their full value.
4.2.1. Median of Largest Order Statistic and an Interval of Prices (Samuel-Cahn, 1984)
Samuel-Cahn (1984) provides a single threshold TSK , and examines the reward of a decision-
maker who stops when she observes a reward ri ≥ TSK . Set the threshold such that
Pr[max
i














Eri [ri − TSK ]+. The proof follows,
V ≥ pTSK + (1− p)
∑
i



















Interestingly, Samuel-Cahn (1984) also provides a separate interval of numbers [TL, TH ] such
that all the numbers in the interval can serve as thresholds to derive the prophet inequality.
Consider two thresholds TL, TH which can be given as fixed points of two different functions
φL, φH , respectively, i.e., TL = φL(TL) and TH = φH(TH). The two functions are
• φL(T ) = Er[(max
i
ri − T )+] and
• φH(T ) = Er[
∑
i
(ri − T )+].
Both of the functions admit fixed points, since the continuity of the distribution functions
implies the continuity of the functions φL, φH .
The two thresholds are related and bounded from below as shown in Lemma 4.4.
Lemma 4.2.1. TL is always less than TH and bounded from below by
1
2M , i.e.,




Proof. Suppose that TL > TH . This implies that
TL > TH = Er[
∑
i
(ri − TH)+] ≥ Er[max
i
ri − TH ]+ ≥ Er[(max
i
ri − TL)+] = TL,
which is a contradiction.
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M > TL = Er[max
i














which is a contradiction.
I combine 4.4 with inequality 4.3 to show that, for any threshold T ∈ [TL, TH ], the expected
reward is at least half of the prophet’s rewards,
V ≥ pT + (1− p)
∑
i
Eri [(ri − T )+] ≥ pTL + (1− p)
∑
i
Eri [(ri − T )+]




4.2.2. Half the Largest Order Statistic (Kleinberg and Weinberg, 2019)
Kleinberg and Weinberg (2019) also provide a (different) threshold in order to derive the










ri− TKW )+] ≥ Er[max
i
ri− TKW ] = TKW , where the equality follows
from the linearity of expectations and the definition of TKW . Thus, I conclude that










Remark. Both proofs discussed are threshold-based. Given that a threshold is a price, both
proofs initially separate the agents’ surplus and the payoff generated by the decision-maker.
Then each quantity can be bounded below, which gives the prophet inequality. Given that
the thresholds differ, the two proofs differ in the way they lower bound the two quantities.
However, in all cases, a balance is attained, which is more evident in the second proof. On
94
the other hand, the threshold in the first case is more robust to outlier values.
4.3. Duality Theory
I provide an alternative proof of the classic prophet inequality, leveraging duality theory.
The analysis directly extends to continuous distributions and linear functional program-
ming. First, a linear program describing the optimal stopping rule is presented, along with
its dual and auxiliary representations of them. Then, strong duality and properties of the
optimal dual variables are utilized to derive the classic prophet inequality.
Consider an alternative representation of the optimal on-line resource allocation problem,
denoted by (ALP).







wi(r) ≤ 1 ∀r
wi(r) = qi(r1, . . . , ri) ∀i ∀r
w, q ≥ 0
(ALP)
The formulation is due to Davis and Karatzas (1994). Here the set of variables is expanded
by including a set of variables w that depend on future rewards too and a set of new
constraints restricting them to have the same value when the history is the same.
Consider a partial dual function L(λ), denoted by (LLP).










wi(r) ≤ 1 ∀r
w, q ≥ 0.
(LLP)
Weak duality implies that the dual function serves as an upper bound to the optimal solution
V . However, strong duality implies that for optimal dual variables the upper bound matches
the optimal value, i.e., there exists λ∗ such that L(λ∗) = V .
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Optimal dual variables can be found utilizing the dual problem denoted by (DP).
min Er[π(r)]
s.t. π(r) ≥ λi(r) + ri
Eri+1,...,rn [λi(r)] ≥ 0
π ≥ 0
(DP)
By examining (DP) it is clear that solving it reduces to computing optimal variables π.
(DP) can be projected to the space of π and the dual variables λ can be chosen maximally
to support them. In more detail, given an optimal solution π∗, optimal dual variables λ∗
can be chosen as follows,
λ∗i (r) = π
∗(r)− ri. (4.5)
The projection of the dual problem to the space of π variables is denoted by (PDP).
min Er[π(r)]
s.t. Eri+1,...,rn [π(r)] ≥ ri ∀i ∀r1, . . . , ri
π ≥ 0
(PDP)




(ri + λi(r))wi(r)]. (4.6)
The above primal-dual definitions are used to provide a proof of the prophet inequality.
First, a few helpful lemmas are presented.
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Lemma 4.3.1. Given an optimal solution λ∗, the optimal value V can be given by









wi(r) ≤ b ∀r
w ≥ 0.
(ALLP)
Proof. The proof is short. Since λ∗ is optimal, it is clear from (DP) that Eri+1,...,rnλ∗i (r) ≥ 0
for all i and r1, . . . , ri. Hence, the optimal q in (LLP) is zero. Hence, the second term in
the objective cancels out, and (LLP) reduces to the form stated in the lemma.





λ∗i (r) = π(r)− ri =
∑
i
[ri − vi+1]+ − ri.
(4.7)
Proof. The above values can be constructed inductively by iteratively adding increments
to the variables π to satisfy the constraints. However, I prove their optimality by showing
that they are feasible and the objective becomes equal to V .




[rj − vj+1]+ +
∑
j>i
Erj [rj − vj+1]+
≥ [ri − vi+1]+ +
∑
j>i
Erj [rj − vj+1]+




= [ri − vi+1]+ + vi+1
≥ ri.
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The first equality follows by linearity of expectations and the first inequality follows by
omitting positive terms before i. The second equality comes from the definition of the
values vi+1, . . . , vn and the third equality by canceling terms in the summation. The last
inequality is straightforward. Furthermore, λ∗ is feasible too, by definition.








Eri [ri − vi+1]+
= V.
The last equality holds because a dynamic program will choose i if the current reward is
larger than the expected reward in future rounds. This completes the proof.







i (r)] ≥ −V. (4.8)




[rj − vj+1]+ − ri








= [ri − vi+1]+ − ri + vi+1
≥ − vi+1 ≥ −V.
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i (r)] ≥ −V Er[
∑
i
w∗i (r)] ≥ −V.
The first inequality holds since w∗ is nonnegative and the second inequality holds because∑
i
w∗i (r) ≤ 1 for all r.
By leveraging the above lemmas the prophet inequality can be derived.
Theorem 4.3.4. The reward of the optimal stopping rule is at least half of the prophet’s
reward in expectation, i.e., V ≥ M2 .
Proof. A few more steps of analysis will suffice to bound the optimal expected reward from
below.
















i (r)] ≥M − V
The first inequality comes from Lemma 4.3.1 and the feasibility of w∗, the second equality
comes form the definition of the prophet’s reward, and the last inequality comes from
Lemma 4.3.3. The above inequality gives an approximation guarantee of 12 .
The proof is closely related to the one by Davis and Karatzas (1994). They first show the
equivalence of (ALP) and (ALLP), by explicitly constructing the dual variables and the
associated stopping rules. I sidestep this part by showing that the equivalence is a simple
byproduct of strong duality. For the remainder, both of the proofs are based on bounding
the dual variables from below. Davis and Karatzas (1994) manages to do so for a suitable
choice of dual variables. Here a different set of dual values is provided, which is chosen
maximally. My hope is that these additional insights will be useful to address the problem
in more general settings.
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Remark. Notice that most of the steps along the proof can be extended to the case of
multiple resource constraints. The crucial step in the above analysis is pinning down the
optimal dual variables π∗. This is the step that requires careful thought when generalizing
to multiple constraints. The application of strong duality as well as determining optimal
dual variables λ∗ carry on.
4.4. The Reduced-Form Representation
I describe a more compact primal formulation using a new set of variables {Qj(rj)}i∈I,ri∈Ri .
The new set of variables are related to the ex-post variables q as follows,
Qj(rj) = Er1,...,rj−1 [qj(r1, . . . , rj)].
The variables Qj(rj) are sometimes called interim variables. A formulation of the stopping
problem in terms of the interim variables is called the reduced-form representation. This
is the first work to express the reduced-form representation of the basic stopping problem.
Similarly, a more compact formulation of the prophet’s problem can be given using variables
{Wj(rj)}i∈I,ri∈Ri , related to the prophet’s ex-post variables as follows,
Wj(rj) = Er−j [wj(r)].
The above set of variables provide a tractable description of the decision-maker’s and
prophet’s problems, in the form of a polytope in polynomially many variables.
Given the above set of reduced variables, I examine the reduced-form representation of the
decision-maker’s and prophet’s problems. When it comes to the prophet’s problem, the
answer has already been given in (C Border, 1991), where a set of constraints is formed
using Hall’s theorem to match interim allocations with ex-post allocations. The formulation
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fi(ri)) ∀S ⊆ R
W ≥ 0.
(PRF)
I now examine the projection of (LP) to the interim space. The use of interim variables is
possible because of the independence of the rewards. The objective can be written in terms
of the interim variables quite easily as the aggregate weighted average of the rewards in
each round scaled by the interim variables. The projection of (LP) to the space of interim
variables can be formulated as a set of constraints parameterized by the reward in each
round.




Erj [Qj(rj)] ≤ 1. (4.9)
Proof. Consider a set of decisions z supporting Q. For each i and ri the interim value is



















For i = 1, the equality reduces to Er1 [1 − z1(r1)] = 1 − Er1 [Q1(r1)], which holds since
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The first equality follows from independence, the second equality follows from linearity of
expectations, and the fourth equality follows from the inductive step and the definition of
the interim variables. Hence, a set of interim values points out to a strategy z such that for








The only constraint tying z is zi(ri) ≤ 1. After substituting with the expression of interim
values, the desired inequality is revealed.












4.4.1. Weakly Coupled LP Relaxations
I describe a proof of the classic prophet inequality, attributed to Guha and Munagala
(2007), which utilizes a weakly coupled linear programming relaxation of the prophet’s




Eri [(ri − TH)+].
The threshold might be the same as in the previous proof, but the proof differs. I will
assume that the distribution functions are continuous to guarantee that TH exists.
The proof of an approximation guarantee for the above rule makes use of an linear pro-
gramming relaxation of (PRF). Let Wi(ri) be the probability that i is selected given that









0 ≤Wi(ri) ≤ 1 ∀i ∀ri
(RPRF)
Let T be the dual variable corresponding to the first constraint. A partial dual function of
RPRF is given by
L(T ) = max T +
∑
i
Eri [(ri − T )Wi(ri)]
s.t. 0 ≤Wi(ri) ≤ 1 ∀i ∀ri
Solving the maximization problem implies that L(T ) = T +
∑
i
Eri [(ri−T )+]. Weak duality
implies that L(T ) ≥M . Recall from Lemma 4.4 that TH =
∑
i
Eri [(ri − TH)+] ≥ 12M .
The approximation guarantee comes from an amortized analysis of the final reward. The
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expected reward is bounded below,
V ≥ pTH + (1− p)
∑
i









4.4.2. New Algorithms utilizing the Reduced Form
I now describe a novel approach utilizing the reduced-form representation of the prophet’s
strategy to devise approximately efficient strategies. I will devise three new algorithms
that perform well in three different settings, the basic stopping problem, a case where the
rewards are sampled from the same distribution, and a case where the decision-maker can
first order the agents appropriately and then start selecting in that order.
Basic Setting
For the classic setting, consider the strategy QA which scales the prophet’s strategy by half,





The above algorithm is crude but achieves approximate efficiency. The approximation
guarantee achieved carries on to the optimal stopping rule, as a consequence.
Theorem 4.4.2. Algorithm A achieves at least 1/2 of the prophet’s reward in expectation.
Proof. It is clear that the objective function with respect to the reduced form for both













The proposed solution is feasible for the stopping problem. In detail, QAi (ri)+
∑
j<i









Erj [W ∗j (rj)] ≤ 1. The last inequality holds since W ∗i (ri) ≤ 1 and the prob-
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ability of stopping in the first i− 1 steps is also less than 1.
IID Setting
If one imposes restrictions on the distribution over rewards one might expect improved
prophet inequalities. For the case when the distributions are identical, I show how using
the optimal interim variables of the off-line problem can lead to informative proofs of the
prophet inequality. For the IID setting, consider a rule B based on stopping on i with
reward ri with probability z
B
i (ri) = W
∗
i (ri). The algorithm achieves approximate efficiency
when compared to the prophet’s reward, but it is not the best bound found in the literature.
A first reference on the problem can be found in Hill and Kertz (1982), where the prophet
inequality presented matches the one presented here. For the latest developments on the
basic stopping problem with identical distributions, see Abolhassani et al. (2017).
Theorem 4.4.3. Algorithm B achieves at least 1− 1e of the prophet’s reward in expectation.
Proof. Consider a symmetric version of the prophet’s strategy, such that W ∗i (r) = W
∗
j (r) =
W ∗(r) for all i and ri. The prophet’s expected reward is equal to M = nEr[W ∗(r)]. The































Variable Arrival Order Setting
The basic stopping problem where the decision-maker can choose the arrival order of the
rewards was presented by Yan (2011). I show an alternative proof of the prophet inequality
for this case, which matches the best possible. Consider a strategy C that selects the
order of the rewards processed and then proceeds with examining the sequence of rewards








. Conditionally on the event of reaching i, the decision-maker selects ri
with probability zi(ri) = W
∗
i (ri). The expected reward is bounded below by a fraction of
the prophet’s expected reward.
Theorem 4.4.4. Algorithm C achieves at least 1− 1e of the prophet’s reward in expectation.
Proof. I assume that the rewards are ordered such that ki ≥ ki+1 for all i. As before I
analyze the interim values under C,





(1− ErjW ∗j (rj)).
Let ai = Eri [riW ∗i (ri)], bi = Eri [W ∗i (ri)], and ci =
∏
j<i
(1 − Erj [W ∗j (rj)]) =
∏
j<i
(1 − bj). The
prophet’s reward can be written as M =
∑
i












































) ≥ (1− 1
e
)M.
The first two equalities come from the definition of C and the definition of a, c. I claim
that the first inequality holds, which I will prove shortly. The third equality follows
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Eri [W ∗i (ri)] = 1. The fifth equality follows by the definition of c in terms of b and the
sixth equality by simplifying the expression. The second inequality follows by the standard
trick, and the last inequality again follows since the prophet always utilizes the resource.






















bjcj ] ≥ 0.
Set xi = ci and yi =
ai
bi
for all i. Let h be an increasing function satisfying yi = h(xi) for

































The first equality follows from the definition of x and y, and the second equality follows






bjxj) = 0. The






bjxj)) ≥ 0 for all
i.
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CHAPTER 5 : Optimal On-line Verification Rules
In many large organizations, scarce resources must be allocated internally without the
benefit of prices. Examples include the headquarters of a firm that must choose between
multiple investment proposals from each of its division managers and funding agencies
allocating a grant among researchers. In these settings, the private information needed
to determine the right allocation resides with the agents, and the principal must rely on
verification of agents’ claims, which can be costly. I interpret verification as acquiring
information (e.g., requesting documentation, interviewing an agent, or monitoring an agent
at work), which can be costly. The headquarters of the diversified firm can hire an external
firm to conduct an assessment of any division manager’s claims, for example. The funding
agency must allocate time to evaluate the claims of the researcher applying for a grant.
Furthermore, in these settings, the principal can punish an agent if his claim is found to be
false. For example, the head of personnel can reject an applicant, fire an employee, or deny
promotion. Funding agencies can cut off funding.
Prior work considered an off-line version of this problem. Specifically, there is a principal
who has to allocate one indivisible object among a finite number of agents, all of whom
are present. The value to the principal of assigning the object to a particular agent is the
private information of the agent. Each agent prefers to possess the object than not. The
principal would like to give the object to the agent who has the highest value to her. Ben-
Porath et al. (2014), the first to pose the question, assumes punishment is unlimited in the
sense that an agent can be rejected and not receive the resource. Punishment can be limited
because verification is imperfect or information arrives only after an agent has been hired
for a while. In Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk (2017), verification is free, but punishment is
limited. Li (2020) generalizes both papers by incorporating costly verification and limited
punishment.
This section introduces and analyzes an on-line version of this problem in which the agents
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arrive and depart one at a time, and the decision to allocate the object to an agent must
be made upon the arrival of an agent. If the principal declines to allocate the object to an
agent, the agent departs and cannot be recalled. If the principal allocates the object to an
agent, the decision is irreversible. The problem is analogous to the problem of choosing a
selling mechanism when facing a stream of buyers who arrive over time (see, for example,
Gershkov and Moldovanu (2014)), except we do not have access to monetary transfers.
If each agent were to truthfully report the value to the principal, the principal faces the
stopping problem. The goal is to select a single element with maximum value. An element
of the sequence must be selected or discarded upon its arrival, and this decision is irre-
vocable. Recall that the solution involves a sequence of thresholds, indexed by the agent,
and the principal allocates the object to the first agent whose reported value exceeds their
corresponding threshold.
If the principal were to adopt such a policy in this setting, it would encourage all agents
to exaggerate their values. To discourage this, the principal can ration at the top of the
distribution of values or verify an agent’s claim and punish him if his claim is found to be
false. The first reduces allocative efficiency while the second is costly. This work aims to
find the optimal way to provide incentives via these two devices in an on-line setting. The
contributions of this work are as follows:
1. A reformulation of the on-line problem as a compact linear program that may be
useful in other applications.
2. This reformulation allows us to derive a prophet inequality for the on-line version of
the verification problem.
This setting is related to three lines of work. The first is on costly verification that begins
with Townsend (1979). This work and others that followed such as Gale and Hellwig (1985),
and Mookherjee and Png (1989), analyze off-line settings with transfers, which I rule out.
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The second is on partial but costless verification, see for example Caragiannis et al. (2012)
or Ball and Kattwinkel (2019), for example. In these models, verification is costless but
imperfect. In my model, verification is perfect but costly. At a high level, the two are related
because one can think of partial verification as being costly, but the cost is endogenous,
depending on the nature of the realized allocation. In my case, the cost is exogenous.
Finally, it is related to the extensive literature on on-line selection problems. The absence
of money in my setting means that the results from these papers do not apply.
In Section 5.1, I introduce my setting and the linear programming formulation. In Sec-
tion 5.2, I characterize the form of the optimal mechanism and provide a corresponding
prophet inequality. In Section 5.3, I study the variation of the problem with limited pun-
ishment.
5.1. Model
There is a single indivisible good to allocate among a set of agents denoted by I = {1, . . . , n}.
The type of agent i ∈ I is ti which is the value to the principal of allocating the object to
agent i. I assume that the agents’ types are independently distributed. The distribution of
agent’s i type has strictly positive density fi over the interval Ti = [ti, ti]. The preferences of
the agents are simple: each prefers to possess the object to not. The actual private benefit
enjoyed by an agent from receiving the object does not need to be specified.
Agents arrive one after the other and report their type, not necessarily truthfully. The
principal can verify the reported type of agent i at cost c > 0 and determine perfectly if
the agent has lied. In the event an agent is discovered to have lied, the object is withheld
from them. This is the case of unlimited punishment. The case of limited punishment is
considered later.
By the revelation principle we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms. Denote by
t≤i the profile of reported types made by all agents up to and including agent i. I write
t<i to denote the profile of reported types made by all agents up to but not including
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i. A direct mechanism specifies for each profile of type reports, an allocation rule and
an verification rule for each agent i. The allocation rule specifies the probability zi(ti)
he is allocated the good conditional on the event that the good is not already allocated.
Specifically, zi(ti) = Pr[choose ti|1, . . . , i − 1 not allocated]. This fully captures the set of
on-line allocation rules, since independence means there is no need to condition the decision
to allocate the good to agent i upon t<i. The verification rule is the probability that agent
i is assigned the good and inspected conditional on the event that the good is not already
allocated and denoted ai(ti). Therefore:
0 ≤ ai(ti) ≤ zi(ti) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ∈ Ti. (5.1)
Definition 5.1.1. A direct mechanism M = (T1, . . . , T|I|, {zi(·), ai(·)}i∈I) restricts the
strategy set of each agent i to Ti, and returns an allocation rule qi : Ti → [0, 1] and a
verification rule ai : Ti → [0, 1] for each agent i ∈ I.
Definition 5.1.2. A direct mechanismM = (T1, . . . , T|I|, {zi(·), ai(·)}i∈I) is incentive com-
patible if each agent i has an incentive to truthfully report her type, i.e.
zi(ti) ≥ zi(t′i)− ai(t′i) ∀i ∈ I ∀ti, t′i ∈ Ti. (5.2)
The left-hand side of (5.2) is the probability of receiving the good with a truthful report.
The right-hand side is the probability of receiving the good with a misreport adjusted
downwards for the possibility of being inspected and punished for misreporting.
The principal would like to choose the allocation and verification probabilities z and a






(1− zj(tj))]Eti [tizi(ti)− cai(ti)].
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5.1.1. Reduced-Form Representation
I work with a reduced-form representation of the allocation and verification rules (see for
example C Border (1991); Vohra (2012); Li (2020)). Given an allocation and verification
rule, (z, a), let Qi(ti) = zi(ti)Et<i [
∏
j<i




be the interim allocation and verification probabilities respectively. The interim allocation
and verification probabilities are related to the allocation and verification probabilities as
follows:
Lemma 5.1.1. Let Q,A, z, a be the interim as well as actual allocation and verification























It is now easy to relate the allocation and verification rules. By the definition of Q,A,
• Qi(ti) = zi(ti)Et<i [
∏
j<i




• Ai(ti) = ai(ti)Et<i [
∏
j<i









Etj [Qj(tj)] ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ∈ Ti
0 ≤ Ai(ti) ≤ Qi(ti) ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ∈ Ti










Etj [Qj(tj)] ≤ 1 ∀i ∀ti ∈ Ti
Qi(ti) ≥ Qi(t′i)−Ai(t′i) ∀i ∈ I ∀ti, t′i ∈ Ti
0 ≤ Ai(ti) ≤ Qi(ti) ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ∈ Ti
(VLP)
5.2. The Optimal Mechanism
In this section, I derive the optimal interim allocation and verification rules. The interim
verification rule will be derived as a function of the optimal interim allocation rule. The
optimal interim allocation rule will be given as a solution to a linear program. The actual
allocation and verification rules can be obtained from the interim ones via Lemma 5.1.1.
Given the optimal interim allocation rule, the optimal interim verification rule can be de-
duced from the incentive constraints in (LP). They can be reduced to the following:
min
ti







(5.6) is used to eliminate the verification variables from (LP). I also introduce a new set
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of variables {φi}i∈I accounting for the minimum interim allocation per agent. For a given
{φi}i∈I , the optimal interim allocation rule is given by the following linear program denoted
LP(φ):








Etj [Qj(tj)] ≤ 1 ∀i ∀ti ∈ Ti




φi ≤ 1, V (φ) is well defined, otherwise there is no feasible solution. This is
because 1 ≥
∑
i Eti [Qi(ti)] ≥
∑








which is also a linear program. I now characterize the optimal interim allocation and
verification rules given φ.
Lemma 5.2.1. The optimal solution of LP(φ) is monotonic in type, i.e.
Qi(ti) ≤ Qi(t′i) ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ≤ t′i
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there is an i and pair (ti, t
′
i) such that Qi(ti) > Qi(t
′
i). I pick
an ε > 0 such that
• Qi(ti)− εfi(ti) ≥ Qi(t
′
i),
• Qi(t′i) + εfi(t′i) ≤ Qi(ti).





i) is increased by
ε
fi(t′i)
, feasibility is preserved. The
objective function value increases by ε(t′i − ti) > 0, which is a contradiction.
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Hence, there exists a threshold t̂i for all i such that Qi(ti) = φi for ti ≤ t̂i and Qi(ti) ≥ φi
otherwise.
I show that the optimal strategy is a threshold strategy in each round. A transformation
of variables will prove convenient:
Qi(ti) = φi + xi(ti) (5.8)










Etj [xj(tj)] ≤ 1−
∑
j≤i
φj ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ∈ Ti
xi(ti) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ∈ Ti
(XP) is a simplified version of LP(φ) given by the transformation defined in (5.8).
Lemma 5.2.2. Suppose that Q is the optimal solution to LP(φ). Then, for each agent i,






Etj [Qj(tj)] if ti ≥ t̂i
φi otherwise
(5.9)
Proof. Suppose we are interested in the allocation and verification rules when we reach
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agent i. Fix all other variables. We are interested in solving the following linear program
max
xi
Eti [xi(ti)(ti − c)]






Etj [xj(tj)] ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ∈ Ti






Etj [xj(tj)] ∀k > i ∀tk ∈ Tk
xi(ti) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ∈ Ti
Now, it is clear that the optimal solution can actually be characterized by a threshold. All
high types will be assigned their upper limit till the constraint on the aggregate allocation









Etj [xj(tj)] if ti ≥ t̂i
0 otherwise
Returning back to Q variables completes the proof.
Lemma 1 allows us to derive the actual allocation and verification rules given the interim
ones. I also provide the form for the actual allocations, given the characterization of the
optimal interim allocation in terms of parameters φ, t̂,
Corollary 5.2.3. For each agent i there exists a threshold t̂i and constant αi, such that
the optimal actual allocation can be written as follows:
zi(ti) =
 1 if ti ≥ t̂iαi otherwise ai(ti) =
 1− αi if ti ≥ t̂i0 otherwise
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The form for the actual verification rule follows by (5.6).
Before continuing, I summarize the roadmap for determining the optimal allocation and
verification rules:





V (φ) to find the optimal interim allocation rule Q.
2. Derive the optimal interim verification rule A from equation (5.6).
3. Derive the optimal actual allocation and verification rules q, a from the interim ones
Q,A, via Lemma 5.1.1.
5.2.1. Prophet Inequality
A prophet inequality is derived for the setting with verification using the reduced form.1 It
scales the optimal off-line solution so as to make it a feasible solution for the on-line setting.
This technique can also be used in the standard setting.
Theorem 5.2.4. The optimal on-line algorithm achieves at least 1/2 of the performance
of the optimal off-line algorithm in expectation.
Proof. LetQ∗i (ti) be the interim expected probability with which agent i with type ti receives
the item in the optimal off-line solution. Let φ∗i = infti
Q∗i (ti) as proposed in Ben-Porath
1This result does not assume that the distribution of types is IID.
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i (ti)(ti − c)] + φ∗i c].








i . It is clear that the objective function
with respect to the reduced form for both problems is linear and coincides. Thus, a simple
scaling approximates the optimal objective:
∑
i∈I







i (ti)(ti − c)] + φ∗i c]











Etj [Q∗j (tj)] ≤ 1: This holds since Q∗i (ti) ≤ 1
and the expected off-line allocation for the first i− 1 agents is also less than 1.
• Qi(t) ≥ φi: The constraint coincides with the off-line constraint. Nothing changes by
scaling both sides of the inequality.
5.3. Limited Punishment
The punishment is limited if the principal cannot reduce an agent’s payoff to his outside
option by punishing him. If we interpret verification as acquiring information, then pun-
ishment can be limited because information is imperfect.2 I assume that punishment is
proportional to the private benefit enjoyed by the agent from receiving the object. If vi is
the private benefit enjoyed by agent i, punishment is kivi, where each ki ∈ [0, 1]. These
are the same assumptions as in Li (2020). As I show below, limited punishment will cause
the principal to ‘ration at the top’ as well. All types above some threshold face the same
2Verification cost and punishment level are taken as exogenous, but it is possible that the principal can
get more precise information by incurring a higher information acquisition cost, which, in turn, leads to a
more severe expected punishment. The results in this work readily extend to the case where the principal
can jointly optimize over verification cost and punishment level.
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probability of receiving the good.
By the Revelation Principle, we can focus on direct mechanisms. In this case, if an agent
is inspected, it is optimal to penalize him if and only if he is found to have lied. After the
allocation is made, the planner will observe the agent’s type and destroy a fraction ki of the
agent’s payoff. A direct mechanism specifies for each profile of type reports the probability
zi(ti) that the good is assigned to agent i conditional on the event that it is not already
assigned. These variables must satisfy the following feasibility conditions:
0 ≤ zi(ti) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ∈ Ti (5.10)
The incentive compatibility constraints are as follows:
vizi(ti) ≥ (vi − kivi)zi(t′i)⇒
zi(ti) ≥ (1− ki)zi(t′i) ∀i ∈ I ∀ti, t′i ∈ Ti (5.11)






As before I work with a reduced-form representation. This allows us to formulate the









Eti [Qi(ti)] ≤ 1 ∀i ∀ti ∈ Ti
Qi(ti) ≥ (1− ki)Qi(t′i) ∀i ∀ti ∈ Ti ∀t′i ∈ Ti
Qi(ti) ≥ 0 ∀i ∀ti ∈ Ti
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5.3.1. The Optimal Mechanism
The incentive constraint is simplified, as in Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk (2017). The proof
is included for completeness.
Lemma 5.3.1. An allocation rule satisfies incentive compatibility if and only if for all i
there exists χi such that
(1− ki)χi ≤ Qi(ti) ≤ χi ∀ti ∈ Ti (5.12)
Proof. If incentive compatibility holds then (5.12) holds with χi = sup
ti
Qi(ti). Conversely,




Qi(ti), which implies incentive
compatibility.
I now write down a linear program which finds the optimal strategy. We know that for









Eti [Qi(ti)] ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ∈ Ti
(1− ki)χi ≤ Qi(ti) ≤ χi ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ∈ Ti
Qi(ti) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ∈ Ti
The optimal strategy is now described.
Lemma 5.3.2. Suppose that Q is the optimal on-line solution. Let χi = sup
ti∈Ti
Qi(ti). Then
for each agent i, there exists a threshold t̂i such that
Qi(ti) =
 χi if ti ≥ t̂i(1− ki)χi otherwise (5.13)
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Proof. Suppose we are interested in the allocation rule when we reach agent i. Fix all other




s.t. Qi(ti) ≤ 1−
∑
j<i
Etj [Qj(tj)] ∀i ∈ I ∀ti ∈ Ti
Eti [Qi(ti)] ≤ 1−Qk(tk)−
∑
j<k,j 6=i
Etj [Qj(tj)] ∀k > i ∀tk ∈ Tk
(1− ki)χi ≤ Qi(ti) ≤ χi ∀ti ∈ Ti
Qi(ti) ≥ 0 ∀ti ∈ Ti
Now, it is clear that the optimal solution can be characterized by a threshold policy. All
high types will be assigned their upper limit till a constraint for the aggregate allocation






Etj [Qj(tj)]} if ti ≥ t̂i
(1− ki)χi otherwise
(5.14)




Etj [Qj(tj)] ∀i ∈ I.
Suppose otherwise. Pick χ′ = 1−
∑
j<i
Etj [Qj(tj)]. This makes the constraints less strict since
the upper bound remains the same, but the lower bound reduces. Thus, the allocation for
lower types can be reduced and the allocation of higher types can be increased while holding
the aggregate allocation steady. This is a contradiction since such a change will increase
total welfare.
In the limited penalties case the actual allocation will have a slightly different form.
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Corollary 5.3.3. For each agent i there exists a threshold t̂i, and constant βi, such that
the optimal actual allocation rule can be written as follows:
zi(ti) =
 βi if ti ≥ t̂i(1− ki)βi otherwise































The same machinery as before is used to further illustrate that extra constraints that restrict
the optimal solution in both off-line and on-line cases, do not have an effect on the prophet
inequality.
Theorem 5.3.4. The optimal on-line algorithm achieves at least 1/2 of the performance
of the optimal off-line algorithm on expectation.
Proof. Let Q∗i (ti) be the interim probability with which agent i with type ti receives the
item in the optimal off-line solution. Let χ∗i = sup
ti∈Ti
Q∗i (ti) as proposed in Mylovanov and














i for all i ∈ I. It is clear that the objective
function with respect to the reduced form for both problems is linear and coincides. Thus,
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Etj [Q∗j (tj)] ≤ 1: This holds since Q∗i (ti) ≤ 1
and the expected off-line allocation for the first i− 1 agents is also less than 1.
• (1−ki)χi ≤ Qi(t) ≤ χi: The constraint coincides with the off-line constraint. Nothing
changes by scaling both sides of the inequalities.
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CHAPTER 6 : Prophet Inequalities with Complex Constraints
In this chapter, an extension of the basic stopping problem is introduced, which involves
selecting a point in a polyhedron where the value of each coordinate must be chosen se-
quentially. The prescribed polyhedra can be described by a collection of inequalities, e.g.,
knapsack or polymatroid.
A version of this problem was proposed by Feldman et al. (2016). In that paper, there
is one unit of a divisible resource that is interpreted as a service level. Each agent can
be allocated a level of service in [0, 1]. For example, this could represent the duration an
agent’s advertisement is displayed. The draw ri denotes the marginal value of the agent
i for service. The goal is to allocate service levels so as to maximize the expected total
reward enjoyed. A polyhedral selection problem, where the constraint set is characterized
by a polymatroid, was examined by Dütting and Kleinberg (2015). A significant portion
of the existing literature has shown interest in a combinatorial setting, where additional
integrality restrictions are imposed on the coordinates. Such problems are called on-line
selection problems.
In the next section, a general version of the on-line polyhedral selection problem is intro-
duced. A few special cases of interest are described. I will emphasize the on-line fractional
knapsack selection problem and provide a possible application in computational sprinting.
Then, a reduced-form representation of it is proposed in order to derive a new prophet
inequality. Unfortunately, the technique cannot be generalized to an arbitrary set of con-
straints. Last, I argue that the prophet inequality derived for on-line matroid selection
problems in the integer and fractional cases might have an intriguing connection. It is
shown that the linear programming formulations for the simple settings of a uniform and
cardinal matroid carry through to the combinatorial setting. This establishes that the
possible prophet inequalities to derive in each case are the same. Previous results in the
literature observe ways to transform algorithms from one case to the other. To the best of
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my knowledge, this is the first formal relation.
6.1. On-line Polyhedral Selection
Let qi(r≤i) be the level of service offered to agent i ∈ I given the profile of rewards r≤i
was realized, where I = {1, . . . , n}. These are called ex-post allocation variables. The
agents arrive sequentially and the decision-maker decides at the spot for the level of service
awarded to each agent. For all i ∈ I, let
q(r) = [q1(r1), . . . , qi(r≤i), . . . , qn(r)].
To describe the set of feasible ex-post allocations let A be a non-negative m×n matrix and
b a m× 1 non-negative vector. Then, q is feasible if for all profiles of rewards r,
Aq(r) ≤ b.





akiqi(r≤i) ≤ bk ∀k ∀r
q(r) ≥ 0 ∀r
(PSLP)
Now a linear programming formulation for the prophet’s problem is given, i.e., the off-line
version. For reasons that will become clear later, notation similar to the above will be used.
In the prophet’s problem, the level of service offered to agent i is based on the entire profile
of rewards. Denote by wi(r), the ex-post level of service offered to agent i at reward profile
r. Let w(r) = [w1(r), . . . , wn(r)]. Here r−i denotes the profile (r1, . . . , ri−1, ri+1, . . . , rn).
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akiwi(r) ≤ bk ∀k ∀r
w ≥ 0 ∀r
(PPSLP)
Denote the optimal solution to the prophet’s problem by w∗.
Consider the interim allocation variables {Qi(ri)}i∈I,ri∈Ri defined as follows,
Qi(ri) = Er<j [qj(r≤j)].
A formulation of the on-line polyhedral selection problem in terms of the interim allocations
is called the reduced-form representation. Similarly, the interim allocation variables are
defined,
Wi(ri) = Er−i [wi(ri, r−i)].
An interim allocation Q is implementable if there exists an ex-post allocation q satisfying
the set of constraints (IMP[Q]), defined below.
n∑
i=1
akiqi(r≤i) ≤ bk ∀k ∀r
Er<i [qi(r≤i)] ≥ Qi(ri) ∀i ∈ I ∀ri
q(r) ≥ 0 ∀r
(IMP[Q])




Denote the optimal solution to the reduced-form representation of the on-line selection prob-
lem by Q∗. Denote the optimal solution to the reduced-form representation of the prophet’s
problem by W ∗.
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6.1.1. Normalization
In fact, the parameterization of the problem can be slightly changed. The LHS on each of
the constraints can be scaled by the RHS, such that all new right hand sides are equal to
one. The prophet’s feasible polytope can now be redefined as follows,
∑
i
akiwi(r) ≤ 1 ∀k ∀r
wi(r) ≥ 0 ∀r
Similarly, the implementation problem (IMP[Q]) can be rewritten as follows,
∑
i
akiqi(r≤i) ≤ 1 ∀k ∀r
Er<i [qi(r≤i)] ≥ Qi(ri) ∀i ∈ I ∀ri
q ≥ 0 ∀r
6.1.2. Examples
The on-line polyhedral selection problem describes a quite general setting with complex
constraints. Several special cases are worth noting, with the hope that their special structure
could lead to different types of results. I go through a few examples.
Example. The basic stopping problem described in Chapter 4 is a special case. A single
constraint is applied to the variables for each profile. The relevant constraints will be
∑
i
qi(r≤i) ≤ 1 ∀r. (6.1)
The relevant constraints will be
∑
i
wi(r) ≤ 1 ∀r. (6.2)
127
Note that here, in comparison to the basic stopping problem, integrality constraints on
the variables are not imposed. As we will see in the end of this chapter, this is without
loss of generality, since the optimal solution will be integer. Intuitively, a decision-maker
selects either the current reward or the future expected reward, i.e., fractional values are
not reward-maximizing.
Example. The on-line fractional knapsack selection problem, first introduced by Feldman
et al. (2016), relates to a knapsack with one unit of capacity and n items with weights
a1, . . . , an and one unit of supply. The knapsack constraint and items’ supply constraints
for the on-line problems follow:
∑
i
aiqi(r≤i) ≤ 1 ∀r
qi(r≤i) ≤ 1 ∀i ∀r≤i.
(6.3)
Similarly, the prophet’s problem can be summarized by a quite similar set of constraints,
∑
i
aiwi(r) ≤ 1 ∀r
wi(r) ≤ 1 ∀i ∀r.
(6.4)
Note that this settings subsumes another interesting setting where each item has the same
weight.
Example. The polymatroid setting involves polymatroid constraints. The relevant con-
straints for the on-line setting follow:
∑
i∈S
qi(r≤i) ≤ f(S) ∀S ∀r, (6.5)
where f is a submodular function. The prophet’s problem can be summarized by a similar
set of constraints, ∑
i∈S
wi(r) ≤ f(S) ∀S ∀r, (6.6)
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This is the setting examined by Dütting and Kleinberg (2015).
The literature contains some stylized applications of these selection problems, such as spa-
tially distributed markets or position auctions. Below, the first concrete application of the
on-line fractional knapsack selection problem, that I am aware of, is given.
Computational Sprinting. Recent chip microarchitecture developments make it possible
to expedite processes running in the processor. The technique is called sprinting, and it is
a class of mechanisms that provides a short but significant performance boost while tem-
porarily exceeding the thermal design point of the processors. Huang et al. (2019) propose a
software runtime that manages sprints by dynamically predicting utility and modeling ther-
mal headroom. The authors also compare their set of mechanisms experimentally against
an “oracular policy”, which matches the notion of a prophet in our setting.
Computational sprinting can be modeled as an on-line fractional knapsack selection prob-
lem. Each epoch consists of a large number of instructions and can be categorized accord-
ingly. When the computation reaches an epoch, the mechanism can predict the gains from
sprinting accurately. The mechanism has to decide the extent of increasing the temperature
beyond the thermal design point in each epoch. Apart from the thermal headroom available
in each period, there is a limit on the number of periods that the processor can perform
over the thermal design point. The intertemporal limitation on heat increase is modeled as
a knapsack constraint. An allocation for the fractional knapsack constraint could serve as
a guide to pace sprints to maximize long-run performance under thermal constraints.
6.2. A Prophet Inequality for the On-line Fractional Knapsack Selection Problem
In this section, I will leverage algorithm A to derive a new prophet inequality for the on-line
fractional knapsack selection problem. Algorithm A first computes the optimal prophet’s
interim allocations, scales them by a factor, and then constructs an on-line allocation that
supports the scaled interim allocations. Let W ∗ be the prophet’s interim allocation and α
the scaling factor. It will be shown that this strategy using a factor α = 12 is implementable,
providing a prophet inequality with an approximation guarantee of 12 . When the setting was
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first introduced, Feldman et al. (2016) derived a prophet inequality with an approximation
guarantee of 111.657 . Later, Duetting et al. (2017) described a new algorithm that outputs an
on-line allocation with precision ε and delivers a prophet inequality with an approximation
guarantee of 12+ε .
Lemma 6.2.1. Scaling the prophet’s optimal interim allocation W ∗ by a factor of 12 is
implementable.
Proof. The implementation problem can be stated as a linear feasibility problem as in
(IMP[Q]). Let (FP(i)) be the implementation problem with respect to 12W
∗




i . It is
shown inductively that given feasibility of (FP(i)) a solution to FP(i+1) can be constructed.




W ∗j (rj) ∀rj ∀j ≤ i∑
j≤i
ajqj(r≤j) ≤ 1 ∀r≤i
0 ≤ qj(r≤j) ≤ 1 ∀j ≤ i ∀r≤j
(FP(i))
A function is defined which can be interpreted as the maximum available allocation for
round i+ 1 after implementing the interim allocations 12W
∗




i . The function will be
parameterized by a constant α as a cap for the supply in round i + 1. The parameterized
function is given in (6.7).
hi(α) = max Er≤i [z(r≤i)]
s.t. Er<j [qj(r≤j)] ≥
1
2
W ∗j (rj) ∀rj ∀j ≤ i




ajqj(r≤j) ≤ 1 ∀r≤i
0 ≤ qj(r≤j) ≤ 1 ∀r≤j ∀j ≤ i
z(r≤i) ≥ 0 ∀r≤i
(6.7)
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Note that hi(1) produces a feasible solution for FP(i+1) if hi(1) ≥ 12W
∗
i+1(ri+1) for all ri+1.
Consider two separate cases for ai+1 ≥ 1 and ai+1 < 1. In the first case, the unit supply
constraint for period i + 1 is redundant, since the knapsack constraint is more restrictive
towards variables z. As a consequence, when it comes to the prophet’s allocationW ∗i+1(ri+1),
it is bounded above by 1ai+1 . Furthermore, for the optimal solution in (6.7) for α = 1, it







for all profiles r≤i. It readily follows that h(1) can be bounded from
below,

























i+1(ri+1) for all ri+1.
On the other hand, when ai+1 < 1, the knapsack constraint allows for larger z which
must be restricted by the unit supply. In this case, the prophet’s allocation W ∗i+1(ri+1) is
bounded above by 1. Consider an optimal solution (ẑ, q̂) to (6.7) for α = 1ai+1 . The supply
constraint (parameterized by α = 1ai+1 ) is redundant since it is less restrictive than the


























Set q = q̂ and z = ai+1ẑ. (z,q) is a feasible solution to (6.7) for α = 1, since z(r≤i) =
ai+1ẑ(r≤i) ≤ ai+1 1ai+1 = 1 for all profiles r≤i and all other constraints trivially continue to
hold. Furthermore, the objective function can be bounded below as follows,








By feasibility of (z,q), it follows that hi(1) is bounded from below by the solution’s objective,






i+1(ri+1) for all ri+1, which
completes the proof for this case too.
The prophet inequality for the fractional knapsack setting holds as a simple corollary of
Lemma 6.2.1.
Theorem 6.2.2. Let VA be the reward gained by A in the fractional knapsack selection





The applicability of algorithmA in a more general setting, as well as that of other algorithms
presented in Section 4.4, are left for future research. Furthermore, the task of understanding
prophet inequalities in more general polyhedral selection problems is left for further research.
6.3. Continuous vs Combinatorial Settings
On-line polyhedral selection problems with integrality constraints are referred to in the
literature as on-line selection problems. I revisit the basic stopping problem and cardinal
matroid selection. I point out that the linear programming formulations of the optimal
stopping rule and the prophet’s problem in a continuous domain coincide with the ones for
the combinatorial domain. As a consequence, the approximation factor driving the prophet
inequalities in these two domains must coincide. It is of interest and left for future research
to generalize the question for polymatroids, where the prophet’s problem is guaranteed to
follow the same pattern (Schrijver, 2003), i.e., the greedy algorithm optimizing a linear




First, a linear program for the fractional case is defined without using the interim variables.








qi(r≤i) ≤ 1 ∀r
qi(r≤i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∀r≤i
(LP )
There exists an optimal solution to (LP ) which is integral. To prove the statement an
integer optimal solution is constructed given an optimal solution q∗.
Theorem 6.3.1. There exists a solution q̄ to (LP ) which is integral, i.e., for all i and all
profiles r≤i, q̄i(r≤i) ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. A process that constructs an optimal intger solution given an optimal solution q∗
will be provided.
Start with each r1, step by step. Construct two solutions q
1, q2 as follows: For all profiles
starting with r1:
1. q11(r1) := 1 and q
1
i (r≤i) := 0 for all i ≥ 2 and r2, . . . , ri,





for all i ≥ 2 and r2, . . . , ri.
q1, q2 are both feasible. By construction, it follows q∗ = q∗1(r1)× q1 + (1− q∗(r1))× q2. By
linearity of expectations the above relation carries on to their values,
V ∗ = V (q∗) = q∗1(r1)× V (q1) + (1− q∗(r1))× V (q2).
This completes the proof because either q1 or q2 with value V ∗. The new solution will
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have a smaller number of non-integer values. By repeatedly applying the above process, an
integer solution with value V ∗ is created.
The above theorem reduces the prophet inequality discovery to the one for the fractional
problem. The optimal integer on-line solution is better than the optimal on-line fractional
solution, which is better than 12 of the optimal off-line fractional solution, which is better
than the optimal off-line integer solution.
Multi-Unit Supply
I first define the problem for the fractional case without using the interim variables. The








qi(r≤i) ≤ k ∀r
0 ≤ qi(r≤i) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I ∀r≤i
(MLP )
There exists an optimal solution to (MLP ) which is integral. In order to prove this, one
will be constructed given an optimal solution q∗.
Theorem 6.3.2. There exists a solution q̄ to (MLP ) which is integral, i.e. for all i and all
profiles r≤i, q̄i(r≤i) ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. The above procedure is slightly rearranged in order to construct q1, q2. Fix r1 such
that q1(r1) ∈ (0, 1). For all profiles r starting with r1 there exists minimum index i(r)
such that qi(r)(r≤i(r)) ∈ (0, 1), because in a non-generic optimal solution all cardinality
constraints are binding (otherwise for a profile that it is not true, moving backwards we
could find a variable to raise). Set






For all profiles starting with r1:
1. q11(r1) := q
∗





2. q21(r1) := q
∗
1(r1)− ε and for all r starting with r1, q2i(r)(r≤i(r)) = q
∗
i(r)(r≤i(r)) + ε.
q1, q2 are both feasible. By construction, it follows that q∗ = 12q
1 + 12q
2. By linearity of
expectations the above relation carries on on their values,







Since q∗ is optimal q1 and q2 must also be optimal. One of them, say for index k ∈ {1, 2},
will have at least one less non-integer value. Set q∗ := qk and repeat. We end up with an
integer solution with value V ∗.
The above integrality property has a straightforward consequence for the relation of prophet
inequalities in the continuous and combinatorial domains. It implies that the best approx-
imation factor achieved is the same for both domains. It is an open question whether the
integrality property holds for more general sets of constraints, like in the case of polymatroid
constraints. From an algorithmic perspective, such a characterization might be valuable for
devising an optimal and tractable selection rule for the matroid selection problem, whose
existence remains an open question. In more detail, it is of interest to understand whether
optimal interim allocations can be computed for the case of polymatroid constraints and
whether a tractable selection rule can be devised from them.
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